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Summary 
In 1980, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Military Services, in cooperation with the 
Department of Labor, sponsored a large-scale research project to assess the vocational aptitudes of 
American youth. A national probability sample of approximately 12,000 young men and women, 
selected from participants in the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of Youth Labor Force Behavior, was 
given the military’s enlistment and job placement test, the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery 
(ASVAB). This research endeavor, known as the “Profile of American Youth,” marked the first time a 
military qualification test, or any vocational aptitude test, had been given to a nationally representative 
sample. The Profile Study thus offered a rare opportunity to evaluate the cross-sectional character of 
military enlistees based on a national measure of vocational test performance. 
Screening for Service describes the results of a research effort that evolved from the Profile Study. Since 
the Profile Study sample was nationally representative, and it incorporated the scores of contemporary 
youth on a version of the ASVAB parallel to that currently used to screen military applicants, it was 
possible to estimate the numbers and proportions of American youth expected to qualify for military 
enlistment under existing standards. The military “participation rates” of American youth could also be 
calculated using enlistment eligibility rates of the general population in combination with information on 
enlistment behavior. 
The analysis of eligibility and participation rates in the all-volunteer military represents an effort to put 
the Profile Study results in an applied, operational context. This research provides the defense 
community with accurate information on the “quality” or “fitness” of American youth to serve in the 
military; it also shows, in statistical terms, the impact of aptitude standards on the employment 
opportunities of young men and women from varied backgrounds. In addition, the data on participation 
present a picture of the attractiveness of military service for minority youth over the past several years. 
Screening for Service is composed of four sections. Section 1 reviews briefly the history, purpose, and 
conceptual foundation of aptitude screening for enlistment. Section 2 traces military testing trends over 
the past several decades and attempts to uncover the relationship between applicant behavior, selected 
recruiting market conditions, and the average aptitude level of new recruits. The main body of research 
details the eligibility rates and enlistment experiences of American youth and appears in Section 3. In 
Section 4, the authors discuss the implications of eligibility and participation research for military testing 
and the use of appropriate entry criteria. 
The research was supported by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, 
Installations, and Logistics), under agreement with the Navy Personnel Research and Development 





In 1980, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Military Services, in 
cooperation with the Department of Labor, sponsored a large-scale research project 
to assess the vocational aptitudes of American youth. A national probability sample 
of approximately 12,000 young men and women, selected from participants in the 
National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of Youth Labor Force Behavior, was given 
the military’s enlistment and job placement test, the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). This research endeavor, known as the “Profile of 
American Youth,” marked the first time that a military qualification test—or any 
vocational aptitude test—had been given to a nationally representative sample. The 
“Profile Study” thus offers an opportunity to evaluate the “cross-sectional 
character” of military enlistees based on a national measure of vocational test 
performance.
This report describes the results of a research effort that evolved from the 
“Profile Study.” Since the “Profile Study” sample was nationally representative, 
and it incorporated the scores of contemporary youth on a version of the ASVAB 
parallel to that currently used to screen military applicants, it was possible to 
estimate the numbers and proportions of American youth who would be expected 
to qualify for military enlistment under existing standards. The military “participa 
tion rates” of American youth could also be computed using enlistment eligibility 
rates for the general population in combination with information on enlistment 
behavior.
The analysis of eligibility and participation rates in the all-volunteer military 
represents an effort to put the “Profile Study” results in an applied, operational 
context. This research provides the defense community with accurate information 
on the “quality” or “fitness” of American youth to serve in the military; it also 
displays, in statistical terms, the impact of aptitude standards on the employment 
opportunities of young men and women from varied backgrounds. In addition, the 
data on participation present a picture of the attractiveness of military service for 
minority youth over the past several years.
Screening fo r Service is intended for a general audience, though one which 
has a basic understanding of the standards of acceptance in the military and civilian 
working environments. This document can be used by technical personnel and 
policymakers alike, for it contains a wealth of information and data upon which to 
draw.
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The report is presented in four sections. Section 1 reviews briefly the history, 
purpose, and conceptual foundation of aptitude screening for enlistment. Section 2 
traces military testing trends over the past several decades and attempts to uncover 
the relationship between applicant behavior, selected recruiting market conditions, 
and the average aptitude level of new recruits. The main body of research details 
the eligibility rates and enlistment experiences of American youth and appears in 
Section 3. In Section 4, the authors discuss the implications of “eligibility” and 
“participation” research for military testing and the establishment of appropriate 
entry criteria.
Dr. Mark J. Eitelberg served as principal analyst and primary author of the 
report. Dr. Eitelberg was a Senior Scientist with HumRRO when the work was 
first undertaken, and is presently an Adjunct Professor in the Department of 
Administrative Sciences at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
Ms. Janice H. Laurence, a HumRRO Research Scientist, served as associate 
analyst; she gathered, compiled, documented, and reviewed most of the historical 
information that appears in Section 1 and was a major contributor to all phases of 
the research effort. Dr. Brian K. Waters, Manager of HumRRO’s Manpower 
Analysis Program, directed the research project, ensured the factual integrity of the 
data, and was a primary contributor to Section 2. Ms. Linda S. Perelman, a 
HumRRO Research Associate, participated in the data collection, and in the 
presentation of results from Sections 1 and 2. The report also benefits from the 
editorial recommendations of Dr. Barbara M. Means. Mr. Gus C. Lee provided 
valuable suggestions on the draft document. Ms. Emma E. King typed the 
manuscript and provided invaluable secretarial assistance throughout the project. 
Graphic and typesetting support were provided by Mrs. Alice H. Thompson and 
her staff in HumRRO’s Publication Support Group. Thanks are extended to Dr. H. 
Wallace Sinaiko of the Smithsonian Institution and Dr. Martin F. Wiskoff of the 
Navy Personnel Research and Development Center who reviewed the draft 
document and offered useful editorial and technical suggestions.
The authors express their appreciation to the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC), under the guidance of Mr. Kenneth C. Scheflen, Director, and Mr. 
Robert J. Brandewie, Deputy Director. Gratitude is extended especially to Ms. 
Helen T. Hagan of DMDC for analytical and programming support during the 
analysis of data from the “Profile of American Youth”; and to Mr. Leslie W. Willis 
for his help in retrieving information on the aptitude test scores of military 
applicants and recruits. In addition, the authors are grateful for the cooperation of 
the following individuals who assisted in the compilation of historical information 
on aptitude and education standards: Mr. Louis A. Ruberton, Headquarters,
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Department of the Army; Mr. Charles R. Hoshaw, Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations; Maj. Larry R. Jurica, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; and Lt. 
Colonel James E. Watson, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force.
A special note of appreciation is offered to Dr. W. S. Sellman of the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics) for his 
wise counsel and generous support during the course of the research.
The research contract was supported by the Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics) under Office of Naval 
Research Contract N00014-82-K-0637. The views, opinions, and findings 
presented in this report are solely those of the authors and should not be construed 
as an official position, policy, or decision of any Government department or 
agency, unless so designated by other official documentation.
This book is dedicated to the memory of Bernard D. Karpinos (1898-1984). 
Dr. Karpinos’ pioneer work within military manpower has benefitted not only 
these authors, but the entire Defense community.
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The “Profile of American Youth” was a landmark study for both the Armed 
Services and the general scientific and research community. In 1980, the Armed 
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) was administered to a nationwide 
probability sample of approximately 12,000 young men and women. The “Profile 
Study,” as it has come to be known, resulted from the cooperative efforts of the 
Departments of Defense and Labor, the Military Services, several independent 
agencies, and many individuals. The study was subjected to the most careful 
scrutiny of some of the nation’s leading experts in sample design, psychometrics and 
general statistics, educational and psychological testing, survey research, population 
demography, and public policy analysis. The ASVAB itself was thoroughly 
examined by independent scholars, and was found to equal or surpass the quality, 
fairness, and overall suitability of commercial tests used to measure aptitude and 
achievement.
The “Profile Study” was the result of many years of planning and diligent 
execution. It was a major research endeavor in its scope, objectives, and final 
product, as well as its value to military manpower policy and the social and 
behavioral sciences. The “Profile Study” marks the first time that a vocational 
aptitude battery has been given to a nationally representative sample. Up to this 
time, such research has not been possible because of the great difficulty in obtaining 
data on a nationwide scale and the prohibitive costs.
The idea for producing the present monograph was first conceived in early 
1981 during the initial analysis of results from the “Profile of American Youth.” 
Since the primary function of the ASVAB is “screening for service” and job 
placement in the military, an evaluation of population eligibility for enlistment and 
assignment appeared as a logical, early application of the new data base.
In the process of conducting the follow-up analyses of population eligibility for 
enlistment, it was necessary for the researchers to first delve into the modem history 
of applicant screening and to compile information from the military’s archives. It 
was during this preliminary research phase that the authors discovered a need for a 
single document that would bring together the historical records and recent statistics 
on personnel selection for military service.
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Screening for Service presents the results of a particular analysis of population 
eligibility and participation in the nation’s military. However, this monograph was 
additionally created to stand as a reference or source of historical information for 
those who may wish to pursue the study of enlistment standards and the tested 
abilities of persons examined for military service.
The monograph begins with a brief review of the modern history, purpose, 
and conceptual foundation of aptitude screening for enlistment. The evolution of 
current aptitude and education screens is examined and some general concepts and 
principles are defined. Finally, in Section 1, the effects of war and peace on military 
selection are explored and discussed.
Section 2 follows with an examination of recruiting outcomes under various 
sets of historical standards. This section presents a brief review of the characteristics 
of people who have been screened by the military during recent years. The test 
score trends of those who have taken military examinations are traced in an effort 
to gain a better understanding of the relationship between minimum standards and 
recruit “quality.” The discussion also attempts to explore the relative influence of 
standards, compared with environmental factors and other external conditions, on 
the qualitative character of new recruits.
Section 3 presents the background, methodology, and results of the analysis of 
population eligibility for military service, based on the “Profile Study” data and 
recent aptitude and education standards applied by each of the Armed Services. 
This section also presents the results of a related study of military participation. 
Using the enlistment eligibility rates for various segments of the general population 
in combination with information on enlistment behavior from the Defense 
Department’s manpower data files, it was possible to compute the military 
“participation rates” of the so-called “qualified and available” groups. This new 
statistic, available through the “Profile Study,” offers a striking picture of the 
attractiveness of military service for minority youth over the past several years.
In Section 4, the authors discuss the implications of “eligibility” and 
“participation” research for military testing and the establishment of appropriate 
entry criteria. Several varied, yet integrated issues are treated—including other 
considerations used in determining enlistment eligibility, problems related to the 
selection and classification of women and minorities, ability levels and the future 
needs of the military, the effects of using multiple aptitude standards, problems 
associated with the use of education standards, and the prospects for improvements 
in screening for service.
Several appendices are offered for those readers who wish to use the 
monograph as a technical resource for further research. Appendix A contains a
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description of the minimum aptitude and education standards employed by each of 
the Armed Services over the past several decades. This information was reviewed 
by the Services for accuracy, and it chronicles the flexible nature of entry standards 
during the post-World War II period. Appendix B presents historical statistics on 
the aptitude test scores of persons examined for military service, with data 
extending back to the early 1950s. Apendix C describes the geographical variables 
used in the analysis, and Appendix D provides a summary of population eligibility 
for the Navy and Marine Corps under their revised (1983) aptitude standards. In 
Appendix E, a brief supplemental study is presented that analyzes population 
eligibility for enlistment under various alternative or “simulated” sets of standards. 
Here, the reader can see the effects of either raising or lowering aptitude standards 
(under defined limits) on the eligibility rates of population subgroups.
Screening fo r  Service represents an early attempt to put the “Profile of 
American Youth” results in an applied, operational context. This research offers the 
defense community accurate information on the “quality” or “fitness” of American 
youth to serve in the military. In addition, the eligibility rates and participation rates 
reveal, in statistical terms, the powerful influence of aptitude standards on the 
employment and training opportunities of young men and women from varied 
backgrounds. This study holds importance for military manpower policymakers 
and social planners alike. This study also demonstrates the practical utility of a new 
data base that will hopefully improve our understanding of human potential, 




ENTRY STANDARDS IN THE MODERN MILITARY: 
A BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW
Minimum standards for acceptance into the American military are flexible 
gates that open and close in reaction to the shifting needs of national defense and 
manpower recruitment. Like finely engineered dams, constructed to regulate the 
flow of a river and form temporary reservoirs, the military’s entry standards are 
designed to take the best available men and women in the required quantities. 
Certain circumstances, such as a recruiting drought or a need for mass mobilization, 
typically necessitate less stringent physical standards, lower education and ability 
criteria, and more lenient eligibility requirements in other areas. Conversely, during 
periods of peace when the standing army is streamlined to function as a 
“caretaker,” or during periods of high unemployment when military “jobs” are 
relatively more attractive to the youthful workforce, the Armed Services are usually 
able to be more selective and the qualitative barriers to entry are strengthened.1
One reason for personnel screening by the Army during the period just prior 
to World War II was a reduction in the number of potential pensioners (that is, 
men who were unfit physically for active duty and who might claim Government 
compensation for a disability acquired while serving in the military). The 
fundamental purpose of entry screening, however, was the elimination of “bad 
risks” or men who could not meet the “severe demands of war,” and the selection 
of those who could be trained in the shortest possible time.2 The Army General 
Classification Test (AGCT) of World War II was thus described as a test of 
“general learning ability,” aimed at “reliably sorting new arrivals according to their 
ability to learn quickly the duties of a soldier” while “keeping at a minimum items 
greatly influenced by amount of schooling and by cultural inequalities.”3
'At the same time, standards are affected indirectly by the prevailing method of recruitment: in 
general, a military that depends largely on conscription has greater flexibility in how it decides to 
apply acceptance standards (assuming that draft deferments or exemptions do not severely reduce the 
size of the manpower reservoir).
2Eli Ginzberg et al., The Lost Divisions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 
30-31.
3Staff, Personnel Research Section (The Adjutant General’s Office), “The Army General 
Classification Test,” Psychological Bulletin 42 (December 1945), 760.
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The Military Services of the Second World War formally applied four screens 
to those who were designated by the Selective Service as eligible for induction: 
physical examination, aptitude testing, psychiatric evaluation, and administrative 
review (moral character and history of arrest).4 The specific criteria within the four 
categories were all subject to modification, depending on the state of the war effort 
and the military’s capacity to accept less capable performers. Indeed, as pointed out 
in Marginal Man and Military Service, expediency has periodically influenced the 
Armed Services to draw from “marginal manpower,” or those individuals who may 
not meet the desired minimum qualifications, but are still capable of serving in 
some (usually limited) position:
Experience in World W ar I, World W ar II, and to a less extent, Korea, 
demonstrated that when a shortage of manpower developed, those 
responsible for procurement and maintenance of a proper replacement 
stream for combat and combat support forces have turned to whatever 
resources might prove productive. Where existing standards left large 
numbers of physically and mentally limited men in the civilian population, 
standards were altered to obtain the numbers required. Even prison 
populations were combed.5
The World War II mobilization perhaps provides the best example of how 
entry standards can be shaped to cope with the particular circumstances and needs 
of the military. When the nation’s first peacetime draft law was enacted in 
September 1940, for instance, the only literacy screen for new draftees was the 
“ability to comprehend simple orders given in the English language.” Several 
months later—with about 66,000 illiterate inductees and many unanticipated 
training problems—the War Department standard was amended to prohibit the 
induction of those “who do not have the capacity of reading and writing the 
English language as prescribed for the fourth grade in grammar school.”6 The 
fourth-grade reading requirement, an operational criterion of “literacy,” was relaxed 
somewhat in August 1942, so that a small percentage of the illiterate pool could be 
inducted. By May 1943, over 100,000 illiterate men had been added to the Army’s 
rank and file. The following month, the policy on literacy was modified once again, 
and the minimum aptitude requirement was set at a “capacity above the lower
4See Ginzberg et al., The Lost Divisions, p. 33.
dep a rtm en t of the Army, Marginal Man and Military Service (Washington, D.C.: Department 
of the Army, December 1965), p. 31.
‘Ibid., pp. 59-60.
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three-fifths of Grade V,” the lowest aptitude category (a percentile score of about 
5.5) on the AGCT. By the end of September 1945, records showed that over
217,000 illiterate men (and another 82,000 scoring in AGCT Grade V) had been 
drafted for wartime duty.7
Needless to say, selection and classification procedures and methods have 
evolved considerably over the past forty years. Broad education and aptitude 
standards have given way to varying combinations of interrelated requirements— 
incorporating aptitude subtests and composites and diverse education credentials 
and, in some cases, a range of background characteristics—that have been identified 
as important correlates of “successful” service. Just as the changing demands of 
current military occupations and the rising levels of education have operated to 
modify and fragment aptitude criteria, advances in technology, shifting job 
requirements, and the generally improved health of the American people have 
resulted in some minor changes in medical or physical standards.8 Even in the area 
of “moral qualifications,” the Armed Services apply a number of different criteria 
for eligibility based on the particular type of arrest or violation, the severity of the 
offense, and the frequency of conviction.9
It is probably true that the flexibility of standards—or the ability of the Armed 
Services to stretch or contract certain entry criteria to the practical limits—has been 
constrained since the advent of all-volunteer recruitment in 1973. In theory, each of 
the Armed Services is permitted to establish its own entry standards based on its 
own manpower supply and demand considerations. However, assorted critics of the 
all-volunteer military have been constantly on the prowl for evidence to prove that 
the Armed Services are incapable of attracting enough “quality” personnel without 
conscription. The “volunteer experiment” is dissected and held under the 
microscopic glass of critics, legislators, the popular media, and other public watch 
dogs with each passing year and periodic release of recruiting statistics. Congress 
has reacted recurrently to indications of declining quality by imposing its own
7Ibid., pp. 74-75, 236.
8Gus C. Lee, Review o f  Enlisted Medical Standards fo r  Entry Into Military Service, FR-MPAD- 
82-3, (Alexandria, VA: HumRRO, June 1982.)
’As observed in Marginal Man: “The history of admission of the morally marginal individual 
into the Army follows fairly closely the manpower demands made upon the Army at any one period. 
In times of less stress, particularly during the absence of war, policies remained exclusive. When 
emergency manpower measures became necessary, searches even extended to convicts who could be 
parolled from penal institutions for induction into the military service.” See ibid., p. 211, and the 
entire chapter on “The Morally Marginal Soldier” (pp. 211-219) for a summary of the early history 
and policies concerning moral standards.
9
minimum standards or guidelines for screening applicants. In the fiscal year (FY) 
1981 Defense Authorization Act, for example, Congress responded to revelations 
that the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) had been misnormed since 1976 
(and, as a consequence, many applicants in the below-average aptitude range were 
inadvertently permitted to enlist) by placing a ceiling on the annual proportion of 
recruits without high school diplomas and with below-average test scores.10
The results of military entrance examinations, as expressed in terms of 
acceptances or rejections, are often grouped together within a particular historical 
context and then compared over time and national circumstance (such as war or 
peace, strength build-up or reduction). Table 1, which shows the military service 
“rejection rates” for six distinct periods beginning with World War I, exemplifies 
this type of comparison. The data, when presented in this manner, are intended to 
point out movements in policy or the shifting importance placed on different 
categories of screening criteria from one era to the next. One may conclude from 
Table 1, for instance, that eligibility for military service was determined more by 
tests of brawn than brains throughout the earlier times of limited technology. This 
conclusion is drawn from both the comparative data and the observation that 
minimum education and aptitude standards were all but nonexistent until forty 
years ago (and very lenient for some time thereafter).
There are limits, however, on the extent to which comparative statistics 
regarding rejections or acceptances may be used, especially when the data are 
spread out over long periods of time. The rejection rates displayed in Table 1, for 
example, generally do not allow the identification of specific trends for at least four 
major reasons:
(1) The characteristics of populations examined for military service may be 
quite disparate from one era to another. Policies during World Wars I and 
II placed quota restrictions on the proportion of blacks permitted to enter 
the military. Similar quotas on female recruitment were applied in 
differing magnitude during each of the periods depicted. In addition, 
Selective Service deferments and exemptions, as well as local draft board
10The standards required that all Services (combined) enlist no more than 25 percent of new 
recruits in AFQT Category IV (percentile score range of 10 through 30) during FY 1981. In FY 
1982, each Service (separately) was allowed to have no more than 25 percent of its new recruits in 
AFQT Category IV; and the Category IV quota was lowered to 20 percent of annual intake during 
FY 1983 and succeeding years. Despite such Congressional limitations, there have been few, if any, 
periods in recent history when the nation’s legislators were altogether pleased with the military’s 
standards and the quality of new recruits.
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Table 1
Military Service Rejection Rates During Selected Periods











AH Votuntaar Fore a
Raaaon for War I* 
1914-18
War llD 




Standards 0.9 4.0 16.6 17.1 9.5 13.3 25.6 22.4 32.4 21.9 13.9
Medical or 
Physical 
Disqualification 15.1 24.7 14.4 26.5 33.4 11.5 9.4 12.0 9.9 9.6 10.7
Other Deficiency 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.9 1.5 0.1 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 3.0
All Reasons 16.4 29.2 31.8 45.5 44.4 24.9 35.8 35.0 42.9 32.1 27.6
Number of 
Persons Examined 
(in thousands) 5,000 18,000 3,500 1,348 4,309 414 609 769 835 786 736
Source: Statistics on W orld  W ars l and II were extracted from  Eli G inzberg et al . The Lost D ivisions  (New York: Colum bia University 
Press, pp 142-43 Korean Conflic t data are from  Bernard D K arpinos "F itness of Am erican Youth fo r M ilita ry  S ervice." M ilbank  
M em oria l Fund Q uarterly 38 (July i960): 220 Data on the peacetim e draft period and Vietnam C onflic t are from  Sum mary o f Registrant 
Exam ination for Induction (RCS M E D -66-O ffice  o f the Surgeon General). Department o f the Army. FYs 1959-62 and 1968-1972. Data for 
1973 are  from  Bernard D Karpinos, A pp lican ts  for E nlistm ent: Results o f E xam ination fo r M ilita ry  Service (FYs 1972 a nd  1973). S R-ED- 
75-5 (A lexandria. VA: HumRRO. A pril 1975). p 5; all other statistics for the A ll-V o lunteer Force were derived from  data p rovided by the 
Defense M anpower Data Center
aW orld  W ar I population inc ludes prim arily men aged 19-36 m 1918 Persons exam ined are com prised of all men inducted, enlisted, 
rejected, or deferred as m ora lly unfit
bW orld  W ar II population inc ludes men aged 18-37 as of 1 August 1945.
°K orean  C onflic t population  inc ludes men w ho underw ent a p re induc tion  exam ination for the first tim e during July 1950 through 
Ju ly  1953 The data do not accoun t for enlistm ents or o ther m anpow er procurem ent apart from  inductions. The aptitude test failure 
ca tegory includes some persons who were also m edically d isqualified
^Peacetim e draft population  inc ludes men w ho underw ent a p re induc tion  exam ination for the first tim e during  July 1959 through 
June 1962 The data do not account for vo luntary enlistm ents The aptitude test fa ilu re  category inc ludes some men who were also 
m edically d isqualified
eVietnam c o n flic t population  inc ludes men w ho underw ent a p re induction  exam ination for the firs t tim e during  July 1968 through 
June 1972 The data do not accoun t for vo luntary enlistm ents The aptitude test fa ilu re  category inc ludes som e men who were also 
m edically d isqualified
practices, operated to modify the demographic characteristics (e.g., 
socioeconomic status, race, age) of the segment of the population required 
to take the preinduction examination. Different methods of recruitment 
also have affected the population of examinees: in the all-volunteer 
situation, for instance, self-selection will usually create a more homo 
geneous group of applicants than the more randomized mechanism of a 
Selective Service draft (assuming there is equal liability of service for the 
general population).
n
(2) Military manpower needs may vary markedly across time with con 
comitant effects on recruit quality. During mobilization for expansive 
war—or any situation where the demand for manpower strains the limits 
of population supply—the Armed Services are usually compelled to trade 
some quality for quantity. The size of the recruiting (or strength) 
objectives, combined with the manner of recruitment and definition of the 
eligible population, have a powerful influence on the requirements that are 
established for filling the ranks. And the size of the recruiting objectives 
for the periods shown in Table 1 are often quite dissimilar: in June 1945, 
there were almost eleven million enlisted personnel on active duty; one 
year later, military strength stood at less than three million; today, there 
are fewer than two million men and women in the active duty enlisted 
force.
(3) The size of the traditional, “age eligible” manpower pool (18-23 years 
old) has fluctuated considerably over the seventy years portrayed in Table
1. Other population changes, such as an increase in the median level of 
education, have also affected the size of the manpower pool deemed 
eligible for military service during a given era. In the case of education, an 
entry standard applied in 1960 may be relatively less stringent than a 
requirement applied during 1980—but, because of an enlargement in the 
size of the age-eligible population and a rise in the average level of 
education, the higher standard of 1980 may actually result in a larger pool 
of eligible applicants. If a similar education requirement were applied in 
both 1960 and 1980, the rejection rate would probably be higher in 1960 
because the median level of education was lower at that time. Never 
theless, the number of individuals in the eligible pool would probably be 
larger in 1980 than in 1960, regardless of the quality restrictions used, 
merely because of the gross differences in population size. For example, 
the complete elimination of all aptitude and education requirements in 
1960 would have resulted in an eligible pool of about 14 million men and 
women (18-23 years old); in 1980, if eligibility were limited to high 
school graduates only with aptitude test scores above the 20th percentile, 
it is estimated that approximately 15 million men and women in the same 
age category would have qualified for military service.
(4) Different policies and procedures may be used during separate periods 
concerning the categorization of disqualified examinees, and it is not clear 
that the sequence of the several examinations is consistent over time. For
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instance, at present, aptitude testing normally precedes physical examina 
tion and, hence, individuals who fail both screens are recorded as 
disqualified on the basis of their performance on the aptitude test. In 
previous eras, physical (or medical) screening was often conducted prior 
to aptitude testing. Thus, the order in which the examinations are 
conducted and the way in which the results are recorded may influence 
the historical statistics and limit the comparison of data from different 
recruiting years.
Table 1 serves the purpose of illustrating why certain comparisons of 
enlistment screening results should not be made over time—unless, of course, one 
also considers population demography, the various recruiting or induction policies, 
and the particular screens in effect during the separate periods being studied. A 
rigorous analysis of historical data is beyond the scope of this effort. Still, an 
evaluation of historical records—along with an understanding of the changing 
nature of warfare and military jobs—suggests that the primary focus of enlistment 
screening has gradually shifted from physical/medical criteria to measures of 
aptitude and education. Advances in science and technology have transformed the 
structure and function of the military and added an ever-expanding need for 
persons with mental as well as physical prowess. During World War II, the average 
footslogger could probably get through training if he could scale a wall, lug a 
fifty-pound pack, shoot straight, keep his nose clean, and salute at the proper 
moment. The “grunts” of the 1980s still have to be physically fit and morally 
straight, but they may also be called upon to operate sophisticated weaponry and 
perform duties that demand comparatively greater skill in mechanical com 
prehension, arithmetic reasoning, problem solving, and verbal fluency.
The statistics on military rejection rates may also reflect the fact that the nation 
as a whole is in better physical condition than it was a half-century ago11—but, 
even though the median level of education has increased, there is no evidence that 
the intellectual ability of the general populace has evolved to any higher stage. 
Indeed, median scores on standardized aptitude and achievement tests dropped 
steadily from the mid-1960s through 1981;12 and the implication is that average 
ability (as measured by the tests) of the nation’s younger generations has likewise 
been in descent.
"United States Department of Health and Human Services, Health, United States 1980, DHHS 
Publication No. (PHS)81-1232. (Hyattsville, MD: United States Department of Health and Human 
Services, December 1980), pp. 137, 271.
"Brian K. Waters, The Test Score Decline: A  Review and Annotated Bibliography, Technical 
Memorandum 81-2. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, August 1981).
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THE EVOLUTION OF CURRENT APTITUDE AND 
EDUCATION SCREENS
Concise historical treatments of the military’s aptitude and education screens 
are available in a number of official Armed Service and Defense Department 
documents, textbooks on aptitude testing, and technical research reports.13
Aptitude Screening
The American military was a pioneer in the field of aptitude testing during 
World War I. In 1917 and 1918, the Army Alpha and Army Beta tests were 
developed so that (1) military commanders could have some measure of the ability 
of their men, and (2) personnel managers could have some objective means for 
assigning the new recruits. The Army Alpha test was a verbal, group-administered 
test used principally by the Army for selection and placement. The test consisted of 
eight subtests—including verbal ability, numerical ability, ability to follow 
directions, and information—and served as a prototype for several subsequent 
group-administered intelligence tests. The Army Beta test was a non-verbal, group- 
administered counterpart to the Army Alpha test. It was used to evaluate the 
aptitude of illiterate, unschooled, or non-English-speaking draftees. The Army Beta 
test is recognized as one of the first important non-language paper-and-pencil tests. 
(Some of its items still appear in present-day intelligence tests.)
As observed in The Lost Divisions, the education screens of World War II 
were designed to “select individuals for military service whose intellectual capacity 
was sufficient to enable them to adjust to the Army, absorb military training, and
13The following represent a sample of available sources:
ASVAB Working Group, History o f  the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) 1974- 
1980, A Report to the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, 
and Logistics) (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve 
Affairs, and Logistics] March 1980).
Department of the Army, Marginal Man and Military Service (Washington, D.C.: Department of the 
Army, December 1965).
Arthur R. Jensen, Bias in Mental Testing (New York: The Free Press, 1980).
Kwan H. Kim, et al., Research o f  the Proportion o f  the Total Youth Population Which is Physically 
and Mentally Unfit fo r  Military Service, NOSC-7229-KK/M S/RS (Bethesda, MD: Mathtech, Inc., 
December 1978).
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thereafter perform effectively.” The tests used during the course of the war varied, 
but they were all “geared to distinguish those who could read, write, and do sums 
at a fourth-grade level from those who could not.” Special tests were also used for 
illiterates to determine whether they could reach the fourth-grade standard with 
twelve weeks of special instruction.14
The Army General Classification Test (AGCT) of World War II largely 
replaced the tests of World War I. The AGCT was described as a test of “general 
learning ability” and was intended to be used in basically the same manner as the 
Army Alpha (i.e., an aid in assigning new recruits to military jobs). The so-called 
“rapid learners” (those achieving a standard score of 130 or above) were ranked at 
the top in Army Grade I: the slowest learners (those with a standard score of 69 or 
below) were placed in Grade V.15
The AGCT was standardized in September of 1940 on white male military 
personnel and civilian Conservation Corps enrollees between the ages of 20 and 29. 
To ensure that this sample was representative of the civilian manpower pool; age, 
education, and geographic region distributions of the general population were 
estimated from the 1930 census.16
After the conclusion of World War II, the Military Services developed their 
own separate aptitude tests for selection. As Karpinos observes: “Though different 
in structure, primarily with respect to cut-off scores, the tests were essentially the 
same with respect to content areas, relying on the time-honored items of 
vocabulary, arithmetic, and spatial relationships.”17
In 1948, the Military Services convened a working group for the purpose of 
developing a uniform aptitude test that could be used for enlisted selection and 
classification by all components. The following four points were established as the 
basic requirements of the test:
1. The test should represent a “global” measure of ability.
2. The test should contain items in vocabulary, arithmetic reasoning, and 
spatial relations.
“ Ginzberg et al., The Lost Divisions, p. 151.
15After 15 July 1942, Army Grade V was narrowed by extending the limits of Grade IV an 
additional half standard deviation downward (from standard score 70-89 to 60-89). The standard 
score limits for Grade V were thus changed from 0-69 to 0-59. Although this change had no effect 
upon the distribution of scores, it did alter the grade distribution considerably.
16Staff, Personnel Research Section, “The Army General Classification Test,” p. 761.
’’Bernard D. Karpinos, Male Chargeable Accessions: Evaluation by Mental Categories (1953- 
1973), SR-ED-75-18 (Alexandria, VA: HumRRO, January 1977), p. V.
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3. The test should minimize the importance of speed so that slow performers 
would not be penalized.
4. The test should minimize the difficulty of verbal instruction relating to test 
items.18
Through the combined efforts of the Military Services, the Armed Forces 
Qualification Test (AFQT) was developed and introduced operationally in July 
1950, in conjunction with the reinstitution of the Selective Service draft.19 The new 
test was modeled after the AGCT and statistically linked with its predecessor in the 
following manner:
1. In 1949, the AGCT was administered to representative samples of groups 
of youths (voluntary applicants) at various recruiting stations throughout 
the nation.
2. A subsample was then selected from the representative groups with a score 
distribution that corresponded to the World War II “mobilization 
distribution” used in standardizing the AGCT.
3. The matched subsample was subsequently tested with the new AFQT.
4. Finally, the AGCT and AFQT distributions were equated (using an 
equipercentile method) so that AFQT scores would relate to the World 
War II mobilization population (the presumed pool of civilians available 
to serve in the military).20 A given AFQT percentile score therefore 
describes aptitude level relative to the 1944 mobilization population rather 
than to a current youth population.
Unlike the AGCT and the aptitude tests of World War I, the AFQT was 
specifically designed to be used as a screening device. Thus, the AFQT was 
established for the purpose of both (a) measuring the “examinee’s general mental 
ability to absorb military training within a reasonable length of time, so as to 
eliminate those who do not possess such ability”; and (b) providing “a uniform
18Bernard D. Karpinos, “The Mental Qualification of American Youths for Military Service and 
Its Relationship to Educational Attainment,” in Proceedings, The American Statistical Association, 
1966, p. 96. (reprint)
19The 1950 Selective Service Act reestablished military conscription after a brief period of all 
volunteer recruitment that began in January 1949.
“ Bernard D. Karpinos, “The Mental Qualification of American Youths for Military Service and 
Its Relationship to Educational Attainment,” in Proceedings, The American Statistical Association, 
1966, p. 96. (reprint)
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measure of the examinee’s potential general usefulness in the service, if qualified on 
the tests.”21
Since its introduction in 1950, the AFQT has undergone several modifications 
in both its character and usage. For example, the original version (as noted) 
included items to test verbal skills, arithmetic reasoning, and spatial relations; a tool 
functions subtest was added in 1953 and then dropped in 1973; and, since 1980, 
the AFQT no longer includes spatial relations, but places increased emphasis on 
verbal and quantitative items. Further, the number of items comprising the AFQT 
has varied over time, and scoring procedures and the ordering of items have 
changed.
In the course of the past thirty years, the Military Services have also used a 
variety of other aptitude screening tests for the supplementary evaluation of 
applicants and draftees. The Army Classification Battery (ACB) and a subsequent, 
shorter version, the Army Qualification Battery (AQB), were used from the late 
1950s to early 1970s by all Services except the Air Force. The Air Force, in the 
late 1950s, introduced the Airman Qualification Examination (AQE) as an 
enlistment screening device. The Navy has used the Applicant Qualification Test 
(AQT), the Short Basic Test Battery (SBTB), and the Basic Test Battery (BTB) for 
the same purpose. All of the Services have also used and continue to use the 
Enlistment Screening Test (EST), an abbreviated AFQT, as needed, for preliminary 
screening at recruiting stations (prior to formal examination). In addition, 
alternative tests have been used for a “special aptitude testing” of female applicants. 
The Armed Forces Women’s Selection Test (AFWST), for example, was 
administered to female applicants in lieu of the AFQT from 1956 to 1974.
Each Service was permitted to develop conversion tables from its own test 
battery as a basis for estimating an individual’s AFQT score from 1973-1975. In 
1974, the Department of Defense decided that all of the Armed Services should use 
a single test battery both for screening enlistees and for assigning them to military 
occupations. By combining selection and classification testing, the testing process 
was made much more expedient. It enabled the Services to improve the matching 
of applicants with available job positions, and allowed job guarantees for those 
qualified. The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) was selected 
for this purpose since (a) it was already being used in the Department of Defense 
High School Testing Program, and (b) at the time, the Air Force and the Marine 
Corps were administering a parallel form of the ASVAB in their own operational 
testing programs. A revised form of the ASVAB was installed as the DoD-wide 
aptitude test of enlistment eligibility on January 1, 1976.
21Ibid., p. 96. See also J.E. Uhlaner and D.J. Bolanovich, Development o f  the Armed Forces 
Qualification Test and Predecessor Army Screening Tests, 1946-1950, PRS Report 976 (Washington, 
D.C.: Personnel Research Section, Department of the Army, 7 November 1952).
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Education Screening
Minimum aptitude standards that differed according to educational attainment 
were first introduced on a trial basis by the Air Force in June 1950. High school 
dropouts were required to have a higher minimum AFQT score than their 
counterparts who finished high school. In November of the same year, the Air 
Force discontinued formal use of a separate education requirement and returned to 
a minimum aptitude score standard for all applicants. Ten years later, in 
consideration of research showing a substantially greater rate of first-term attrition 
among men who failed to complete high school, the Air Force reintroduced the 
education differential: high school graduates were required to score no lower than 
26 on the AFQT; nongraduates were required to have an AFQT score of at least 
31.22
The Army started to combine education and aptitude criteria in 1962: high 
school graduates with an AFQT score of at least 31 were “fully qualified”; 
graduates who scored between 21 and 30 could qualify if they had standard scores 
(mean of 100 and standard deviation of 20) of 90 or higher in three AQB aptitude 
areas; and nongraduates were required to have AFQT scores of 31 or greater. 
Education differentials based on high school graduation were likewise established as 
entry standards for the Marine Corps and the Navy in 1965. Varying aptitude 
standards continue to be linked with high school graduation status in all Services. 
In the Army, Navy, and Air Force, separate aptitude criteria (higher than graduates, 
but lower than nongraduates) have also been established for applicants with 
General Educational Development (GED) certificates of high school equivalency.
The formal aptitude and education standards (for male applicants without 
prior service) applied by the military appear in Appendix A, arranged by Service 
over the following periods: Army, 1946 to present; Navy, 1953 to present; Marine 
Corps, 1953 to present; Air Force, 1946 to present; and general military induction, 
1940 to 1973. The points at which each Service introduced different aptitude 
standards based on education, age, and length-of-enlistment (for the Army) are 
highlighted.
“ See Eli S. Flyer, Factors Relating to Discharge fo r  Unsuitability Among 1956 Airman 
Accessions to the A ir  Force, WADC-TN-59-201 (Lackland AFB, TX: Personnel Laboratory, Wright 
Air Development Center, December 1959).
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SOME GENERAL CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES
The fundamental objectives of military “quality” standards are summarized 
in a recent Department of Defense report to Congress:
Proper enlistment screening and job placement are prerequisites for 
efficiencies in training, retention of skilled personnel, and mission per 
formance. Any deficiencies in the selection and classification system lead to 
increased training times and cost, dissatisfied personnel with concomitant 
decreases in morale, productivity, and retention, and critical shortages of 
skills caused by failure to achieve optimal assignment of available 
manpower into the various occupations.25
The military’s task in screening potential recruits is complicated by the fact 
that the available manpower pool is composed predominantly of young men and 
women who have never held a “permanent,” full-time job. The median age of new 
recruits each year is just over 19 years, and most of the individuals who are 
screened for enlistment are recent high school graduates or dropouts. In civilian 
employment selection, past job performance and specialized postsecondary training 
are important criteria in evaluating applicants. But military applicants, for the most 
part, do not have job histories of any length, and the Services must depend mainly 
on indicators of potential performance such as relevant aptitudes, level of education, 
background characteristics, attitudes and interests, personal interviews, and evalua 
tions or recommendations from various sources.24
The current aptitude test used for screening applicants (ASVAB) is admin 
istered yearly to nearly two million applicants and high school students, making it 
the largest-volume employment test in the United States. With the exception of 
school-level, state-administered proficiency examinations, only the Scholastic 
Aptitude Test (SAT) and the American College Testing Program (ACT), which 
account for virtually all undergraduate college admissions testing, even approach 
the annual volume of ASVAB tests.25
The ASVAB is also used by the Military Services in assigning new recruits to 
jobs and placing them in the appropriate skill-training courses. Because the military
23Department of Defense, Department o f  Defense Efforts to Develop Quality Standards for  
Enlistment, A Report to the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services (Washington, D.C.: 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], December 
1981), p. 5.
24See Ibid., p. 7.
^Approximately 1.5 million young men and women take the SAT at least once each year, and 
just under 1 million take the ACT. Many college-bound high school students take both tests. See 
Rodney Skager, “On the Use and Importance of Tests of Ability in Admission to Postsecondary 
Education,” Ability Testing: Uses, Consequences, and Controversies, Part II, edited by A.L. Wigdor 
and W.R. Gamer (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1982), pp. 286-314.
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encompasses a wide range of occupations, the ASVAB consists of ten subtests that 
measure a variety of abilities.26 Four of the ASVAB subtests—Word Knowledge, 
Paragraph Comprehension, Arithmetic Reasoning, and Numerical Operations—are 
currently combined to produce the AFQT score. The four Services use various 
combinations of ASVAB subtest scores to develop aptitude composites (e.g., 
mechanical, clerical, general-technical) for assigning new recruits to specific training 
courses.
For reporting purposes, scores on the AFQT traditionally have been grouped 
into five broad AFQT categories (formerly called “mental categories”). Persons 
who score in Categories I and II tend to be above average in trainability; those in 
Category III, average; those in Category IV, below average; and those in Category 
V, markedly below average (and typically not eligible for enlistment). The range of 
percentile scores for the AFQT categories and the percentage of the “World War II 
reference population” with scores in each category are as follows:
Table 2
Armed Forces Qualification Test Category Ranges and 






World War II Reference 
Population Distribution* 
(Percent)
1 9 3 -1 0 0 8
II 6 5 -9 2 28
III 31 -64 34
IV 1 0 -30 21
V 1-9 9
100
SOURCE: Department of Defense. 1982.
*The "W orld War II reference population” approximates the aptitude score distribution of males 
on active duty (including 12 million officers and enlisted personnel) as of 31 December 1944.
“ The ten subtests appearing in the 1983 versions (Forms 8, 9, and 10) are Arithmetic 
Reasoning, Numerical Operations, Paragraph Comprehension, Word Knowledge, Coding Speed, 
General Science, Mathematics Knowledge, Electronics Information, Mechanical Comprehension, and 
Automotive-Shop Information.
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In addition to assessing recruit quality via AFQT categories, educational level 
is also used to indicate quality—albeit on a different dimension. As noted, high 
school graduation status has been used by the Military Services in combination 
with aptitude test standards for over twenty years. High school graduation is not 
viewed in this context as evidence of an individual’s intellectual capacity, nor is it 
perceived as a surrogate measure of aptitude. The AFQT is used to measure 
aptitudes. Education level evolved as a screening tool mainly because of its 
recognized value in predicting a new recruit’s chances for “adapting to military 
life.” The personal attributes that allow or encourage certain teenagers to follow 
through and finish high school—whether maturity, motivation, ambition, strength 
of character, determination or persistence, or, as some contend, the ability to 
tolerate boredom and routine—apparently help to make them more successful 
members of the nation’s military.
The Armed Services thus place a high premium on completion of high school, 
since “possession of a high school diploma is the best single measure of a person’s 
potential for adapting to life in the military.”27 Male enlistees who have not 
completed high school (at time of entry), for example, are about twice as likely as 
are high school graduates to leave the military before finishing their full first-term of 
active duty. In addition, non-high school graduates characteristically experience 
more disciplinary, administrative, and retraining actions.28 Consequently, “the active 
force recruiting programs have concentrated on enlisting high school diploma 
graduates” through the use of recruiting quotas, educational benefits and enlistment 
bonuses (in specific occupational categories), and other special incentives;29 and 
“the Services compensate for the high attrition rates of high school non-graduates 
by requiring that they achieve higher test scores to qualify for enlistment.”30
It should be observed at this point that the minimum education and aptitude 
standards established by the Armed Services each year represent the formal limits
27Department of Defense, America’s Volunteers (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], December 1978), p. 30.
21 See Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Quality Requirements, Report to the 
Committee on Armed Services of the U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], January 1974); and General 
Accounting Office, Problems Resulting From Management Practices in Recruiting Training and 
Using Non-High School Graduates and Mental Category TV Personnel, FPCD-76-24 (Washington, 
D.C.: General Accounting Office, 12 January 1976).
29Department of Defense, America’s Volunteers, p. 30.
“ Department of Defense, Efforts to Develop Quality Standards, p.2.
21
(or absolute “floor”) used in determining applicant eligibility. As a rule, informal 
limits can be raised at any time, however, to reduce further the pool of eligible 
applicants and focus recruiting efforts on those with higher test scores and special 
abilities. During an especially good recruiting year, for example, the Services may 
find that the number of above-average applicants is large enough to warrant the 
establishment of “tighter” eligibility standards. The administrative workload can 
thus be reduced by limiting enlistment eligibility to, say, only high school graduates 
or only those who are able to score above the 30th percentile on the AFQT.
Consequently, the formal minimum standards instituted by the Armed 
Services during any particular period may not be a true reflection of the actual 
“operational standards” used for determining who gets in and who stays out. The 
minimum “cutting score” on the military’s enlistment test may be adjusted up or 
down (but not below the formal minimum requirements) in response to periodic 
changes in manpower retention and the recruiting market. These temporary 
modifications are intended to increase recruiting efficiency by regulating the flow of 
applicants and skimming only the cream of the crop of otherwise qualified recruits. 
The impermanence and changeable nature of operational criteria have usually 
functioned to keep them from general public view.
“Cutting scores” are established on the basis of three major factors: (1) the 
manpower quantity needs of the Armed Services; (2) the manpower quality needs 
of the Armed Services; and (3) determination of the status of the recruiting market 
and the ability of the Armed Services to draw from the available supply of qualified 
youth. In addition, “cutting scores” may be influenced directly by the actions of 
Congress. In the past, for instance, Congress has enacted minimum eligibility 
requirements on entrance test scores (e.g., no enlistees or draftees with scores below 
the 10th percentile) and restrictions on the proportion of below-average recruits 
during a given year (e.g., no more than 25 percent of all new enlistees with scores 
between the 9th and 31st percentiles).
External factors (such as manpower supply) and organizational needs (such as 
manpower demand) largely determine Department of Defense policies and the 
minimum standards established by the Armed Services. Recruiting outcomes and 
reenlistments are then monitored closely to ascertain whether the operational 
standards should be modified in some manner. Numerical and quality needs are 
obviously affected by the success or failure of previous recruiting efforts, as well as 
ongoing programs to retain capable personnel. Congressional actions (such as 
changes in budget levels or the imposition of “quality” restrictions and quotas) are 
likewise influenced by recruiting results and manpower retention from one year to 
the next.
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A simplified model showing the interaction of the principal factors (policy, 
standards, and outcomes) is presented below (Figure 1). It should be noted that the 
various determinants of Congressional action and the perceived needs of the 
military are not enumerated here. A complex arrangement of economic, social, 
political, and organizational factors, both in the domestic and international domain,
MANPOW ER D E T E R M IN A N T S
External )  Defense










Figure 1. Simplified Model of the Interaction Between 
Manpower Determinants, Military Policy, 
Selection Standards, and Recruiting Outcomes
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may be said to determine the size and content of the nation’s Armed Forces. A 
complete treatment of these factors and their relative influence on enlistment 
standards is beyond the scope of this volume. However, one major aspect of the 
environment—that is, movement between states of war and peace and the 
concomitant effects on enlistment eligibility—is examined more closely to illustrate 
the relationship between external factors, defense requirements, and military 
selection criteria.
WAR AND PEACE: EFFECTS ON MILITARY 
SELECTION CRITERIA, 1940-1973
Wartime mobilization typically gives priority to abundant manpower quantity 
over manpower quality; the old adage of conventional war is that strength lies in 
numbers. So, with each mobilization for war or other national emergency, 
voluntary enlistment and induction standards usually have been lowered.31 When 
the minimum aptitude standard was raised from “ability to comprehend simple 
orders in the English language” to “ability to read and write English at the fourth 
grade level” just prior to World War II, there was some uneasiness about the overly 
restrictive elimination of illiterate manpower. Concern over possible manpower 
shortages, coupled with pressure from certain southern Congressmen (whose 
constituents were being rejected at relatively high rates), eventually led to a 
softening of the aptitude restriction and an allowance for the induction of some (10 
percent) illiterates.32
Following the end of the Second World War, the draft tapered off and 
peacetime enlistment standards were raised. All inductions were halted between 
November 1945 and October 1948. In 1948, new Selective Service legislation was 
enacted to bolster America’s defense. The draft law established an aptitude standard 
that was somewhat more restrictive than before: conscripts were required to achieve 
a standard score of at least 70 on the AGCT. (This corresponds to a percentile 
score of 13 on the AFQT.) The new aptitude standard for draftees was the same as 
the standard being applied for Army enlistees, and it operated to “weed out” many 
men who would have qualified for induction during the earlier mobilization.
31The reader is reminded that a full description of the minimum aptitude and education 
standards (formal limits) for each Service over selected periods can be found in Appendix A.
32Harold Wool, The Military Specialist Skilled Manpower fo r  the Armed Force (Baltimore, MD: 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968).
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Just prior to the Korean Conflict, the minimum aptitude standard for 
voluntary enlistment in the Army was set at a percentile score of 31 (or standard 
score of 90) on the AFQT. In July 1950, the minimum required AFQT percentile 
score was lowered to 13 (standard score of 70); and, then again, one year later the 
minimum percentile score was reduced to 10 (standard score of 65), affirming the 
nation’s commitment to Korea and full involvement in the Cold War. The aptitude 
standard for induction similarly fell from an AFQT percentile score of 13 to a score 
of 10, in an effort to widen the pool of potential conscriptees.
The Department of Defense adopted a “qualitative distribution policy” from 
1951 through 1958, so that low-aptitude personnel would not be concentrated in 
the Army (the only Service using the draft). This policy set all voluntary enlistment 
standards at the same level as those for induction and additionally directed that 
each Service establish a quota for new recruits in AFQT Categories I through IV. 
Over the period of the qualitative distribution program the quotas for low aptitude 
personnel (AFQT Category IV) ranged from a high of 27 percent to a low of 12 
percent of all new recruits.
The standards for draftees were relatively lenient at this time so that the widest 
pool of eligible recruits could be assembled. In addition, for reasons of “equity,” all 
but the most “untrainable” were deemed acceptable for service; a citizen’s duty to 
defend his country, it was felt, should be a universal principle that reaches into all 
strata of society (notwithstanding draft deferments, which are a subject for 
treatment elsewhere). The shorter tours of duty required of men who were 
conscripted provided some assurance that the so-called marginal performers would 
not compromise the long-term quality of the enlisted force (though it also assured 
that bright draftees wouldn’t serve very long, either).
The years between Korea and Vietnam were comparatively calm, and 
manpower strength gradually declined throughout this period. Minimum aptitude 
standards were set under Department of Defense oversight in accordance with the 
particular needs of the Services. The trend at this time was to gradually raise the 
caliber of new recruits by reducing the percentage of persons in AFQT Category IV 
that the Services were required to take. After 1958, the standards were somewhat 
more “sophisticated,” with supplemental test requirements and other criteria added 
to filter further the pool of eligible recruits. In the early 1960s the Cold War 
intensified, the nation’s collective consciousness of defense issues was again aroused, 
and the Berlin Crisis along with Soviet actions in Cuba prompted an expansion of 
the military’s active-duty force (as well as substantial Reserve recalls).33 The Navy,
33Department of Defense, Reference Materials Department o f  Defense Study o f  the Draft 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower), July 1966), p. l.b.
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Marine Corps, and Air Force lowered their standards slightly (Army induction 
standards were already sufficiently relaxed), and end strength increased.
In August 1964, Congress approved the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 
authorizing the President to take necessary steps to “maintain peace” in Vietnam. 
Approximately 23,000 American “advisors” were committed to combat during the 
summer of 1965; six months later, the number of U.S. troops exceeded 184,000, 
and all signs pointed to an even greater involvement in the Asian conflict.
In the fall of 1965 the Department of Defense directed that Army and Marine 
Corps aptitude standards for voluntary enlistment be set at about the same level as 
the standards for induction. This move was intended to promote volunteer 
recruitment for the Vietnam mobilization. Supplementary test requirements—such 
as the minimum scores on aptitude composites or subtests for high school graduates 
with AFQT percentile scores between 16 and 30—were also waived. By 1968, the 
U.S. had over 500,000 troops stationed in Vietnam, and the active duty enlisted 
force reached a post-Korean-era peak of 3.1 million, an increase of 45 percent over 
the enlisted strength levels at the turn of the decade.
During the course of the Vietnam war, aptitude and education standards for 
induction were lowered four times, and all Services except the Air Force loosened 
their formal minimum requirements for volunteers. In addition, “Project 100,000” 
opened the doors to military service for many young men who did not qualify 
under existing standards. “Project 100,000” was related to President Lyndon 
Johnson’s “War on Poverty” program. It was created to provide “a more equitable 
sharing of the opportunities and obligations for military service among the nation’s 
youth,”34 and it called for the recruitment of about 100,000 “New Standards Men” 
(as they were later named) each year. The Department of Defense concurrently 
directed that each Service admit an annual quota of recruits with test scores in 
AFQT Category IV (ranging from a high of 25 percent in the Army to 15 percent 
in the Air Force).
The extent of the initial reduction in aptitude and education standards during 
the Vietnam mobilization is illustrated in Table 3. In October 1965, as troop levels 
in Vietnam were just beginning to increase, the Army considered high school 
graduates with AFQT percentile scores of at least 31 as “fully qualified” for 
enlistment; those with scores between 21 and 30 could qualify if they also achieved 
an acceptable score in one of three Army Qualification Battery (AQB) aptitude
^Department of Defense, Project 100,000: Characteristics and Performance o f  "New Standards" 
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areas. By the start of the next fiscal year (July 1966) high school graduates with 
AFQT percentile scores of 16 could meet the Army’s aptitude standards without 
additional test requirements. At the same time, the Army’s minimum standard for 
nongraduates was lowered from an AFQT score of 31 (in October 1965) to either 
(a) a score of 31 for full qualification or (b) a score between 16 and 30 with 
acceptable scores on the General-Technical aptitude component and two other 
aptitude areas from the AQB. The minimum aptitude and education standards in 
the Navy and Marine Corps were similarly lowered during the early stages of the 
Vietnam mobilization.
As the war in Vietnam subsided during the early 1970s, quantitative 
manpower requirements dropped, active duty enlisted strength was cut, and the 
military’s entry standards were again raised. “Project 100,000” officially ended in 
December 1971. The last draftees were delivered by Selective Service in December 
1972, as the nation’s defense establishment initiated the “all-volunteer experiment.”
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Section 2
STANDARDS AND RECRUITING OUTCOMES: 
THE QUALITY OF MILITARY EXAMINEES AND 
NEW RECRUITS UNDER VARIOUS CONDITIONS
The history of aptitude and education standards is not complete without a 
brief review of the types of people who have been screened by the military during 
recent years. Section 1 focused primarily on the minimum requirements for 
entrance over time, including the conceptual premise for aptitude screens and the 
dependence of eligibility criteria on the defined needs (mostly in terms of strength 
objectives) of the military at any particular moment. This section traces the test 
score trends of those who have taken military examinations in an effort to gain a 
better understanding of the relationship between minimum standards and recruit 
“quality.” What is the average ability of these candidates for military service? Who 
among those examined, minimum standards notwithstanding, is able to gain entry? 
What is the relative influence of standards, compared with environmental factors 
and other external conditions, on the qualitative character of new recruits?
The answers to these questions are sought in Department of Defense data on 
the test scores of “examinees” and “accessions,1 “along with some speculative 
reasoning about the effects on recruiting of selected factors such as mobilization, 
unemployment, and the presence of conscription. Before reviewing military test 
score data, however, it is important that the reader be acquainted with the selection 
process and certain technical terms used by the Armed Services.
THE MILITARY SELECTION PROCESS 
FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL
Figure 2 depicts the military enlisted selection process. The manpower pool 
consists of men and women between the ages of about 17 and 35. The "primary”
'“Examinees” include all persons (unless otherwise restricted) who are examined for the purpose 
of induction (as a draftee) or enlistment (as a volunteer) into military service, regardless of acceptance 
or rejection. “Accessions” are new recruits (enlistees or inductees) without prior military service.
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w A N P O W E R  P O O L
Figure 2. Military Enlisted Selection Process
or “preferred” pool is generally limited to “military-age youth,” or young men and 
women in their late teens to early twenties. At times, the manpower pool is 
improperly referred to as the “mobilization population.” The mobilization 
population is that portion of the general population (or manpower pool) that could 
be called for military duty in time of national emergency. This group commonly 
includes only men of appropriate age, since women are barred from combat-related 
occupations and excluded from participating in the draft. It should be noted that 
the figures and tables in this section (as well as most of the data presentations in the 
following sections) include data on males only. Since females were not inducted 
and generally comprised such a minuscule proportion of recruits prior to the AVF, 
quality trends are statistically more pure and more easily analyzed and interpreted 
when the data are limited to males only.
Historically, as shown in Figure 2, members of the manpower pool can enter 
the enlistment selection process as either (1A) pre-inductees who have been 
directed to undergo examination for military induction (during time of draft), or 
(IB) applicants for voluntary enlistment. Local draft boards typically determine the 
eligibility of pre-inductees, and recruiters provide initial screening for applicants. 
Individuals who pass the preliminary screening may continue in the examination
30
process. Those who progress to step 2 of Figure 2—the complete assessment of 
medical and moral fitness, aptitude, education, and other qualifications for military 
service—are called “examinees.” “Examinees” may be either accepted or rejected 
at this point; those who are found to be fully qualified for military service are then 
inducted or permitted to enlist voluntarily. Currently, persons who are eligible for 
enlistment may postpone entry into active duty for up to a year through the 
Delayed Entry Program (DEP). Stage 4 signifies formal entry into active duty or 
“accession” status.
It should be noted that some persons who successfully pass the examination 
phase never follow through with induction or enlistment. Selective Service 
registrants, for example, may still be deferred from military service at a point 
following the examination. Similarly, volunteers may decide to withdraw their 
application for enlistment after being examined; even those who decide to enlist 
under the DEP may renege on their agreement and never actually enter active 
duty. The fact that a large segment of those who qualify for enlistment never enlist 
(37 percent in 1977) and a number of people who enlist never enter active duty (4 
percent in 1977) should be kept in mind when comparing examinee and accession 
data.2
MILITARY EXAMINEES: TEST SCORE TRENDS
Since the early 1950s, intellectual aptitude, or military “trainability,” has been 
measured by the Armed Services with a composite of verbal and quantitative 
subtests (spatial and tool knowledge subtests were also used formerly) known as 
the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). Scores on the AFQT are 
traditionally reported as percentiles; and, as observed in Section 1, they are 
statistically related to the aptitude score distribution of men on active duty during 
World War II. The use of a World War II “reference population” provides the 
Armed Services with a baseline for comparing and evaluating the test scores of 
individuals over time. In this manner, military psychologists have attempted to hold 
constant the relative aptitude of an individual with a particular percentile score, 
even though the tests used to calculate AFQT scores have changed frequently over 
the past 40 years. Consequently, it is presumed that individuals who earn AFQT 
percentile scores of 60 in, say, 1983 would also earn percentile scores of 
approximately 60 on whatever test was used during any period since World War
II.
2Sue E. Berryman, Robert M. Bell, and William Lisowski, The Military Enlistment Process: What 
Happens and Can It Be Improved? (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, May 1983).
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Table 4 shows the percentage of male examinees (without prior military 
service) who achieved AFQT percentile scores of 50 or higher while processing for 
induction or enlistment between FY 1964 and FY 1983. The 50th percentile—or 
the median of the reference population score distribution—is often used as a 
dividing line of aptitude “quality” by the Armed Services. Indeed, the Army 
currently separates AFQT Category III into two subcategories for administrative 
and reporting purposes: AFQT IIIA includes percentile scores from 50 to 64, and 
Category IIIB includes scores between 31 and 49 inclusive. For convenience, then, 
individuals who score in AFQT Categories I through IIIA (particularly high school 
graduates) are frequently combined and simply called the “top half’ (of the 
population), the “high quality” group, “preferred recruits,” or the like.
It can be seen in Table 4 that the annual percentage of male examinees who 
score at or above the 50th percentile on the AFQT has generally declined during 
the past decade. In fact, the data suggest the existence of two distinct periods: the 
Vietnam-era draft, when the annual proportion of examinees in the AFQT 50-and- 
above range (for all Services combined) approximated 50 percent; and the all 
volunteer era, when the annual proportion of male examinees in this score range 
was usually below 40 percent.
The average aptitude of young men tested for enlistment eligibility increased 
considerably during FY 1982 and particularly during FY 1983, but this sudden 
shift upward may be an anomaly rather than the start of a new, long-term trend. 
Closer study of the data in Table 4, for example, reveals a distinctly dramatic drop 
in the average aptitude of young men tested by the Army over the past ten years. 
During the Vietnam era, no fewer than two out of every five Army examinees 
scored at least 50 on the aptitude test. In contrast, only about one out of three or 
four Army examinees typically scored in the “top half’ of the population 
distribution during the all-volunteer era. The nadir was reached in 1979 and 1980, 
when 23 percent of all young men applying for enlistment in the Army attained a 
percentile score of 50 or higher—compared with a peak level of almost 52 percent 
during the transition to all-volunteer recruitment. The aptitude level differences 
between the draft and All-Volunteer force periods may be partially explained by 
the fact that the former period was a time of high draft calls and restricted 
deferments. A higher aptitude force would be expected under such draft conditions, 
particularly since there tends to be a greater proportion of college educated persons 
who enter the screening process than under all-volunteer conditions.
The change that occurred in the average aptitude level of examinees after the 
end of the draft is emphasized in Table 5, which contrasts the median percentage of 




Percent of Male Examinees Who Achieved AFQT Percentile 
Scores of 50 or Higher (Categories l-IIIA) by 
Service, FY 1964-83









1964 39.7 .. 41.9
1965 41.3 -- -- 43.7
1966 48.0 - -- 48.2
1967 49.5 - - 49.6
1968 47.3 - - 47.8
1969 43.0 -- - 44.6
1970 51.4 - - 51.0
1971 50.0 - - 50.0
1972 49.8 50.9 33.6 55.0 49.7
----------- All-Volunteer Force Transition0 ----------------
1973 51.5 50.3 31.2 57.5 51.8
1974 39.6 56.3 39.3 51.6 45.1
1975 37.3 45.2 36.5 54.9 41.7
1976 32.2 39.7 40.3 42.5 36.4
1977 25.1 42.3 33.2 48.4 34.8
1978 26.5 46.5 33.7 49.6 37.4
1979 23.3 45.1 31.7 47.4 34.7
1980 23.0 50.5 36.3 50.7 37.2
1981 26.2 45.9 40.5 51.7 38.1
1982 36.4 49.3 41.4 52.1 43.3
1983 43.7 55.8 49.2 59.7 50.1
S ourcM : Data lo r years 1964-71 are based upon adjusted preinduction examinee scores 
reported in Office of the Surgeon General, Form 1043, Results of Preinduction Examinations 
Summary and Armed Forces Examining A Entrance Station Qualitative Distribution Report olMale 
Enlistments, Induction, and Rejections, RCS DD-M(M)-663 (Form 1042) (Washington, D C.: Office 
of the Surgeon General, 1964-71). Data for years 1972-83 were provided by the Defense 
Manpower Data Center.
P e rcen tag e s  appear according to the Armed Service that tested the examinee. Examinees 
include only males w ithout prior m ilitary service who were tested for the purpose of enlistment or 
induction
^Separate data on examinees tested by these Services are not available for the period 
1964-71.
cThe official end of the draft occurred on 30 June 1973. The drawdown began in July 1972, 
with the last draft call issued in December 1972.
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Table 5
Median Percent of Male Examinees Who Scored 
AFQT 50 or Higher, FY 1964-72 and FY 1974-83®
Service in Vietnam-Era Draft All-Volunteer Force
Which Tested (FY 1964-72) (FY 1974-83)
Army 48.0 32.2
All Services Combined 48.2 38.1
aExcludes FY 1973, the AVF transition year.
Unfortunately, separate statistics are not available on examinees tested by the 
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force between 1964 and 1971. However, the data 
for these Services after 1971 reveal general consistency in the annual proportion of 
male examinees who score AFQT 50 or above. For instance, during the eleven- 
year period (1972-82) shown in Table 4, between 45 and 50 percent of all young 
men applying for enlistment in the Navy characteristically scored at or above the 
50th percentile. The Marine Corps experienced somewhat more variability from 
year to year, but the annual proportion still remained in a range between 30 and 
40 percent. Young men examined for enlistment by the Air Force tended to have 
higher average scores than those examined by the other Services; but the annual 
proportion of “high quality” examinees during the five-year period of 1977 through 
1981 was consistently around 50 percent. A large increase in all Services’ 
percentages occurred in FY 1983.
Table 6 offers a different view of the aptitude test performance of male 
examinees (all Services combined). The consistency in test performance from one 
year to the next is even more apparent when examinees are arranged according to 
AFQT Category. With amazing regularity, the annual proportion of examinees 
within each AFQT category hardly varies—even though there are sizeable 
differences in the number of applicants for enlistment each year. The AFQT 
category distributions for 1977 through 1981 display virtually no variance. Indeed, 
a difference of only one percentage point in Categories IIIB and V distinguishes the 
distribution of 1978 from that of 1980; yet, the number of examinees jumped from
453,000 in 1978 to 612.000 in 1980 (an increase of 35 percent).3
3The percentage distributions of male examinees by AFQT category were tabulated for each of 
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The data on AFQT test scores of male examinees suggest two general 
conclusions: (1) there are discernible differences in average aptitude between young 
men examined during the Vietnam era and those who have applied (so far) for 
enlistment under the all-volunteer format; and (2) there is a remarkable consistency 
or similarity in the aptitude levels of those who were examined within each of the 
two periods. At the same time, the statistics on examinees imply that the Vietnam- 
era draft brought a “higher quality” group of potential recruits to the doors of the 
military: since conscription was phased out in 1972-73, the average aptitude of 
examinees (primarily in the Army) has declined, and it has remained at a relatively 
lower level throughout most of the all-volunteer period.
The main reason for observed differences in the average aptitude of examinees 
during these two periods probably lies in several external (or environmental) 
factors and in the types of people who are inclined to volunteer without the threat 
of conscription. Still, it is astounding to find so much consistency in the aptitude 
levels of examinees within the two periods—and especially during the All- 
Volunteer Force, when changes in enlistment inducements, military budgets, and 
national economic trends so strongly influenced the quantity of military applicants.
MILITARY ACCESSIONS: TEST SCORE TRENDS
Most military manpower studies disregard AFQT data on examinees and 
deal with quality considerations only as they relate to new recruits or “accessions.” 
After all, it is observed, the quality level of applicants is inconsequential as long as 
the Military Services are able to enlist enough young men and women in the 
desired numbers and cross section of ability.
As shown in Table 7, there is a relationship between the average aptitude of 
new recruits and that of examinees (see Table 4) with corresponding increases and 
decreases from year to year. Generally, “better” examination years result in 
“better” accession years. However, many applicants for enlistment enter the DEP 
and hence may not begin active military service during the same fiscal year in 
which they were examined; thus, year-by-year comparisons of examinee and 
accession data should be made cautiously. The following example illustrates the 
problem in comparing test score data for examinees and accessions on a yearly 
basis:
•  It is assumed that the degree of improvement in the test 
scores of recruits over those of examinees between 1973 
and 1983 is dependent largely on the total number of
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young men who apply for entry—since a larger pool of 
applicants generally means that the Military Services have a 
greater number of individuals in the higher aptitude 
categories from whom to choose (as long as average 
aptitude and strength requirements remain fairly constant).
•  During FY 1978, about 466,000 young men were ex 
amined for enlistment (Table 6) with just over 37 percent 
scoring at or above AFQT 50. About 270,000 young men 
enlisted that year (a ratio of six accessions per 10 
examinees) and just over 49 percent achieved a score of 
AFQT 50 or higher.
•  During FY 1980, the Services examined 624,000 appli 
cants with an almost identical aptitude score distribution as 
that recorded in FY 1978. About 307,000 young men 
enlisted in FY 1980 (a ratio of 5 accessions per 10 
applicants) and the proportion who scored at or above 
AFQT 50 was 44 percent—surprisingly lower than the 
average aptitude of new enlistees two years earlier.
In summary, examinee and accession data should probably not be compared 
except for the purpose of viewing long-term trends.
Table 7, when studied in isolation, also reveals a drop in average aptitude 
(mostly in the Army) after the end of the draft. Yet, once again, there is a 
limitation on how the data may be employed: during FY 1976-80, the Armed 
Services were using a version of the enlistment test that was calibrated incorrectly 
(that is, there was an error in the method by which the test raw scores were 
converted to percentile scores). Because scores in the lower-ability levels were 
being overstated, far more low-scoring enlistees were admitted to military service 
than would have qualified otherwise on the basis of their “correct” aptitude test 
results. The Department of Defense and the Armed Services mistakenly observed 
“marked and steady improvement” in the average test scores of their recruits 
during the late 1970s.4 Subsequent recomputation showed that, in fact, a
‘Department of Defense, America's Volunteers (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], December 1978), p. 3. For a more 
technical discussion of the problem and chronology of events, see Department of Defense, Aptitude 
Testing o f  Recruits (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, 
Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], July 1980).
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Table 7
Percent of Male Recruits Who Achieved AFQT Percentile 
Scores of 50 or Higher by Service, FY 1952-83









1952 39.8 50.2 39.0 48.3 43.2
1953 42.7 56.0 42.8 54.7 45.8
1954 50.8 56.7 40.8 52.1 50.5
1955 51.9 47.0 51.8 52.0 50.6
1956 51.7 50.7 41.4 58.5 51.5
1957 48.5 61.2 46.5 59.8 52.7
1958 49.8 67.7 56.6 67.8 56.5
1959 53.0 69.2 54.5 67.1 58.8
1960 54.4 68.1 49.6 65.0 58.7
1961 56.7 68.0 58.3 62.2 60.2
1962 52.5 66.7 58.1 70.6 59.0
1963 52.1 71.8 63.5 68.2 60.5
1964 53.9 67.7 58.4 72.2 60.0
1965 52.9 65.0 60.9 69.1 59.2
1966 52.6 75.2 57.5 71.1 59.9
1967 51.5 76.1 54.2 67.5 57.5
1968 49.8 72.9 49.1 64.6 55.1
1969 51.0 66.1 46.8 64.0 55.2
1970 51.0 70.0 46.0 65.0 55.0
1971 51.0 70.8 46.7 59.9 55.0
1972 53.7 59.2 47.6 65.8 56.5
----------------- All-Volunteer Force Transition6
1973 53.4 59.2 48.3 68.7 57.2
1974 47.9 60.9 62.9 69.1 56.6
1975 52.8 64.6 64.6 74.4 61.1
1976 45.9 67.5 65.3 78.6 59.2
1977 32.4 55.9 47.3 72.7 47.3
1976 34.0 58.9 44.1 69.4 49.2
1979 28.5 55.4 42.6 63.6 44.1
1980 28.9 59.9 43.3 59.9 44.0
1981 39.9 61.9 54.8 67.7 54.5
1982 51.4 62.9 56.5 68.0 58.7
1983 59.3 69.8 58.4 72.3 63.7
Sources: Percentages fo r FY 1952-70 were derived from  data appearing  in Departm ent o f Defense. A nnua l 
Reports o f the Q ua lita tive  D is tr ibu tio n  o f M ilita ry  M anpower. Percen tages fo r FY 1971 -83 were ca lcu la ted  from  
data p rovided by the Defense M anpow er Data Center.
a M ale recru its  in c lu de  persons w ithou t p rio r m ilita ry  serv ice  w ho were inducted  o r enlisted  and entered 
active  duty during  the ind icated  fisca l year.
bThe o ffic ia l end o f the  d ra ft o ccurred  on 30 June  1973. The d raw dow n  began in Ju ly  1972, w ith  the  last dra ft 
ca ll issued in Decem ber 1972.
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considerably higher proportion of new enlistees were below-average (and many 
even below minimum entry standards) in tested ability.5
The downward shift in recruit aptitude test scores across DoD can also be 
seen when the data are displayed according to AFQT Category (Table 8). During 
the all-volunteer era, there has been a decline in the proportion of Category I 
recruits (all Services combined). In fact, during 1979 and 1980 proportionately 
fewer male recruits scored in AFQT Categories I and II (combined) than in any 
other single year during the three decades depicted in Table 8.
TEST SCORE TRENDS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
As previously observed, some analysts contend that the downward trend in 
military aptitude test scores can be partially attributed to a nationwide decline in 
scholastic aptitude and achievement test scores of young men and women over the 
past two decades.6 Others believe that the drop in “quality” is primarily a 
consequence of all-volunteer recruitment. A detailed exploration of the causes of 
changes in average aptitude from one year to another is beyond the scope of this 
research. Nevertheless, some light may be cast on the subject of possible causes by 
viewing the data within the context of selected, external events and shifts in policy.
In the past, certain changes in selection policy have been aimed specifically at 
modifying the qualitative mix of recruits in the lower-ability region. For example, it 
can be seen in Table 8 that the proportion of new recruits in AFQT Category IV 
was noticeably higher during the years between 1952-58 and 1967-71. (Table B-5 
in Appendix B shows the AFQT category distributions of new recruits by Military 
Service from 1952 through 1983. Table B-6 compares the AFQT category
5A11 tables and figures in this report use test scores that were recomputed to correct for 
calibration errors during 1976-80. There is no reason to suspect that the test scoring problems strongly 
affected the number or character of persons who applied (as opposed to those who were accepted) for 
military service— unless, of course, similar versions of the miscalibrated test were employed 
extensively for prescreening purposes and more persons in the low-ability range (than otherwise) were 
allowed to process a formal application. But there is no evidence that such presceening of applicants 
occurred.
6See, for example, Department of Defense, Profile o f  American Youth: 1980 Nationwide 
Administration o f  the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], March 1982), p. 16: Also, 
see Advisory Panel on Scholastic Aptitude Test Score Decline, On Further Examination. (New York: 
College Entrance Examination Board, 1977).
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Table 8
Percent Distribution of Male Recruits (All Services Combined) by 
AFQT Category, FY 1952-83
Percent Diatrlbution of Male Recruits*
Fiscal Year Category I Category II Category III Category IV Totalb
1952 6.4 22.0 32.3 39.2 100.0
1953 7.2 24.1 31.5 37.2 100.0
1954 8.2 25.3 36.9 29.6 100.0
1955 7.8 25.3 38.1 28.8 100.0
1956 7.1 25.9 40.2 26.8 100.0
1957 7.8 25.2 42.8 24.2 100.0
1958 8.7 26.2 47.1 18.0 100.0
1959 9.1 27.8 47.7 15.4 100.0
1960 8.2 26.9 51.3 13.6 100.0
1961 6.1 31.3 49.7 12.9 100.0
1962 6.2 31.8 45.7 16.3 100.0
1963 6.0 32.5 47.8 13.7 100.0
1964 6.3 32.1 47.1 14.5 100.0
1965 5.5 31.3 48.8 14.4 100.0
1966 6.4 33.5 43.5 16.6 100.0
1967 6.6 33.1 38.7 21.6 100.0
1968 6.0 31.8 37.6 24.6 100.0
1969 6.2 31.7 37.7 24.4 100.0
1970 5.3 30.5 41.0 23.2 100.0
1971 5.1 30.0 43.1 21.8 100.0
1972 4.2 30.2 48.1 17.5 100.0
---------------- All- Volunteer Force Transition0
1973 3.7 30.1 52.1 14.2 100.0
1974 3.0 32.3 54.5 10.2 100.0
1975 3.5 34.0 56.3 6.1 100.0
1976 3.9 33.9 51.7 10.5 100.0
1977 4.3 28.2 39.6 27.9 100.0
1978 3.6 27.3 42.1 27.0 100.0
1979 3.0 23.6 41.8 31.6 100.0
1980 2.8 23.8 41.6 31.8 100.0
1981 2.6 30.2 47.8 19.5 100.0
1982 3.1 33.4 49.4 14.1 100.0
1983 3.7 36.7 50.1 9.5 100.0
Sources: Data for FYs 1952-70 ware calculated from Annual Reports o f the Qualitative Diatrlbution of Military 
Manpower. Data for FYs 1971-83 were provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.
a M ale recruits include persons without prior military service who were inducted or enlisted and entered active 
duty (all Services combined) during the indicated fiscal year. 
bRow totals may not equal 100 due to rounding.
cThe official end of the draft occurred on 30 June 1973. The drawdown began in July 1972, with the last draft call 
issued in December 1972.
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distributions of Army enlistees and draftees between 1955 and 1983.) In fact, 
during most of the 1950s the Military Services were directed by the Defense 
Department to select a particular proportion (or quota) of new recruits in Category 
IV; and a similar policy was enforced throughout the 1967-71 period under 
“Project 100,000.”
The effects of “quality quotas” in the 1950s and “Project 100,000” in the late 
1960s are portrayed graphically in Figure 3. As the quotas for new recruits in the 
1950s were gradually reduced and manpower strength requirements were cut, a 
steady increase in average aptitude (or the percent of male recruits scoring at or 
above AFQT 50) can be observed. A drop in average aptitude coincided with the 
institution of “Project 100,000” and the nation’s entry into the Vietnam conflict.
The end of the draft, as seen in Figure 3, witnessed another rise in recruit 
aptitude levels despite a markedly downward shift in the average test scores of 
applicants. By the mid-1970s, the aptitude levels of both recruits and examinees 
were declining in parallel fashion. Test miscalibration in 1976 apparently 
accelerated the drop (not recorded at the time of testing) in the average test scores 
of new recruits; at the same time, the scores of examinees exhibited periods of 
modest decline and improvement within a fairly small range.
Taken as a whole, the most substantial changes in the average aptitude of new 
recruits occurred during two periods: (1) 1952 through the end of the decade, 
when aptitude levels increased; and (2) 1975 through 1980, when aptitude levels 
dropped drastically and remained relatively low until 1981-83, when they surged 
upward. The proportion of new recruits with test scores equal to or above AFQT 
50 remained reasonably steady throughout most of the 1960s and early 1970s, 
with a small drop in average aptitude coinciding with the Vietnam-era draft and 
“Project 100,000.”
Historical events offer an important backdrop for viewing test score trends 
and for understanding the external factors or conditions that influence recruiting 
outcomes. This brief discussion of external factors would not be complete, 
however, without mention of the national economy and its presumed (though still 
uncertain) effect on all-volunteer recruitment. Changes in the national economy 
cannot be considered “events” in the strict sense applied here unless these changes 
result in identifiable periods of recession, depression, recovery, growth, or other 
conspicuous shift in the business cycle. Yet, it is possible to juxtapose the average 
aptitude levels used in Figure 3 and the unemployment rate for “military-age” 




SOURCES; Examinee data fo r  Years 1964-1971 are based upon adjusted P re induction Examinee Scores 
reported in the  O ffice  o f the  Surgeon General Form  1043, Results o f  P re induction  Exam inations Sum mary 
and A rm e d  Forces Exam ining &  Entrance S ta tion  Q ua lita tive  D is tr ib u tio n  R e po rt o f  Male Enlistments, 
Induction , and  Rejections, RCS D D-M (M )-663, 1964-1971. Recru it data fo r  FYs 1952-1970 were 
calculated fro m  A nnua l Reports o f  the Q ua lita tive  D is tr ib u tio n  o f  M ilita ry  Manpower. A ll data fo r  FYs 
1971-1983 were p rovided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.
aMale recruits include persons w ith o u t p rio r m ilita ry  service who were inducted o r enlisted and entered 
active d u ty  (all Services com bined) during the indicated fiscal year.
^Male examinees include persons w ith o u t p rio r m ilita ry  service w ho were tested fo r  the  purpose o f 
enlis tm ent o r induction.
CA F Q T  50 is the  median fo r  the "W orld  War II reference p o p u la tio n ." (See te x t fo r  d e fin it io n .) This 
p o in t (A F Q T  53) is the  median score (calibrated w ith  the W orld  War II reference p opu la tion ) fo r  a 
nationw ide p ro b a b ility  sample o f male y o u th  (18-23 years) w ho were tested in 1980.
^N O T E : Vertica l comparisons between recruits and examinees since FY  1975 should " la g "  the recru it 
p lo t an average o f app rox im a te ly  one-half year to  account fo r  the  Delayed E n try  Program (DEP).
For example, the average January examinee would not actually enter the military service until the 
following summer under average conditions in the DEP.
Figure 3. Percent of Male Recruits and Examinees Who
Achieved A FQ T Percentile Scores of 50 or Higher 
By Selected Historical Event, FY 1952-83d
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Figure 4 compares the annual proportions of male recruits and examinees 
who had test scores of AFQT 50 or higher between 1952-83 with the annual 
unemployment rate for males between the ages of 18 and 24 during the same 
years. Figure 4 also shows the proportion of male recruits who were high school 
graduates during each fiscal year period (except where data were unavailable).7
Logic suggests that civilian labor market conditions have a strong impact on 
the number and character of young men who apply for military enlistment. Yet, 
the results of several studies undertaken since the end of the draft on the effects of 
unemployment are still inconclusive—and most results thus far (with the exception 
of two studies) show only a very minor interaction between shifts in the civilian 
job sector and the flow of qualified recruits.8
No attempt is made here to detail statistically the relationship between 
unemployment and the average aptitude or educational level of new recruits. 
Indeed, a proper analysis of this relationship would also have to identify and 
measure several associated factors such as military/civilian pay comparability, 
military benefits and enlistment incentives, attitudes of youth toward military 
service, the national spirit or patriotism of the times, service advertising and 
recruiting budgets, and assorted other variables that might influence the quantity 
and quality of volunteers. Nonetheless, the parallel form of movement in 
unemployment and the composition of examinees and recruits, as displayed in 
Figure 4, generally suggests the influence of the former on the latter.9 Figure 4 also
T h is  comparison of “quality” trends and national economic conditions first appeared in Janice 
H. Laurence, Brian K. Waters, and Linda S. Perelman, “Enlisted Military Selection: Impacts of 
Changing Aptitude Standards Since 1940.” Paper presented at the 24th Annual Conference of the 
Military Testing Association, San Antonio, TX, November 1982.
8For a brief summary of studies concerning the effects of civilian labor market conditions and 
related literature, see Charles Dale and Curtis Gilroy, “The Effects of the Business Cycle on the Size 
and Composition of the U.S. Army,” PPRG Working Paper 82-1 (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army 
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, n.d.), p. 1. The authors of this particular 
study (preliminary) find that “the rise in the employment rate has led to a substantial increase in Army 
enlistments of male nonprior service high school graduates” (p. 10). And, conversely, “a drop in the 
national unemployment rate from 9 percent to 8 percent could cause Army enlistments of male 
nonprior service high school graduates to fall sharply by about 8.8 percent—or at the rate of over 
7,000 per year.” See also Linda S. Perelman, A Review o f  Military Enlistment Supply Models: In 
Search o f  Further Improvements, IR-PRD-83-16. (Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research 
Organization, July 1983.)
’One recruiting official points out that the Military Services are more inclined to take qualified 
applicants “as they come” during recognized periods of low unemployment or a depression in 
recruiting. Conversely, when applications for enlistment are at a peak, recruiters can “pick and choose 






DRAFT ERA ALL-VOLUNTEER ERA
1952 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82
Fiscal Year
Source*: Unem ploym ent rates w ere  derived from data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data  
on military recruits and exam inees w ere obtained from Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(M anpow er, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics) and the Defense M anpow er Data Center.
a M ale  recruits include persons w ithout prior military service w ho w ere  inducted or enlisted and 
entered active duty (all Services com bined) during the indicated fiscal year.
bM a le  exam inees include persons without prior military service who w ere adm inistered an operational 
version of the Arm ed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) regardless of w hether or not they actually  
entered one of the military services
U n e m p lo y m e n t rate w as calculated as yearly average of all men (1 8 -2 4  years) w ho w ere available for 
work but not working during the designated period (as defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics).
F igure  4. Percent High School Diploma Holders and AFQ T Category  
l-IIIA s Among M ale Examinees and Recruits Com pared with 
National Unemployment Rate for M ales (Ages 18-24),
FYs 1952-83
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implies that, at certain times during the all-volunteer era, the Military Services have 
emphasized the importance of high school graduation over aptitude test scores. 
(Though the reader is reminded that officially the Services were unaware of the 
extent of the drop in aptitude levels until the test miscalibration between 1976 and 
1980 was first detected and then corrected. There is however, anecdotal evidence 
to suggest that field commanders had noticed a drop in the quality of recruits 
earlier than 1980.)
SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Recruit “quality,” when viewed in an aggregate form combining multi-year 
periods, appears strikingly consistent. Table 9 compares the AFQT category 
distributions of male military recruits during three periods—the modem draft
Table 9
Percent Distribution of Male Recruits (All Services Combined) 












I 8 6.5 3.2 5.8 5
li 28 29.6 29.5 29.5 35
III 34 42.6 49.1 44.2 29
IV 21 21.3 18.2 20.5 23
V 9 0 .0 b 0 .0 b 0 .0 b 8
100 100.0 100.0 100.0 100
Source: AFQT distributions for 1953-73 were derived from data in Bernard D. Karpinos, Male 
Chargeable Accessions: Evaluation by M ental Categories (1953-1973), SR-ED-75-18 (Alexandria, 
VA: Human Resources Research Organization, January 1977). All other data on male recruits are 
from the Defense Manpower Data Center.
aMale recruits include persons without prior military service who were inducted or enlisted and 
entered active duty (all Services combined) during the indicated fiscal year. Draftees who failed the 
aptitude test but who were declared administratively acceptable (on the basis of personal 
interviews and some additional aptitude testing) are included in AFQT Category IV. 
bPersons with scores in AFQT Category V are not eligible for military enlistment.
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(1953-1972), the All-Volunteer Force (1973-1983), and the entire period since 
1953—with the distributions of the 1944 “World War II reference population” 
and the 1980 male youth population. It can be seen that male recruits during the 
all-volunteer era are very much like their draft-year counterparts, with the only 
noteworthy difference between the two groups being a moderately greater 
proportion of all-volunteer recruits within AFQT Category III. At the same time, 
compared with male youth as a whole, military recruits have tended to be 
concentrated in the average aptitude range (Category III); and, as a group, they are 
characteristically more similar to the 1944 reference population than to the 1980 
group in terms of the proportion of above-average individuals (Categories I and II 
combined).
These aggregated statistics, however, mask some of the differences in general 
“quality” during the 20-year draft period—including the fact that, in terms of 
average aptitude, the All-Volunteer Force of the 1970s often looks more like the 
draft-era military of the 1950s than that of the 1960s. Furthermore, statistics for 
test scores in all Services combined hide the several variations that have taken 
place in each of the separate Military Services.
Indeed, although the average aptitude of the Vietnam-era military was 
approximately equal to that of the All-Volunteer Force, the end of the draft has 
been followed by “quality” decrements in the Army and Navy, and improvements 
in the Marine Corps and Air Force. As shown in Table 10, the drops in average 
aptitude for the all-volunteer Army and Navy have been considerable—with just 
under 46 and 65 percent of male enlistees scoring AFQT 50 or above, compared 
with nearly 52 and 70 percent of all Vietnam-era recruits, respectively.
The reader should note that the median percent values in Table 10 were 
affected by the ASVAB miscalibration results in FYs 1976-1980. It is not clear 
what Table 10 AVF data would have looked like if the equating error had not 
occurred.
It is clear from the abundance of statistics on aptitude test scores, the review 
of historical events, and the history of selection criteria presented in Section 1, that 
minimum aptitude and education screens are less related to average quality levels 
of recruits than has been commonly assumed. The mechanism of the draft largely 
dictates who gets in and who stays out during a mobilization for war or national 
emergency. The draft is equipped to take the best or the worst of the general 
populace, or whomever the nation’s leaders decide to send to arms. During all 
volunteer periods (or lulls in the draft), external factors largely determine who 
applies for military service, but the pool of volunteers appears to be pulled from the 
very same “quality” sector of society each year. Even though there have been wide
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Table 10
Median Percent of Male Recruits8 Who 
Scored AFQT 50 or Higher by Service, 








Marine Corps 49.1 54.8
Air Force 65.8 69.1
TOTAL 56.5 56.6
aMale recruits include persons without prior military service. 
bExcludes FY 1973; the AVF transition year.
variations in the number of persons who apply to enter military service, numerous 
permutations in policy and practice, along with a full range of historical events and 
changes in recruiting conditions, the qualitative profile of applicants has remained 
remarkably similar throughout the all-volunteer period.
The suggestion here is that changes in the economy, recruiting incentives, and 
policy during the AVF have not operated to alter the “attractiveness” of military 
service for any one particular aptitude category over another; all categories have 
been equally affected by the influencing factors of the 1970s. The recruiting 
successes of the past two years, so it follows, are not a direct consequence of having 
proportionately more high-quality applicants—but, more precisely, a result of 
having numerically more high-quality applicants from whom to choose. With a 
larger pool of high test-scorers, the Armed Services have been able to tighten their 
cutting scores and raise the average aptitude of their new recruits. When the total 
number of applicants drops or the ratio of applicants to recruits falls from one year 
to the next, it appears likely that quality will suffer in a parallel fashion.
The “AVF experiment” of the 1970s compelled the Armed Services to locate 
their “true volunteer” recruiting market for the first time after 30-odd years with a 
draft. The all-volunteer era was consequently characterized by a probing for the 
proper minimum standards and a search for screening criteria flexible enough to 
bend with the frequently unknown effects of external factors while ensuring that
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qualitative and quantitative recruiting objectives could be accomplished. It was also 
a time, as observed in test score data, when the average aptitude of examinees sank 
to a lower level than that experienced under the draft.
The evidence implies that aptitude and education Service screens are highly 
reactive to changes that occur in the recruiting environment. Standards do not 
dictate who applies for military service, how many apply, or even the qualitative 
complexion of new recruits who place above the minimum criteria. Returning to 
the metaphor of the dam, the flow of applicants is constantly affected by 
unpredictable environmental forces; but the entry screens of the military, like the 
gates of the dam, compensate for these forces by opening and closing in reaction to 
the flow and the needs of those on the other side.
Recent survey results and related data on the test scores of a nationally 
representative sample of American youth now offer manpower analysts the 
opportunity to study the effects of aptitude and education standards on population 
eligibility rates and participation in the all-volunteer military. This source of 
information casts a new light on the statistics normally used to describe recruiting 
outcomes. The data on eligibility and participation should additionally help 
manpower managers reach a more complete understanding of the effects of raising 




AMERICAN YOUTH AND MILITARY SERVICE: 
QUALIFICATION AND PARTICIPATION
This section presents the results of a preliminary effort to estimate the 
eligibility for military service of various segments of the general population. The 
discussion first focuses on the common perception of military “qualification” from 
the standpoint of manpower administrators. It then traces the various attempts that 
have been made to estimate, from historical information, the military “qualification 
rates” of young men. As an introduction to the results of the present analysis, the 
primary data resource (the “Profile of American Youth”) is described and briefly 
evaluated. Population eligibility, as determined from the “Profile Study” (nation 
wide administration of the ASVAB), is then explored in some depth. The discussion 
subsequently turns to actual participation in the military by selected subgroups of 
American youth. A new statistic, the participation rates of potentially qualified 
youth, is introduced and presented in several tables showing racial/ethnic groups at 
different levels of education.
The Department of Defense states that “entrance standards are set so as to 
enlist the largest possible number of individuals who will be eligible for several 
types of training, who will successfully complete training courses, who will 
complete their first term of service, and who will be qualified to enter the career 
force.1” This is the fundamental purpose of screening for military service, expressed 
in positive terms. The Department of Defense could say alternatively that entrance 
standards are established to eliminate the largest possible number of applicants who 
would fail to complete training, would leave before finishing the first term of 
service, or would be disqualified in the future from reenlisting. The latter statement 
is probably more accurate today since the military’s entry standards are less a
'Department of Defense, Department o f  Defense Efforts to Develop Quality Standards fo r  
Enlistment, A Report to the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services (Washington, D.C.: 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], December 
1981), p. 3.
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hurdle for all who are capable of serving successfully than an impassable barricade
for those who are least likely, on the average, to perform at a predetermined level
of competence.
This is not just an exercise in semantics. Education and aptitude standards in 
the military have been analyzed and reanalyzed actively since the end of the draft. 
The motivation for conducting such research has usually revolved around 
budgetary matters—that is, reducing the high costs associated with first-term 
attrition, training failures, and delinquent behavior by new recruits. As one study 
points out, “the military training of young, unskilled people” is an “investment.” 
And
the underlying purpose of the screening process is to reduce 
the risk that an investment will be made in persons who are
unable or unwilling to perform their duty. In times when the
number of applications exceeds the manpower needs of a 
service, the screening process serves the additional function of 
identifying which candidates are likely to be more pro 
ductive.2
The authors of a study of enlistment standards in the Air Force similarly 
observe:
In the accomplishment of its mission, the Air Force 
invests millions of dollars in training to improve the skills of 
the men and women who are accepted for enlistment. Air 
Force personnel planners seek ways to reduce costs asso 
ciated with attrition from training programs and, at the same 
time, maintain the highest quality potential possible. This 
objective has been sought through imposition of stringent 
qualifications for initial enlistment in an effort to raise the 
quality of the basic recruit.3
The belief that standards are intended primarily to eliminate “poor risks” 
(screening out as opposed to screening in) is a vestige of the modem draft when the 
Army could fill its ranks with involuntary recruits and the other Services could pick 
and choose from a cache of draft-avoiders (or the so called “draft-motivated”
2Kwrn H. Kim et al., Research o f  the Proportion o f  the Total Youth Population Which is 
Physically and Mentally Unfit fo r  Military Service, Volume 1A: Main Report, NOSC-7229- 
K K /M S/R S (Bethesda, Md.: Mathtech, Inc., December 1978), p. 1-1 (emphasis added).
3Bart M. Vitola et al., Impact o f  Various Enlistment Standards on the Procurement Training 
System, AFHRL-TR-77-16 (Brooks AFB, TX: Air Force Human Resources Laboratory, April 1977), 
p. 5 (emphasis added).
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enlistees). Congress has also been responsible for encouraging this outlook, mainly 
because “failure” is perceived more easily and clearly than “success” in this context. 
Personnel performance failures, for example, appear in the military’s reports to 
Congress as premature discharges (historically, for almost two out of every five 
first-term recruits), disciplinary actions, skill qualification failures, training losses, 
desertions, and the like. Personnel performance successes, on the other hand, are 
not quantified with the same categorical precision as their counterparts; indeed, 
personnel successes are viewed and counted mainly as the opposite of failures.4
Various attempts have been made over the years to ascertain the size of the 
so-called “eligible” youth population, or those who have a relatively low 
probability of failure, based on educational level and aptitude test scores. Many of 
these research efforts have focused on the young men who were summoned to take 
a preinduction examination, assuming that preinductees are approximately representa 
tive of the general population (in similar age groups). There are some obvious 
methodological problems involved in using preinductees as a substitute for the 
general population—such as the dissimilarities between the two groups that resulted 
from disqualifications before examination, and draft deferments favoring certain 
segments of the general population—but the young men who took the draft 
examination were the closest thing to a representative sample that was readily 
available for statistical study.
In 1960, Bernard D. Karpinos examined the “Fitness of American Youth for 
Military Service” during the Korean Conflict (July 1950-July 1953) and found that 
91.3 percent of all young men were able to pass the minimum aptitude standards 
for induction. Karpinos concluded that, since all men between 18 and 26 years of 
age were equally liable for military service during the war, the results of the 
preinduction testing presented a reasonably accurate picture of the general “fitness” 
of American youth for military service.5
4Certain measures of success, such as reenlistment eligibility and paygrade achieved after a 
specified period of time, are commonly used. However, most analyses of success in terms of personnel 
performance center on the individual’s ability to be a “completer,” or one who simply receives a 
passing mark (as opposed to a grade of high achievement) and finishes the full term of obligated 
service without getting into trouble.
’Bernard D. Karpinos, “Fitness of American Youth for Military Service,” Milbank Memorial 
Fund Quarterly 38 (June 1960): 213-247. Karpinos notes, however, that the data are dispropor 
tionately weighted by youths who could not qualify for voluntary enlistment or other reserve 
programs, but were subsequently examined for induction, and, conversely, the data do not include 
persons who were able to discharge their military liability in a “nondraft method.” Overall, 76.4 
percent of the young men examined were able to qualify for induction (including the additional 
rejections for medical and moral unsuitability). See also Bernard D Karpinos, Draftees: Disqualifica 
tions fo r  Military Service fo r  Medical Reasons— A n  Analysis o f  Trends Over Time, Report No. MA- 
72-1 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower and Reserve 
Affairs], June 1972).
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A study of the “mental qualification” of American youth for military service 
in 1960 showed that preinductees (young men ordered to report for the induction 
examination) were distributed according to AFQT Category as follows:6
Table 11












*Less than 0.5 percent.
Source: Karpinos, 1966.
in c lu d e s  all racial/ethnic groups other than black.
In response to a request by the General Accounting Office, historical data on 
the AFQT scores of preinductees were compiled and analyzed by the Department 
of Defense during the early days of the All-Volunteer Force. Specifically, the data 
were requested so that changes over time in AFQT scores could be evaluated. The 
distributions of preinductees by AFQT Category none-the-less provide an approxi 
mation of the general population who could probably qualify for induction during 
the indicated periods. As shown in Table 12, about 80 percent of preinductees 
scored AFQT 10 or above (Categories I-IV) in the 1958-64 period and thus
6Bernard D. Karpinos, “The Mental Qualification of American Youths for Military Service And 
its Relationship to Educational Attainment,” Proceedings, American Statistical Association, 1966. 
(Reprint.) See also Bernard D. Karpinos, Qualification o f American Youths fo r  Military Service 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1962).
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Table 12
Percent Distribution of Preinductees by AFQT 
Category During Selected Time Periods, 1958-72





1 9.0 6.7 6.2 6.5
II 23.2 27.6 29.5 31.7
III 26.4 32.0 34.5 34.9
IV 22.9 20.6 19.2 17.8
Subtotal 81.5 86.8 89.4 90.9
V 18.5 13.2 10.6 9.1
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Derived from data in Bernard D. Karpinos, AFQT: Historical Data (1958-1972), SR- 
ED-75-12 (Alexandria, VA.: HumRRO, June 1975), p. 11.
“passed” (or were not routinely disqualified) the aptitude test, compared with about 
90 percent during the late 1960s and the transition to all-volunteer recruitment.
Table 13 presents the percentages of white and black preinductees who 
achieved scores of 10 or higher on the AFQT during each year between 1953 and 
1971. It can be seen here that the proportion of white preinductees who “qualified” 
on the basis of the aptitude test remained between about 88 and 90 percent from 
1953 through 1964. In 1965, the proportion of white preinductees scoring above 
Category V edged above 90 percent for the first time; it then increased again the 
following year and stayed in the range of 94 to 96 percent up to the all-volunteer 
transition.
There is considerable variability in the proportion of black preinductees 
scoring AFQT 10 or higher between 1953 and 1965, with the appearance of 
especially low “passing” rates in the 1955 through 1959 time period (ranging from 
a low of 39 percent in 1955 to a high of 46 percent in 1956 and 1959). In 1966, an 
increase similar to that seen for whites occurred in the proportion of black 
preinductees scoring in AFQT Categories I through IV. Between 1965 and 1966, 
the proportion of black preinductees with initially “qualifying” scores jumped from
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Table 13
Percent of Preinductees Who Achieved 
AFQT Percentile Scores of 10 or Higher During 
Initial Examination by Race, FY 1953-71
Fiscal
Year
Percent of Preinductees Who Scored 





















Source: Derived from data in Bernard D. Karpinos, Draftees: A FQ T Failures 
(Alexandria, VA: HumRRO, February 1973), p. 3. (Processed.)
aFrom 1953 through 1971, approximately 11.4 million preinductees were 
examined— including 9.8 million white (and other) young men and 1.6 million black 
young men.
bWhite category includes all racial/ethnic groups other than black.
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58 percent to 67 percent. In 1967, it increased again to 72 percent, then declined 
below 70 percent for the next two years, and rose again above 70 percent for the 
final years of the draft. It may appear that these black test score trends are 
inconsistent with overall national trends. The general trend of increasing black test 
scores reflected in these data also appeared in national black aptitude test score 
data.7 The overall national trends increased from the 1950s until 1964 and 
decreased further until the late 1970s.8
The percentage of preinductees with AFQT scores of 10 or higher are arrayed 
by Census region and division in Table 14. For both white and black preinductees, 
“qualifying” rates are noticeably lower in the South. The magnitude of the 
difference between rates in the South and those in other regions, however, is much 
greater for black preinductees than it is for whites. In 1971, for example, about 98 
percent of all white preinductees from areas outside the South achieved AFQT 
scores of 10 or higher, compared with between 91 and 94 percent within the South. 
For black preinductees outside the South, the “passing” rate ranged between 79 and 
89 percent, while the rate for those in the Southern divisions was around 60 to 67 
percent.9
In 1972, the Defense Department’s Directorate for Manpower Research 
attempted to determine the military qualification rates for different categories of 
young men (white and black by state, area, and region of the country) using seven 
different combinations of minimum AFQT scores and educational levels. The data 
base included men who were examined for either voluntary enlistment or Selective 
Service induction during FY 1971 (a total of over one million cases), and it 
incorporated the results of aptitude testing as well as medical examination and 
moral review.10 Table 15 shows the military “qualification rates” for white and
’College Entrance Examination Board. National College Bound Seniors, 1982. Princeton, NJ: 
Admissions Testing Program, 1982).
8Brian K. Waters, The Test Score Decline: A Review and Annotated Bibliography, Technical 
Memorandum 81-2. (Washington, D.C.: Directorate for Accession Policy, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, August 1981).
’There are also large differences on the level of the individual states. For example, the rates in 
1971 were lowest for blacks in Louisiana and Mississippi, where less than half of the preinductees 
achieved AFQT scores of 10 or above. The rates for blacks were highest in Oklahoma, with 94 
percent “passing” the test. See Karpinos, Draftees: A F Q T  Failures, pp.7-8.
’“Department of Defense, “Geographic and Racial Differences Among Men Qualified for 
Military Service,” Manpower Research Note 72-16 (Washington, D.C.: Directorate for Manpower 
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black young men from the various Census regions and divisions. The qualifying 
requirements shown here include four different sets of minimum standards or 
conditions: (1) medically and morally qualified, minimum AFQT percentile score 
of 10 (AFQT Categories I through IV); (2) medically and morally qualified, 
minimum AFQT percentile of 21; (3) medically and morally qualified, high school 
graduates with a minimum AFQT percentile of 16, and nongraduates with a 
minimum AFQT percentile of 31; and (4) medically and morally qualified, high 
school graduates with a minimum AFQT percentile of 21, and nongraduates with a 
minimum AFQT percentile of 31. (The third set of standards is roughly equivalent 
to present minimum standards for the Army, and the fourth set is similar to the 
current minimum standards for the Marine Corps.)
The “qualifying” rates shown in Table 15 are somewhat inconsistent with the 
previous statistics on preinductees. For instance, the “qualifying” rates for blacks in 
the Northeast and North Central regions are generally higher than those for whites 
under the first set of standards (AFQT 10). At the same time, the rates for whites 
are lowest in the Northeast rather than the South under all sets of standards (though 
the “qualifying” rates for blacks are substantially lower in the South than in any 
other region). These differences and other inconsistencies in the data on 
preinductees may be attributed to the fact that Table 15 includes voluntary 
applicants for enlistment (a self-selected group) as well as the men summoned by 
Selective Service.
In 1964, the President’s Task Force on Manpower Conservation evaluated the 
military service examination process and the statistics on rejections. The Task Force 
found that one-third of all young men in the nation turning 18 would be found 
unqualified if they were to be examined for induction into the Armed Forces. Of
those rejected, about one-half would be turned down for medical reasons, and the 
remainder would fail through the inability to qualify on the aptitude test (about 16 
percent of all 18-year-old males throughout the nation). In a nationwide survey 
conducted by the Task Force, it was also discovered that a major proportion of the 
young men who failed the aptitude test were “the products of poverty”—the poor, 
the unskilled, the jobless, and the uneducated.11
In a study of the total youth population (17 to 24 years old) considered 
physically and mentally unfit for military service, carried out 14 years after the 
Task Force research, Kim and his associates estimated (a “reasonable estimate”) 
that about three-quarters of all young men and women who apply for enlistment 
would probably be found acceptable under the current medical, mental, and moral 
standards. Using data obtained through the Department of Defense High School
“ The President’s Task Force on Manpower Conservation, One-Third o f  a Nation: A  Report on 
Young Men Found Unqualified fo r  Military Service (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
January 1, 1964).
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Testing Program between 1974 and 1976, the research analysts also developed 
estimates of the population distribution by AFQT Category.12
Table 16 displays the AFQT distributions by educational level, sex, and race 
that were used to determine the “fitness” of American youth for military service.
Table 16
Percent Distribution of American Youth (17-24 Years) by 
Educational Level and AFQT Category, Sex, and Race, 1974-76
Educational 
Level and
American Youth (17-24 Year*), 1974-76
Male Female
AFQT
Category White8 Black White8 Black
Non-High School 
Graduates 
1 0.7 b 0.7 b
II 11.2 0.7 3.1 0.6
IIIA 13.3 2.1 12.1 2.0
IIIB 23.6 9.5 26.7 6.1
IV 33.1 38.1 39.1 40.0
V 18.1 49.6 21.0 51.3
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
High School Graduates
1 4.8 0.2 2.7 0.1
II 32.1 4.1 24.1 1.9
IIIA 21.6 7.3 20.7 4.4
IIIB 23.0 18.6 26.6 14.9
IV 16.6 50.4 23.4 55.0
V 1.9 19.4 2.5 23.7
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Derived from  data in Kwan H. Kim et a l„  Research of the Proportion of the Total 
Youth Population Which Is Physically and Mentally Unfit lor Military Service, Volume IB: Mam 
Report, N O S C -722 9 -K K /M S /R S  (Bethesda, MD.: M athtech, Inc., D ecem ber 1978), pp. 9 -1 1 /1 2
aW hite  category inc ludes all ra c ia l/e th n ic  groups other than black. 
b Less than 0.05 percent.
12Kim et al., Research o f  the Proportion o f  the Total Youth Population, Volume IA, p. 1-12.
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These estimated test score distributions were also arrayed by Census region and 
division and then combined with statistics on physical and medical disqualifications, 
diagnostic indicators, and various other demographic information to project 
disqualifications among the relevant age groups through the year 1995. It is 
important to note that the data on AFQT scores were estimated mainly on the basis 
of the scores of high school seniors who decided on their own to take the ASVAB. 
Since there were no comparable data on nongraduates (assuming that practically all 
seniors eventually graduated), it was necessary for the researchers to make several 
additional assumptions concerning the population, to accommodate for missing 
data through other sources, and to make assorted statistical adjustments. The 
percentage distributions shown in Table 16 were derived from some of the best 
available information at the time, but the distributions are very rough estimates 
nonetheless.
In the final analysis, neither the population of preinductees, the population of 
voluntary applicants, nor the group of high school students who elected to take the 
ASVAB can be considered a representative sample of the general population from 
which they came. Preinductees represent only the group of young men who did not 
have draft deferments or exemptions, did not satisfy their military obligation by 
alternative means, and were not dismissed from being examined. Applicants for 
enlistment and students who take the military’s test are much more homogeneous, 
as a rule, than their contemporaries in the community at large. Up to this time, 
manpower analysts had to accept these limitations and make as many statistical and 
conceptual concessions as necessary in estimating the “fitness” or military 
qualification rates of American youth. Now, with the “Profile of American Youth,” 
it is possible to estimate with scientific accuracy the numbers and proportions of 
young men and women from varied backgrounds who would be expected to 
qualify for each of the Armed Services.
THE “PROFILE O F AM ERICAN YO UTH ”: SU M M A R Y  O F THE  
STU D Y  A N D  SELECTED RESULTS
In 1980, the Department of Defense and the Military Services, in cooperation 
with the Department of Labor, sponsored a large-scale research project to assess the 
vocational aptitudes of American youth. A national probability sample of about 
12,000 young men and women, consisting of participants in the National 
Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of Youth Labor Force Behavior, was administered an
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operational version (Form 8a) of the ASVAB. The sample was designed to yield a 
data base that could be statistically projected (within known confidence intervals) 
to represent the entire national population born between January 1, 1957 and 
December 31, 1964.13
This project, known as the “Profile of American Youth,” marks the first time 
that a vocational aptitude test has been administered to a nationally representative 
sample. The “Profile Study” thus offers an unprecedented opportunity to evaluate 
the “cross-sectional character” of military enlistees based on a national measure of 
vocational test performance. In addition, the Military Services have, for the first 
time, a valid means for (a) detailing the specific attributes and “trainability” of the 
military-age population, by geographic area and social category (for recruiting 
purposes or possible future mobilization); (b) estimating, with a greater degree of 
precision, the effects of various modifications in aptitude/education standards on 
recruiting outcomes (under a variety of conditions); (c) tracking (through the 
linkage with the main NLS data bases) the labor force behavior of American youth 
according to measured vocational aptitudes and attitudes toward the military; and 
(d) gauging the comparative aptitudes of different demographic subgroups of 
American youth.
The findings from initial analyses of the “Profile Study” are presented in 
Profile o f American Youth: 1980 Nationwide Administration o f the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery.1* The “Profile Study” report describes the project, 
presents a comparison of the aptitude test scores of military recruits and 
contemporary youth, and evaluates the performance of selected population 
subgroups on the AFQT, ASVAB subtests and composites, and a reading grade 
level estimate derived from the Adult Basic Learning Examination (ABLE). Since 
the Military Services recruit primarily individuals who are at least 18 years old, the 
report focuses on persons who were 18 to 23 years old at the time of testing (birth 
years 1957 through 1962). The restriction on age reduced the sample size to 9,173.
A major part of the initial analyses was devoted to a comparison of the test 
scores of selected subgroups within the 1980 youth population. The demographic
13See Martin R. Frankel and Harold A. McWilliams, The Profile o f  American Youth: Technical 
Sampling Report (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, 1981). The 
sample contained individuals from urban and rural areas, youth from all major Census regions, and 
approximately equal proportions of males and females. Certain key groups such as Hispanics, blacks, 
and economically disadvantaged whites were oversampled, allowing for more precise subgroup 
analyses.
■‘Department of Defense, Profile o f  American Youth: 1980 Nationwide Administration o f  the 
Arm ed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], March 1982).
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variables used to differentiate population subgroups were age, sex, race/ethnicity, 
level of education, socioeconomic status, and geographic region. The results of the 
subgroup comparisons were generally consistent with the findings of published 
research on aptitude and achievement tests.15 For example, the “Profile” study 
results revealed the following differences in test performance among the several 
demographic categories:
•  Age. Average AFQT scores and estimates of reading grade level increased 
with age.
•  Sex. The average AFQT scores of males and females were similar. 
However, sex differences in average test scores were found on the aptitude 
composites—with males scoring higher on the Mechanical, Electronics, and 
General Composites, and females outscoring males on the Administrative 
Composite.
•  Race/Ethnicity. AFQT scores for whites were higher, on the average, than 
those recorded for either Hispanics or blacks. Hispanics, in turn, scored 
higher than blacks. This pattern of racial/ethnic group performance was the 
same on estimates of reading grade level and on the four aptitude 
composites examined (Mechanical, Administrative, General, and Elec 
tronics).
•  Level of Education. Aptitude test performance was strongly correlated with 
amount of formal schooling (based on high school graduation status). Non- 
high school graduates had the lowest average AFQT scores, and high 
school graduates had the highest scores. GED recipients scored between 
these two groups.
•  Socioeconomic Status. Individuals achieved higher scores on the AFQT in 
direct correspondence with advances in the amount of formal education 
completed by their mothers.16
•  Geographic Region. Average AFQT scores were highest for youths in the 
New England and West North Central regions of the country, and lowest in 
the three southern divisions. Persons in the East North Central, Middle 
Atlantic, Mountain, Pacific, and West South Central divisions scored 
approximately at the level of the overall population median.
15See Mark J. Eitelberg, Subpopulation Differences in Performance on Tests o f  Mental Ability: 
Historical Review and Annotated Bibliography, Technical Memorandum 81-3 (Washington, D.C.: 
Directorate for Accession Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, August 1981).
16The socioeconomic status of children and adolescents is typically indexed using mother’s 
education, father’s education, average family income, and father’s occupational status. Recent analyses 
of profile study data suggests that the measured effects of mother’s education on ASVAB performance 
approximate the measured effects of all four variables combined. For the profile study analyses, then, 
mother’s education was used in place of a socioeconomic status index as a general indicator of family 
background.
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Tables 17 and 18 give some idea of the extent of the differences in test score 
performance between the sexes, racial/ethnic groups, persons from different 
sections of the country, and persons with different levels of education. From these 
scores one can infer the probable effect that the military’s education and aptitude 
standards have on persons with different backgrounds.
Table 17
Mean AFQT Standard Scores of American Youth (18-23 Years) by 






GED High School 
Equivalency
High School Diploma 
Graduate and Above
White0
Male 438 511 547
Female 437 513 539
Total 438 512 543
Black d
Male 341 407 430
Female 333 417 432
Total 337 412 431
Hispanic
Male 358 451 495
Female 355 433 468
Total 359 442 481
Total
Male 420 493 528
Female 418 495 520
Total 419 494 524
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).
aScores were standardized to a metric with a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. 
^American youth population includes all persons born between Janury 1,1957 and December 
31,1962.
cWhite category includes all racial/ethnic groups other than black or Hispanic. 
dBlack category does not include persons of Hispanic origin.
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Table 18
Mean AFQT Standard Scores of American Youth (18-23 Years) by 
Sex, Racial/Ethnic Group, and Geographic Region8
Racial/Ethnic 
Group and Sexb







Male 535 529 508 522
Female 534 521 509 528
Total 535 525 509 525
Black
Male 405 422 383 405
Female 424 400 401 426
Total 415 411 392 416
Hispanic
Male 420 430 458 426
Female 388 441 430 430
Total 404 436 444 428
Total
Male 510 508 488 500
Female 509 500 489 508
Total 510 504 489 504
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).
aScores were standardized to a metric with a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. 
b American youth population includes all persons born between January 1,1957 and December
31,1962.
M ETHO DO LO GY EM PLO YED IN THE PR ESENT STUDY
The “Profile of American Youth,” as noted, contains ASVAB performance 
measures for a nationally representative sample of American youth. For the 
purposes of previous analyses, this sample was statistically weighted to correspond 
with the 1980 national youth population. Since the “Profile Study” incorporated 
the scores of contemporary youth on a version of the ASVAB similar to that used
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currently to screen military recruits, it is possible to estimate, with reasonable 
precision, the numbers and proportions of young men and women who would be 
expected to qualify for military enlistment under current standards.
The minimum education and aptitude standards applied by the Armed 
Services during FY 1981 were selected for use in the present study because this 
period (October 1980 through September 1981) coincided roughly with the point 
of educational attainment established for the “Profile of American Youth” 
population (that is, September 1980, or the start of the 1980-81 school year). Table 
19 shows the FY 1981 aptitude standards for enlistment by Service, sex, and 
educational level. It should be noted that the minimum standards are the 
operational criteria employed during most of the year; and minimum scores are 
expressed as percentile scores on the AFQT and as standard scores on aptitude 
composites. In FY 1981, these scores were derived by combining subtests appearing 
on ASVAB forms 8, 9, or 10.
It is obvious from Table 19 that each Military Service applies its own aptitude 
standards in determining eligibility for enlistment. These aptitude standards reflect 
the diverse requirements of the separate Services, and they typically vary according 
to educational attainment (high school graduation status) and, at times, sex. For 
example, individuals wishing to enlist in the Army are required to achieve a 
minimum AFQT score of 16 and a score of at least 85 on one of ten Army- 
specific aptitude composites. In contrast, Air Force enlistment standards for FY 
1981 required that male and female high school graduates achieve a minimum 
AFQT score of 21; in addition, prospective recruits were required to attain a 
combined Air Force specific-aptitude composite score (including the Mechanical, 
Administrative, General, and Electronics composites) of no less than 120 and a 
General composite score of at least 30.
The component ASVAB subtests (forms 8, 9, and 10) for the aptitude 
composites listed specifically in Table 19 (under Marine Corps and Air Force 
standards) are:
Mechanical (M): Mechanical Comprehension, Automotive-Shop Informa 
tion, and General Science.
Administrative (A): Coding Speed, Numerical Operations, Paragraph 
Comprehension, and Word Knowledge.
General (G) and General Technical (GT): Arithmetic Reasoning, 
Paragraph Comprehension, and Word Knowledge.
Electronics (E): Arithmetic Reasoning, Electronics Information, General 
Science, and Mathematics Knowledge.
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Table 19
Fiscal Year 1981 Minimum Aptitude Standards for Enlistment by 
Service, Sex, and Educational Level8
Educational Laval
Minimum Aptltuds Standards










H.S. Diploma Graduate 16 85 on Any 1 16 85 on Any 1
GED 31 85 on Any 1 31 85 on Any 1
Non-H.S. Graduate 31 85 on Any 2 31 85 on Any 2
NAVY
H.S. Diploma Graduate 17 b School Eligible0
GED 31 b School Eligible0
Non-H.S. Graduate 38 b Not Eligible
MARINE CORPS
H.S. Diploma Graduate 21 GT<,=80 50 b
Non-H.S. Graduate
(Including GED) 21 01^=95 Not Eligible
AIR FORCE
H.S. Diploma Graduate 21 G*=30; MAGE<=120 21 G*=30; MAGE*=120
GED 50 G*=30; MAGE*=120 50 G*=30; MAGE*=120
Non-H.S. Graduate 65 G*=30; MAGEI=120 65 G*=30; MAGE*=120
a M in im um  a p titude  s tandards (opera tiona l) a re  expressed  as p e rcen tile  sco re s  on the  A rm ed F o rces  Q ua lifica tio n  Test 
(AFQT) and s tandard sco res  on the  aptitude  com posites. In 1981, these sco res  w e re  derived  from  co m b ina tio ns  o f subtests 
a ppearing  on Arm ed S erv ices V oca tiona l Battery (ASVAB) Form s 8, 9, o r 10. 
b No m inim um  ap titude  com pos ite  standard.
c "S ch o o l e lig ib le " as de fined  in D epartm ent o f the  Navy, "C rite ria  fo r S e lection  o f R ecru its  and N ew  A ccess ions  fo r Formal 
S choo l T ra in ing .”  NAVMILPERSCO M  Instruction  1236.1 A  (W ashington, D.C.: Navy M ilita ry  P ersonnel Com m and, January 1981). 
d G en era l-T echn ica l (GT) ap titude  com posite . 
eG enera l (G) ap titude  com posite .
fCom bined  scores on  the  M echan ica l (M), A dm in is tra tive  (A). G enera l (G), and E lectron ics (E) aptitude  com posites.
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The enlistment standards for the Army shown in Table 19 require that 
applicants attain a standard score of at least 85 on “any 1” (for high school diploma 
graduates) or “any 2” (for all others) of the Army’s aptitude composites. The 
aptitude composites (and component subtests) used by the Army include the 
following:
Combat (CO): Coding Speed, Arithmetic Reasoning, Mechanical 
Comprehension, and Automotive-Shop Information.
Field Artillery (FA): Coding Speed, Arithmetic Reasoning, Mechanical 
Comprehension, and Mathematics Knowledge.
O perators/Food (OF): Numerical Operations, Paragraph Compre 
hension, Word Knowledge, Mechanical Comprehension, and Auto 
motive-Shop Information.
Surveillance/Communications (SC): Numerical Operations, Coding 
Speed, Paragraph Comprehension, Word Knowledge, and Automotive- 
Shop Information.
General Maintenance (GM): General Science, Automotive-Shop Infor 
mation, Mathematics Knowledge, and Electronics Information.
Mechanical Maintenance (MM): Numerical Operations, Electronics 
Information, Mechanical Comprehension, and Automotive-Shop Informa 
tion.
Electronics (EL): Same as Electronics (E) above.
Clerical (CL): Same as Administrative (A) above.
Skilled Technical (ST): Paragraph Comprehension, Word Knowledge, 
Mathematics Knowledge, Mechanical Comprehension, and General 
Science.
General/Technical (GT): Same as General (G) and General Technical 
(GT) above.
The Navy did not have an enlistment eligibility requirement for minimum 
scores on specific aptitude composites other than the AFQT during FY 1981. 
Nonetheless, aptitude composite standards were used by the Navy in determining 
the eligibility of applicants for job training and assignment and in determining 
“school eligibility” (and basic enlistment eligibility) of female applicants. The 
Navy’s aptitude composites are similar to those presented above, though structured 
and weighted to fit the particular training and skill demands of occupations in this 
Service.
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The aptitude standards established for males and females with different levels 
of education were transcribed into selection algorithms for each of the Armed 
Services. A computer program was created to identify both qualified and 
unqualified participants in the “Profile of American Youth” data file.
The subgroups selected for the present study were limited to gender, the three 
racial/ethnic categories analyzed in the Defense Department report (white, black, 
and Hispanic),17 the three categories of high school graduation status identified by 
the Armed Services in their standards (below high school graduate, General Educa 
tional Development [GED] high school equivalency, and high school diploma 
graduate and above), and the four regions and nine divisions established by the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census.18
The base population used to derive the “qualification rates” is shown in Table 
20. This population—presented by racial/ethnic group, sex, and educational 
level—includes all (approximately 25 million) residents of the United States who 
were born between January 1, 1957 and December 31, 1962. The educational 
level of a very small proportion of the “Profile” study sample (about 1.4 percent of 
all participants) could not be determined at the time of the data analysis. Since 
educational level is an important criterion of the individual’s ability to qualify for 
enlistment, “unknown education” cases were excluded from computation of the 
subgroup qualification rates. This procedure reduced the total base population by 
about 350,000 persons, with proportional decreases in each of the subgroup 
categories.19
STUDY RESULTS 
Eligibility for Enlistment: Selected Subgroups
Two sets of tables were produced to show separately (1) the estimated 
enlistment qualification rates (percent) among the various selected subgroups for 
each of the Armed Services and (2) the corresponding numbers of American youth
17For the purpose of this analysis, the white category includes all racial/ethnic groups other than 
black or Hispanic; and the black category does not include persons of Hispanic origin.
l8A list of the states that comprise the geographic regions and divisions appears in Appendix C.
19There were slight variations among the subgroup categories in the proportion of “unknown 
education” cases. For example, “unknown” cases occurred most often among black males (2.2 
percent) and least often among Hispanic males and white males (1.2 percent).
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Table 20
Base Population Used to Derive Qualification Rates by 













































































Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).
aBase population includes residents of the United States born between January 1,1957 and 
December 31, 1962. Base population figures in this table exclude persons for whom education 
was unknown. Exclusion of these persons reduced base population figures by an average of 1.4 
percent below Bureau of the Census estimates. Unknown cases occurred most often among 
black males (2.2 percent) and least often among Hispanic and white males (1.2 percent).
kwhite category includes all racial/ethnic groups other than black or Hispanic. Black 
category does not include Hispanics.
cEducation as of September 1980 (start of the 1980-81 school year).
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in each demographic category who would be expected to meet the minimum 
aptitude standards. The qualification rates for the four Services appear in Tables 21 
through 24. The corresponding estimates of the numbers of young men and women 
considered eligible for enlistment are displayed in Tables 25 through 28.
It should be noted again that the percentages and numbers presented here are 
estimates of the portion of the population that would have qualified for enlistment 
based only on the education/aptitude criteria applied in FY 1981.20 Eligibility for 
actual enlistment would have depended on the individual’s ability to satisfy certain 
other requirements, including standards that relate to physical fitness, medical 
condition, and background and behavior (i.e., the so-termed moral standards).
Higher minimum aptitude scores, as seen above in Table 19, were required 
ordinarily for male non-high school graduates and recipients of GED high school 
equivalency certificates in each of the four Services. The “Profile of American 
Youth” revealed that aptitude test scores tend to increase, on the average, in direct 
correspondence with advances in an individual’s level of education. The com 
bination of higher minimum aptitude standards and lower average scores for high 
school dropouts reduced considerably the number and percentage of nongraduates 
who would have been eligible for military service. Restrictions on women (e.g., 
Congressional restrictions on women in combat) likewise diminished their relative 
eligibility compared with males in all educational categories. In FY 1981, for 
instance, female non-high school graduates were not eligible to enlist in either the 
Navy or the Marine Corps; females with GED certificates also were barred from 
joining the Marine Corps; and female high school graduates wishing to enter the 
Navy or Marine Corps were required to meet higher minimum aptitude standards 
than those established for male graduates.
In general, proportionately more young men and women—within each level 
of education and racial/ethnic category—would have been able to qualify for
20The minimum education and aptitude standards applied in FY 1981 are the same as those 
applied in FY 1982. Beginning in FY 1983, the Navy and the Marine Corps modified their minimum 
standards as follows: (1) in the Navy, differential standards for females were eliminated, so females at 
all educational levels were required to meet the same standards as those established for males; (2) in 
the Marine Corps, males who did not possess a high school diploma were required to attain an AFQT 
percentile score of no less than 31 (instead of 21) and a standard score of at least 105 (instead of 95) 
on the General-Technical composite. All other minimum standards in the Armed Services were the 
same in FY 1983 as in FY 1981. Table D -l through D-4 in Appendix D display the effects of the FY 




Estimate Percent of American Youth
(18-23 Years) Who Would Qualify for Enlistment by
Educational Level, Racial/Ethnic Group, and Sex*















Male 42.4 73.0 95.6 83.9
Female 40.8 79.2 95.4 86.0
Total 41.7 76.0 95.5 84.9
Black*
Male 8.9 37.7 61.0 40.7
Female 4.6 32.4 61.1 45.5
Total 7.1 35.2 61.0 43.1
Hispanic
Male 11.6 48.7 85.8 52.8
Female 15.3 31.8 79.1 52.5
Total 13.3 40.0 82.4 52.7
Total
Male 32.2 66.6 91.4 76.3
Female 30.8 69.6 90.3 78.3
Total 31.6 68.0 90.8 77.3
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).
aEstimates of the percent of youth qualified for military service were calculated on the basis of 
results from the "Profile of American Youth” (administration of the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery [ASVAB] to a national probability sample in 1980) and the 1981 education/aptitude 
standards used by the Armed Services. (It should be noted that eligibility for enlistment would also 
depend on other factors—including medical and moral requirements.)
b American youth population includes all persons born between January 1,1957 and December
31,1962.
cEducational level as of September 1980 (start of the 1980-81 school year). 
dWhite category includes all racial/ethnic groups other than black or Hispanic. 




Estimated Percent of American Youth
(18-23 Years) Who Would Qualify for Enlistment by















Mai* 35.2 73.0 95.5 82.3
Female 0.0 67.6 79.7 66.4
Total 19.9 70.4 87.5 74.5
Black*
Male 6.4 37.7 63.7 41.4
Female 0.0 14.6 30.6 22.1
Total 3.8 26.6 45.6 31.7
Hispanic
Male 9.1 48.7 85.1 51.3
Female 0.0 23.6 45.4 26.9
Total 4.8 35.7 64.8 39.2
Total
Male 26.4 66.6 91.6 75.0
Female 0.0 57.2 72.0 57.8
Total 15.0 62.1 81.6 66.6
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by ttie Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).
aEsttmates of the percent of youth qualified for military service were calculated on the basis of 
results from the “Profile of American Youth" (administration of the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery [ASVAB] to a national probability sample in 1980) and the 1981 education/aptitude 
standards used by the Armed Services. (It should be noted that eligibility for enlistment would also 
depend on other factors—including medical and moral requirements.)
b American youth population includes all persons bom between January 1,1957 and December
31,1962.
cEducatlonal level as of September 1980 (start of the 1980-81 school year). 
dWhlte category Includes all racial/ethnic groups other than black or Hispanic. 
eBlack category does not Include persons of Hispanic origin.
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Table 23
Estimated Percent of American Youth
(18-23 Years) Who Would Qualify for Enlistment by
Educational Level, Racial /Ethnic Group, and Sex*















Male 39.7 67.2 92.1 80.5
Female 0.0 0.0 67.7 54.4
Total 22.5 35.1 79.8 67.7
Black*
Male 6.5 26.7 52.1 34.2
Female 0.0 0.0 18.5 13.1
Total 3.9 13.9 33.8 23.6
Hispanic
Male 10.5 38.9 79.0 48.3
Female 0.0 0.0 31.5 18.1
Total 5.5 18.8 54.7 33.3
Total
Male 29.7 66.6 87.2 72.4
Female 0.0 0.0 59.8 46.4
Total 16.8 31.1 73.2 59.6
Source Derived from special tabulations provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).
aEstimates of the percent of youth qualified for military service were calculated on the basis of 
results from the "Profile of American Youth" (administration of the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery [ASVAB] to a national probability sample in 1980) and the 1981 education/aptitude 
standards used by the Armed Services. (It should be noted that eligibility for enlistment would also 
depend on other factors—including medical and moral requirements.)
b American youth population includes all persons born between January 1,1957 and December
31.1962.
cEducational level as of September 1980 (start of the 1980-81 school year). 
dWhite category includes all racial/ethnic groups other than black or Hispanic. 
eBlack category does not include persons of Hispanic origin.
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Table 24
— a ir  f o r c e  —
Estimated Percent of American Youth (18-23 Years)
Who Would Qualify for Enlistment by Educational Level,















Male 11.8 56.3 88.1 71.3
Female 10.4 55.8 82.2 69.6
Total 11.2 56.1 85.1 70.5
Black*
Male 0.8 10.5 34.9 21.3
Female 0.7 11.9 29.9 21.7
Total 0.8 11.2 32.1 21.5
Hispanic
Male 0.7 19.9 67.8 37.5
Female 2.3 13.8 46.1 27.9
Total 1.5 16.8 56.7 32.7
Total
Male 8.3 47.8 81.4 62.6
Female 7.6 46.9 74.0 60.4
Total 8.0 47.4 77.6 61.5
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).
aEstimates of the percent of youth qualified for military service were calculated on the basis of 
results from the “Profile of American Youth" (administration of the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery [ASVAB] to a national probability sample in 1980) and the 1981 education/aptitude 
standards used by the Armed Services. (It should be noted that eligibility for enlistment would also 
depend on other factors—including medical and moral requirements.)
bAmerican youth population includes all persons born between January 1,1957 and December
31.1962.
cEducational level as of September 1980 (start of the 1980-81 school year). 
dWhite category includes all racial/ethnic groups other than black or Hispanic. 




Estimated Number of American Youth (18-23 Years)
Who Would Qualify for Enlistment by Educational Level,










































































Source Derived from special tabulations provided by the Office of the Assisted Secretary of 
Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).
aEstimates of the number of youth qualified for military service were calculated on the basis of 
results from the "Profile of American Youth" (administration of the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery [ASVAB] to a national probability sample In 1980) and the 1981 education/aptitude 
standards used by the Armed Services. (It should be noted that eligibility for enlistment would also 
depend on other factors—including medical and moral requirements.)
b American youth population includes all persons born between January 1,1957 and December
31,1962.
cEducational level as of September 1980 (start of the 1980-81 school year). 
dWhite category includes all racial/ethnic groups other than black or Hispanic. 
eBlack category does not include persons of Hispanic origin.
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Table 26
— n a v y  —
Estimated Number of American Youth (18-23 Years)
Who Would Qualify for Enlistment by Educational Level,













































































Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).
aEstimates of the number of youth qualified for military service were calculated on the basis of 
results from the "Profile of American Youth" (administration of the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery [ASVAB] to a national probability sample in 1980) and the 1981 education/aptitude 
standards used by the Armed Services. (It should be noted that eligibility for enlistment would also 
depend on other factors—including medical and moral requirements.)
^American youth population includes all persons born between January 1,1957 and December 
31. 1962
cEducational level as of September 1980 (start of the 1980-81 school year). 
dWhite category includes all racial/ethnic groups other than black or Hispanic. 
eBlack category does not include persons of Hispanic origin.
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Table 27
— MARINE CORPS —
Estimated Number of American Youth (18-23 Years)
Who Would Qualify for Enlistment by Educational Level,













































































Source Derived from special tabulations provided by the Office of the Assisted Secretary of 
Defense (Manpower. Installations, and Logistics).
aEstimates of the percent of youth qualified for military service were calculated on the basis of 
results from the "Profile of American Youth" (administration of the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery [ASVAB] to a national probability sample in 1980) and the 1981 education/aptitude 
standards used by the Armed Services. (It should be noted that eligibility for enlistment would also 
depend on other factors—including medical and moral requirements.)
^American youth population includes all persons born between January 1,1957 and December
31,1962.
cEducational level as of September 1980 (start of the 1980-81 school year). 
dWhite category Includes all racial/ethnic groups other than black or Hispanic. 
eBlack category does not include persons of Hispanic origin.
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Table 28
— AIR FORCE —
Estimated Number of American Youth (18-23 Years)
Who Would Qualify for Enlistment by Educational Level,













































































Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).
aEstimates of the number of youth qualified for military service were calculated on the basis of 
results from the "Profile of American Youth" (administration of the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery [ASVAB] to a national probability sample in 1980) and the 1981 education/aptitude 
standards used by the Armed Services. (It should be noted that eligibility for enlistment would also 
depend on other factors—including medical and moral requirements )
^American youth population includes all persons born between January 1,1957 and December
31,1962.
cEducational level as of September 1980 (start of the 1980-81 school year). 
dWhite category includes all racial/ethnic groups other than black or Hispanic. 
eBlack category does not include persons of Hispanic origin.
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enlistment in the Army than in any other Service. The overall effect of minimum 
aptitude standards on the comparative ability of persons to qualify for enlistment in 
the other Services may be summarized as follows:
•  The proportion of males (regardless of racial/ethnic group) with GED high 
school equivalency certificates and of males with high school diplomas who 
would have qualified for enlistment is largest for the Navy and Army, next 
largest for the Marine Corps, and smallest for the Air Force.
•  Young men without high school diplomas or equivalency certificates would 
have found it comparatively easier (but just slightly) to qualify for the 
Marine Corps than for the Navy, and most difficult to have qualified for the 
Air Force.
•  Females with high school diplomas would have found it most difficult to 
qualify for the Marine Corps in FY 1981. For white female graduates, the 
next lowest qualification rate was that for the Navy and then the Air Force, 
while for black female graduates the qualification rate for these Services 
was reversed. Because of the bar on women who did not possess diplomas, 
the overall proportion of females eligible to enlist in the Marine Corps was 
the lowest of all the Services. The Navy’s aptitude requirements for women 
with equivalency certificates were slightly more lenient than those of the Air 
Force.
It is quite apparent from the results presented here that enlistment “selectivity” 
varies from Service to Service. About three out of four young men, on the average, 
would have qualified for the Army (76.3 percent), Navy (75.0 percent), or Marine 
Corps (72.4 percent) in FY 1981, compared with fewer than two out of three (62.6 
percent) for the Air Force. Just over three out of four (78.3 percent) women would 
have been expected to meet the Army’s minimum requirements, compared with 
about three out of five for the Air Force (60.4 percent) and the Navy (57.8 
percent), and fewer than one out of two (46.4 percent) for the Marine Corps.
Even more dramatic, however, are the effects of aptitude/education standards 
on the enlistment eligibility rates for the three racial/ethnic groups. For example, 
approximately four out of five white youth would have been expected to qualify for 
enlistment in the Army during FY 1981. Just over half (54.6 percent) of all 
Hispanic youth, and just under half (48.1 percent) of all black youth, would have 
met the minimum aptitude standards established by the Army. And the disparity 
between racial/ethnic groups is even wider in the other Services. About three out of 
10 white youth (29.5 percent), for instance, probably would have failed to qualify 
for entry into the Air Force, based on FY 1981 minimum education/aptitude
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standards; in sharp contrast, almost four out of five (78.5 percent) black youth 
would have been rejected by the Air Force for aptitude test score or education level 
disqualifications.
Differential aptitude standards had a pronounced effect on the eligibility rates 
for American youth in three education categories, both within and between the 
separate racial/ethnic groups. The enlistment eligibility rates for non-high school 
graduates, regardless of racial/ethnic group, were considerably below the com 
parable rates for persons with equivalency certificates or high school diplomas (who 
could qualify with lower test scores). Minorities who were high school dropouts 
(without GED certificates), in fact, had little or no likelihood in FY 1981 of being 
able to meet the minimum aptitude score criteria established for enlistment in the 
Armed Services. This was especially true for black nongraduates. In FY 1981, 
about 7.1 percent probably could have passed the Army’s standards, compared 
with still lower proportions in the Navy and Marine Corps and less than one 
percent in the Air Force.
Tables 25 through 28 display the estimated numbers of young men and 
women—by educational level, racial/ethnic group, and sex—who would have been 
expected to qualify for enlistment into each of the four Military Services during FY 
1981. These data are presented here to give some idea of (1) the approximate 
number of youth, by selected demographic subgroup, affected by the eligibility rates 
shown above, and (2) the differential impact of Service standards on the supply of 
qualified applicants.
Eligibility for Enlistment: Regional Differences
The results of the “Profile of American Youth” revealed regional differences in 
the test performance of young men and women. These differences are related to 
other factors, such as urban-rural composition, quality of education, and socio 
economic and subcultural differences. Nevertheless, the variations in test per 
formance around the nation indicate that the “qualified and available” population 
in, say, Mississippi or Georgia may be quite unlike its counterpart in Maine or New 
York. And these variations in aptitude test scores from one region to the next hold 
some bearing on the allocation of resources for recruiting, on issues concerning 
future mobilization of manpower, and on other policy or program decisions that are 
connected with regional recruiting or draft quotas.
Table 29 shows the estimated percent of American youth who would have 
been expected to qualify for enlistment in FY 1981 by Census region and division 
and Military Service (Appendix table C-l displays Census regions and Divisions by
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State). Table 30 displays the corresponding numbers of eligible young men and 
women from the four regions and nine component divisions. (It should be noted 
that persons outside the major regions—such as those in outlying areas, bordering 
nations, and countries and dependencies of special sovereignty (n=233)—were 
excluded from the analysis.)
Table 29
Estimated Percent of American Youth (18-23 years) Who 
Would Qualify for Enlistment by Census Region and 
Division, and Military Service3






Northeast 81.4 72.4 64.8 66.9
New England 86.5 76.3 70.6 72.3
Middle Atlantic 79.7 71.1 62.8 65.1
North Central 81.9 71.1 64.5 66.6
E. North Central 81.3 69.3 62.3 64.9
W. North Central 83.8 77.4 72.2 72.7
West 78.3 67.3 61.4 62.9
Mountain 83.6 69.3 66.8 62.2
Pacific 75.8 66.4 58.9 63.2
South 70.0 58.4 51.0 52.9
South Atlantic 69.4 57.4 50.8 52.7
E. South Central 69.2 54.7 44.2 49.0
W. South Central 72.0 63.1 55.8 56.0
TOTAL 77.3 66.6 59.6 61.5
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).
aEstimates of the percent of youth qualified for military service were calculated on the 
basis of results from the "Profile of American Youth” (administration of the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery [ASVAB] to a national probability sample in 1980) and the 1981 
education/aptitude standards used by the Armed Services. (It should be noted that eligibility 
for enlistment would also depend on other factors— includ ing medical and moral 
requirements.)
bAmerican youth population includes all persons born between January 1, 1957 and 
December 31, 1962. Estimates of American youth qualified for military service use 
educational level as of September 1980 (start of 1980-81 school year).
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Table 30
Estimated Number of American Youth (18-23 years) Who Would 
Qualify for Enlistment by Census Region and 
Division, and Military Service8
Census Region and 




































































Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).
aEstimates of the number of youth qualified for military service were calculated on the basis of 
results from the "Profile of American Youth" (administration of the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery [ASVAB] to a national probability sample in 1980) and the 1981 education/aptitude 
standards used by the Armed Services. (It should be noted that eligibility for enlistment would also 
depend on other factors— including medical and moral requirements.)
^American youth population includes all persons born between January 1,1957 and December 
31, 1962. Estimates of American youth qualified for military service use educational level as of 
September 1980 (start of 1980-81 school year).
cTotals may differ slightly from those presented in other tables due to exclusion of persons 
from areas outside the four major Census Regions and nine divisions listed here.
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The results presented in Tables 29 and 30 demonstrate that there are 
substantial differences in the “qualification rates” for designated geographical areas 
both within and between the Military Services. In the three divisions in the South, 
for instance, fewer than three out of four young men and women probably would 
have been qualified for enlistment into the Army during FY 1981; in the Northeast 
and North Central regions and part of the West (the Mountain states), on the other 
hand, it is estimated that better than four out of five individuals would have passed 
the Army’s education and aptitude standards.
The proportions of “qualified” American youth who reside in the South—the 
traditional recruiting base for the Armed Services, where pro-military sentiments 
are said to be the strongest, and where most military installations are situated— 
appear especially low when compared with the qualification rates in the other 
geographical areas. Indeed, less than half of all young men and women living in the 
East South Central division (Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi) 
would have been able to meet the FY 1981 education and aptitude standards 
established by either the Marine Corps or the Air Force. By comparison, the 
Marine Corps and Air Force would have found that about two out of every three 
young residents in the Northeast and North Central divisions qualified to join their 
enlisted ranks.
The geographical statistics on youth who were potentially eligible to enlist in 
the Navy or Marine Corps during FY 1981 obviously reflect the influence of 
restrictions on females who did not possess a high school diploma. The aggregate 
geographical statistics are influenced also by differences in the average educational 
level of individuals from different parts of the country. Tables 31 through 34, which 
present the estimated numbers and percent of “qualified” youth by educational 
level and sex, provide a more detailed view of the population and the effects of 
Service standards on specific categories of potential recruits within separate 
geographical areas.
Of particular note, perhaps, is the fact that there are certain regional 
differences in the relative proportion of males and females who would meet 
minimum aptitude standards for enlistment in the Army or the Air Force. For 
example, in the Army, the relative proportion of female nongraduates exceeded the 
proportion of male nongraduates in three divisions (East North Central, South 
Atlantic, and West South Central); female high school graduates had higher 
eligibility rates than their male counterparts in four divisions (Middle Atlantic, East 
South Central, Mountain, and Pacific); and, overall, the proportion of eligible 
female youth exceeded that of males in the Middle Atlantic, East North Central, 
South Atlantic, East South Central, Mountain, and Pacific divisions. In the Air 
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proportion of “qualified” males in the same Census divisions as the Army, with the 
exception of East North Central and Pacific.
During FY 1983, the Navy modified its minimum education and aptitude 
standards (as noted above) so that the same criteria applied to both women and 
men. This change resulted in a sizeable increase in the population of potentially 
qualified females at all three levels of education. In addition, in a pattern similar to 
the results in the Army and the Air Force, the proportion of females who would be 
expected to meet the Navy’s education and aptitude criteria surpassed the 
comparable proportion of males in several geographical areas. The estimated 
number and percent of the 1980 youth population who would have passed the 
Navy’s education and aptitude standards of FY 1983—by educational level, sex, 
and Census division—can be found in Appendix Table D-3.
With the understanding that enlistment standards are flexible and subject to 
change in accordance with manpower supply and demand, population eligibility 
rates were also calculated on the basis of various alternative standards. Four sets of 
alternative or “simulated” criteria were selected for analysis. The statistical results 
and a brief discussion of the findings are presented in Appendix E.
Table 35 was extracted from the data appearing in Appendix E. This excerpt 
shows the enlistment qualification rates for each of the Armed Services using actual 
and lower aptitude standards. The “lower” aptitude standards used here are the 
minimum scores for high school diploma graduates applied by each of the Services 
during FY 1983 (thus eliminating education differentials or the higher minimum 
aptitude requirements currently set for nongraduates and GEDs). While the data for 
all four Services show increases in the proportions of persons eligible, these 
increases are rather modest (i.e., from a low of two percent for the Air Force to a 
high of seven percent for the Navy). Obviously, the four Services share the 
manpower pool and therefore no one Service could actually expect to increase its 
pool by these amounts under such reduced standards. (More simulations, 
demographic details, and discussion can be found in Appendix E.)
Military Participation Rates
A popular subject of discussion, beginning around the middle of the 1960s and 
extending through the period of the All-Volunteer Force, has been the “representa 
tiveness” or statistical description of the youth population in the American 
military.21 Over the years, numerous attempts have been made to describe the
J1Mark J. Eitelberg, Military Representation: The Theoretical and Practical Implications o f  
Population Representation in the American Armed Forces, AD-A093-391 (Alexandria, VA: Defense 
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cross-sectional character of the Armed Services by estimating the “participation 
rates” of various demographic subgroups. The rates of participation for all youth 
(or specific age cohorts) can be determined easily with Department of Defense 
statistics on active duty personnel and Bureau of the Census population estimates. 
However, the “participation rates” of potentially qualified youth—a more refined 
measure of participation—must obviously be based on a reasonable estimation of 
the number and characteristics of the specific portion of the population that could 
be expected to pass through the military’s enlistment screens.
In 1976, Cooper drew upon 
exam ination  data  on p rein  
ductees and, assuming that the 
population of preinductees approx 
imated a representative sample of 
military-age youth, derived the 
several estimates of the popula 
tion classified as AFQT Cate 
gories I through III.22 These esti 
mates are shown in Table 36.
The projected population 
scores on the AFQT were then 
combined with Census data and 
Defense Department statistics on 
active duty recruiting, and a 
rough estimate was derived of 
the proportion of higher-quality 
youth (AFQT Categories I through III or AFQT percentile 31 and above) who had 
joined the Armed Services.23 These so-termed “participation rates” among men in 
the top three AFQT Categories are displayed in Table 37.
More recently, the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of Youth Labor Force 
Behavior (but without the “Profile of American Youth” component) was used to 
estimate military “participation rates” for males (18 to 21 years) during 1979 (the 
week of survey administration). The authors of one report on the NLS results, for 
instance, found generally higher participation rates for minorities than for whites,
“ Richard V.L. Cooper, Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force, R-1450-ARPA (Santa 
Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, September 1977), p. 213.
“ Ibid., p. 216.
Table 36
Previously Estimated Percent of 
Male Population Scoring in 
AFQT Categories I-III
Estimated Percent of Male Population Scoring 









especially when level of educa 
tion is taken into account (see 
Table 38).24 (It should be noted 
here that Cooper’s estimates are 
participation rates for Category I- 
III males of all ages—all of 
whom would generally qualify 
for enlistment—while the rates 
from the NLS analysis are per 
centages of the total population 
ages 18-23.)
Both of the previous studies 
summarized above show that mi 
norities—particularly those with 
higher levels of education and 
those in the higher aptitude cate 
gories—participate in the mili 
tary at relatively greater rates 
than their white counterparts. This is not unexpected, considering the fact that the 
Armed Services have been a traditional avenue of social mobility and (frequently) 
an employer of last resort for qualified minorities. Nevertheless, although the 
analysis by Cooper seeks to discover the participation rates of higher-quality youth, 
it is based largely on data obtained from the less-than-representative population of 
preinductees. And, while the study by the Center for Human Resource Research 
uses the NLS national probability sample to estimate general rates of participation, 
it did not yet have the benefit of aptitude testing results from the “Profile of 
American Youth”.
In the present analysis, the military “participation rates” of American male 
youth were calculated with aptitude and education data from the “Profile Study” 
and recruiting statistics compiled by the Defense Manpower Data Center. The 
“participation rate” is defined as the percentage of male youth born between 
January 1, 1957 and December 31, 1962 (18 through 23 years old at the time of
24Choongsoo Kim et al., The All-Volunteer Force: A n Analysis o f Youth Participation, Attrition, 
and Reenlistm ent (Columbus, OH: Center for Human Resource Research, The Ohio State University, 
May 1980), p. 213.
Previously Estimated Percent of 
Male Population in AFQT 
Categories I-III Who Enlisted 
in the Military
Table 37
Estimated Percent of Male Population in AFQT 








Source: C ooper, 1977.
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Table 38
Previously Estimated “Military 
Participation Rates” for Males 
(18-21 Years) by Racial/Ethnic 
Group and Education
Military Participation Rate (Percent) 
tor Males (18-21 Years)
Racial/Ethnic
Group
All Levels of 
Education






Source: Kim, et al. 1980.
the “Profile Study”) who would be qualified for enlistment and who actually 
enlisted in the military (for the first time) between July 1, 1973 and September 30, 
1981.25
Before the participation rates could be calculated, it was first necessary to 
obtain a detailed computation of all males born during the appropriate time period 
who had ever enlisted in the military. Table 39 shows this base population arrayed 
by racial/ethnic group, educational level, and Service in which enlisted. Using 
these statistics on male enlistees provided by the Department of Defense and the 
estimates of the general population (Table 20) and “qualified” population (Tables 
25 through 28), it was possible to derive two ratios: (1) the proportion of all male 
youth (within selected categories) who have ever participated in the active duty 
military; and (2) the proportion of all potentially qualified male youth who have 
ever entered active duty military service.
25The aforementioned ASVAB miscalibration affected the test scores of recruits who tested from 
1 January 1976 through 30 September 1980. The scores of AFQT Category IV examinees were 
inflated approximately 15 points; thus, the “participation rates” shown in Tables 40-44 are higher than 
would be expected without the calibration error.
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Table 39
Base Population Used to Derive Participation Rates by 
Racial/Ethnic Group, Educational Level, and Military Service8
Radal/Ethnlc 
Group and 







WHITE* 419,881 356,362 162,540* 240,019 1,178,802*
NHSG 188,563 91,377 50,966 16,584 347,490
GED 20,275 23,952 5,665 18,490 68,382
HSG 211,043 241,033 104,167 204,945 761,188
BLACK8 180,274 47,921 45,053* 35,874 309,122*
NHSG 56,396 8,146 10,759 1,046 76,347
GED 4,818 1,853 753 1,805 9,229
HSG 119,060 37,922 33,258 33,023 223,263
HISPANIC 30,615 12,849 12,671 8,554 64,089*
NHSG 10,685 2,582 3.785 420 17,472
GED 1,653 869 409 727 3,658
HSG 17,677 9,398 8,277 7,407 42,759
UNKNOWN 5,878 2,835 1,386 2,389 12,488
NHSG 2,757 319 246 110 3,432
GED 595 209 66 148 1,018
HSG 2,526 2,307 1,074 2,131 8,038
TOTAL 636,048 419,968 221,560 286,836 1,564,412*
NHSG 258,401 102,424 65,756 18,160 444,741
GED 27,341 26,884 6,893 21,170 82,288
HSG 350,306 290,660 146,776 247,506 1,035,248
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).
aBase population includes all males born between January 1 .19S7 and December 31,1962 who enlisted 
in the m ilitary (for the first time) between July 1973 and September 1981.
^Educational level at time of entry into m ilitary service. NHSG is non-h igh school graduate. GED is 
recip ient of General Educational Development (GED) high school equivalency certificate. HSG is high school 
diploma graduate or above
cWhite category includes all rac ia l/e thn ic  groups other than black or Hispanic.
^  Black category does not include persons of Hispanic origin.
in c lu d e s  persons lo r whom educational level could not be determined. Unknown cases are distributed 
as follows: White - 1,742; Black - 283; Hispanic - 200; Total - 2,225.
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Tables 40 through 44 present the results of this analysis for each of the four 
Armed Services and all Services combined. It should be noted that the cross- 
sectional participation rates displayed in the tables actually understate the true 
percentages of male youth who join the military, since they do not include
Table 40
Military Participation Rates of Male Youth Born 1957 
Through 1962 by Racial/Ethnic Group and Educational Level8
- a r m y  -
Educational Laval and 
Basa Population15
Racial/Ethnic Group
Whltac Blackd Hispanic Total
Below High School Graduate
All Youth 9.0 9.0 3.2 8.4
Qualified Youth 21.2 100.3* 28.0 26.2
GED High School Equivalency
"A I IY  outh 5.5 7.4 6.5 6.0
Qualified Youth 7.6 19.6 13.4 9.0
High School Diploma Graduate 
and Above
All Youth 2.7 11.9 4.3 3.8
Qualified Youth 2.8 19.5 5.0 4.2
TOTAL
All Youth 4.1 10.6 3.9 5.0
Qualified Youth 4.9 26.1 7.5 6.6
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).
Partic ipation  rate is the percentage of male youth born between January 1, 1957 and 
December 31, 1962 who enlisted in the military (for the first time) between July 1973 and 
September 1981. Participation rates are shown for two base populations: 1. all male youth within 
the racial/ethnic and education category; and 2. all male youth who would be expected to qualify 
for enlistment under 1981 aptitude test standards (by racial/ethnic and education category). The 
cross-sectional participation rates understate the true percentage of male youth who join the 
military since they do not include individuals who a) enlist after 30 September 1981 and b) enter 
officer programs. Estimates of the number of youth qualified for military service were calculated on 
the basis of results from the “Profile of American Youth” (administration of the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery to a national probability sample in 1980) and the 1981 education/ 
aptitude standards used by the Armed Services. (It should be noted that eligibility for enlistment 
would also depend on other factors— including medical and moral requirements.)
^For military personnel, education at time of entry (and initial qualification) into service. 
Approximately one percent of the male youth population could not be identified on the basis of 
education; and one percent of military personnel could not be identified on the basis of 
racial/ethnic group. These unknown cases were not included in the calculations of participation 
rates.
cWhite category includes all racial/ethnic groups other than black or Hispanic.
^Black category does not include persons of Hispanic origin.
eThis figure reflects the fact that during the FY 1976-80 period the Armed Services 
unknowingly accepted volunteers who did not meet eligibility standards because of errors in test 
calibration. Since these errors affected principally non-high school graduates with low aptitude 




Military Participation Rates of Male Youth Born 1957 
Through 1962 by Racial/Ethnic Group and Educational Level8
- n a v y  -
Racial/Ethnic Group
Educational Level and 
Base Population^ White® Blackd Hispanic Total
Below High School Graduate
All Youth 4.4 1.3 0.8 3.3
Qualified Youth 12.4 20.2 8.6 12.7
GED High School Equivalency
All Youth 6.5 2.8 3.4 5.9
Qualified Youth 8.9 7.5 7.0 8.8
High School Diploma Graduate 
and Above
All Youth 3.1 3.8 2.3 3.2
Qualified Youth 3.2 5.9 2.7 3.4
TOTAL
All Youth 3.5 2.8 1.7 3.3
Qualified Youth 4.2 6.8 3.3 4.4
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).
Partic ipation  rate is the percentage of male youth born between January 1, 1957 and 
December 31, 1962 who enlisted in the military (for the first time) between July 1973 and 
September 1981. Participation rates are shown for two base populations: 1. all male youth within 
the racial/ethnic and education category; and 2. all male youth who would be expected to qualify 
for enlistment under 1981 aptitude test standards (by racial/ethnic and education category). The 
cross-sectional participation rates understate the true percentage of male youth who join the 
military since they do not include individuals who a) enlist after 30 September 1981 and b) enter 
officer programs. Estimates of the number of youth qualified for military service were calculated on 
the basis of results from the “Profile of American Youth" (administration of the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery to a national probability sample in 1980) and the 1981 education/ 
aptitude standards used by the Armed Services. (It should be noted that eligibility for enlistment 
would also depend on other factors— including medical and moral requirements.)
P o r  military personnel, education at time of entry (and initial qualification) into service. 
Approximately one percent of the male youth population could not be identified on the basis of 
education; and one percent of military personnel could not be identified on the basis of 
racial/ethnic group. These unknown cases were not included in the calculations of participation 
rates.
cWhite category includes all racial/ethnic groups other than black or Hispanic.
dBlack category does not include persons of Hispanic origin.
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Table 42
Military Participation Rates of Male Youth Born 1957 
Through 1962 by Racial/Ethnic Group and Educational Level8
- MARINE CORPS -
Educational Level and 
B ate Population*9
Racial/Ethnic Group
White® Blackd Hispanic Total
Below High School Graduate
All Youth 2.4 1.7 1.1 2.1
Qualified Youth 6.1 26.1 11.0 7.2
GED High School Equivalency
All Youth 1.5 1.2 1.6 1.5
Qualified Youth 2.3 4.3 4.2 2.5
High School Diploma Graduate 
and Above
All Youth 1.3 3.3 2.0 1.6
Qualified Youth 1.5 6.4 2.5 1.8
TOTAL
All Youth 1.6 2.7 1.6 1.7
Qualified Youth 2.0 7.8 3.4 2.4
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).
Partic ipation  rate is the percentage of male youth born between January 1, 1957 and 
December 31, 1962 who enlisted in the military (for the first time) between July 1973 and 
September 1981. Participation rates are shown for two base populations: 1. all male youth within 
the racial/ethnic and education category: and 2. all male youth who would be expected to qualify 
for enlistment under 1981 aptitude test standards (by racial/ethnic and education category). The 
cross-sectional participation rates understate the true percentage of male youth who join the 
military since they do not include individuals who a) enlist after 30 September 1981 and b) enter 
officer programs. Estimates of the number of youth qualified for military service were calculated on 
the basis of results from the “Profile of American Youth" (administration of the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery to a national probability sample in 1980) and the 1981 education/ 
aptitude standards used by the Armed Services. (It should be noted that eligibility for enlistment 
would also depend on other factors— including medical and moral requirements.)
bFor military personnel, education at time of entry (and initial qualification) into service. 
Approximately one percent of the male youth population could not be identified on the basis of 
education; and one percent of military personnel could not be identified on the basis of 
racial/ethnic group. These unknown cases were not included in the calculations of participation 
rates.
cWhite category includes all racial/ethnic groups other than black or Hispanic.
dBlack category does not include persons of Hispanic origin.
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Table 43
Military Participants Rates of Male Youth Born 1957 
Through 1962 by Racial/Ethnic Group and Educational Level8
— AIR FORCE -
Educational Level and 
Base Population*’
Racial/Ethnic Group
White0 Blackd Hispanic Total
Below High School Graduate
All Youth 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.6
Qualified Youth 6.7 20.5 18.1 7.1
GED High School Equivalency
All Youth 5.0 2.8 2.9 4.6
Qualified Youth 8.9 26.4 14.4 9.7
High School Diploma Graduate 
and Above
All Youth 2.6 3.3 1.8 2.7
Qualified Youth 3.0 9.5 2.6 3.3
Total
All Youth 2.3 2.1 1.1 2.3
Qualified Youth 3.3 9.9 3.0 3.6
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).
Partic ipation  rate is the percentage of male youth born between January 1, 1957 and 
December 31, 1962 who enlisted in the military (for the first time) between July 1973 and 
September 1981. Participation rates are shown for two base populations: 1. all male youth within 
the racial/ethnic and education category; and 2. all male youth who would be expected to qualify 
for enlistment under 1981 aptitude test standards (by racial/ethnic and education category). The 
cross-sectional participation rates understate the true percentage of male youth who join the 
military since they do not include individuals who a) enlist after 30 September 1981 and b) enter 
officer programs. Estimates of the number of youth qualified for military service were calculated on 
the basis of results from the “Profile of American Youth" (administration of the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery to a national probability sample in 1980) and the 1981 education/ 
aptitude standards used by the Armed Services. (It should be noted that eligibility for enlistment 
would also depend on other factors— including medical and moral requirements.)
P o r  military personnel, education at time of entry (and initial qualification) into service. 
Approximately one percent of the male youth population could not be identified on the basis of 
education; and one percent of military personnel could not be identified on the basis of 
racial/ethnic group. These unknown cases were not included in the calculations of participation 
rates.
cWhite category includes all racial/ethnic groups other than black or Hispanic.
dBlack category does not include persons of Hispanic origin.
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Table 44
Military Participation Rates of Male Youth Born 1957 
Through 1962 by Racial/Ethnic Group and Educational Level8
— ALL SERVICES —
Racial/Ethnic Group
Educational Lavalb WhHac Black*! Hispanic Total
Below High School Gradual*
All Youth 16.6 12.1 5.3 14.5
Qualified Youth 39.0 135.7* 45.7 45.1
GED High School Equivalency
All Youth 18.6 14.2 14.5 18.0
Qualified Youth 25.5 37.6 29.7 27.0
High School Diploma Graduate 
and Above
All Youth 9.8 22.3 10.3 11.2
Qualified Youth 10.2 36.6 12.0 12.3
TOTAL
All Youth 11.5 18.2 8.3 12.3
Qualified Youth 13.6 44.7 15.8 18.1
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).
Partic ipation  rate is the percentage of male youth born between January 1, 1957 and 
December 31, 1962 who enlisted in the military (for the first time) between July 1973 and 
September 1981. Participation rates are shown for two base populations: 1. all male youth within 
the racial/ethnic and education category: and 2. all male youth who would be expected to qualify 
for enlistment under 1981 aptitude test standards (by racial/ethnic and education category). The 
cross-sectional participation rates understate the true percentage of male youth who join the 
military since they do not include individuals who a) enlist after 30 September 1981 and b) enter 
officer programs. Estimates of the number of youth qualified for military service were calculated on 
the basis of results from the "Profile of American Youth" (administration of the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery to a national probability sample in 1980) and the 1981 education/ 
aptitude standards used by the Armed Services. (It should be noted that eligibility for enlistment 
would also depend on other factors— including medical and moral requirements.)
bFor military personnel, education at time of entry (and initial qualification) into service. 
Approximately one percent of the male youth population could not be identified on the basis of 
education: and one percent of military personnel could not be identified on the basis of 
racial/ethnic group. These unknown cases were not included in the calculations of participation 
rates.
cWhite category includes all racial/ethnic groups other than black or Hispanic.
dBlack category does not include persons of Hispanic origin.
eThis figure reflects the fact that during the FY 1976-80 period the Armed Services 
unknowingly accepted volunteers who did not meet eligibility standards because of errors in test 
calibration. Since these errors affected principally non-high school graduates with low aptitude 
scores the services enlisted many more black male dropouts than would have been qualified in the 
relevant population group.
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individuals who either (a) enlist after September 30, 1981, (b) enter officer 
programs, or (c) directly join the Reserves or National Guard. It should also be 
pointed out that eligibility for enlistment would depend on other factors in addition 
to aptitude and education—including medical and moral requirements—which 
would reduce again the potentially qualified population (especially for those in the 
lower socioeconomic strata) and further increase the corresponding participation 
rates.26
The statistics on the separate Military Services (Tables 40 through 43) 
indicate, as expected (particularly from end strength requirements), that the 
participation rates for young men are highest in the Army, followed generally in 
order by the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps. Participation rates are 
presented also for the selected demographic categories. Among white male youth 
with GED certificates or high school diplomas, the participation rates in the Navy 
are higher than those in the Army—and the participation rates of white males at 
these educational levels in the Air Force are about the same as the rates in the 
Army (if not slighly higher). The participation rates for blacks are usually equal to 
or higher in the Marine Corps than in the Navy (with the exception of blacks 
possessing GED certificates). The total rates for Hispanics are lowest in the Air 
Force, and the rates for non-high school graduates generally are lowest in the Air 
Force.
The attraction of the military for minority youth is most vividly portrayed 
when the participation data for the separate Armed Services are combined. As seen 
in Table 44, black and Hispanic youth who are “qualified” for military service have 
generally enlisted in proportionately greater levels than their white counterparts. 
This is particularly true for blacks: as of September 1981, almost 45 percent of all 
potentially qualified black males in the United States (born in 1957 through 1962) 
had entered military service. One out of three black male youth who had a high 
school diploma or a GED, and would probably qualify for enlistment, had enlisted
“ Variations exist in the definitions of “high school graduate” applied by each Military Service 
and the definition used in the NLS data base. Indeed, there are about nine different categories at 
present in the available types of high school completion or equivalency credentials—and no two 
Services treat all types alike. Persons who complete a correspondence school program as a substitute 
for formal graduation (with diploma), for example, are treated as GED equivalents in the Navy, but as 
diploma graduates in the other Services. The definitions used in the NLS data base, on the other hand, 
tend to generalize—though it is unknown how some of the types of credentials are defined. For a 
further discussion of the various types of education credentials available in the U.S. today, see Janice 
H. Laurence, Secondary Education Credentials: A M ilitary Enlistm ent Policy Dilemma, FR-PRD-83- 
22 (Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Organization, November 1983).
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by September 1981—while the comparable rate for black high school dropouts was 
a whopping 136 percent. (This unusually high rate reflects the fact that the ASVAB 
misnorming during FY 1976-80 principally affected the eligibility of non-high 
school graduates with low aptitude test scores. Many more black youth in this 
category consequently were accepted for military service than would have qualified 
with a correctly calibrated test.) In contrast, the participation rate for potentially 
qualified white high school graduates was 10 percent; and the overall rate for white 
males who would qualify for enlistment was about 14 percent.
The participation rates presented in Table 44 were updated to cover the next 
two years of military eligibility (through September 30, 1983) for younger males in 
the group. (Males born in 1957 through 1962 would have been between the ages of 
about 21 and 26 in September 1983. The median age of new enlistees is 19 years; 
so the vast majority of all men in the relevant group who planned to join the 
military would have probably enlisted already by the end of FY 1983.)
The revised participation rates for all Services combined are shown in Table 
45. The addition of two more years of enlistment experience resulted in a modest 
increase in the participation rates of all youth and in those who were potentially 
qualified. It is noteworthy, nevertheless, that the rate for “qualified” black males 
increased from 45 percent to 50 percent. It is estimated that, if disqualifications for 
medical and moral reasons were also taken into account, the participation rate for 
all potentially eligible blacks at this point would be as high as 60 percent. That rate 
would even be slightly greater if officers and nonprior service reservists were 
counted as “military participants.”
Perhaps an even more revealing aspect of the youth participation statistics lies 
in the fact that potentially qualified youth who do not have a high school diploma 
or equivalency certificate—regardless of race—find military service an especially 
appealing job or education alternative. Almost half of all high school dropouts who 
could probably pass the military’s aptitude test standards had enlisted; and more 
than one out of four qualified GED recipients had made the same choice. In fact, 
the impact of the Armed Services as a place of relative opportunity, equal 
acceptance, and involvement, regardless of prior social disadvantage, has helped to 
make the military a traditional channel for social mobility. The participation rates 




Military Participation Rates of Male Youth Born Between 
1957 Through 1962 by Racial/Ethnic Group and Educational
Level
— ALL SERVICES —
(Updated Through September 1983*)
Racial/Ethnic Group
Educational Laval White Black Hispanic Total
Below High School Graduate
All Youth 17.0 12.3 5.4 14.8
Qualified Youth 40.0 137.8* 46.5 45.9
GED High School Equivalency
All Youth 21.4 16.2 16.1 20.4
Qualified Youth 29.4 43.0 33.2 30.6
High School Diploma Graduate 
and Above
All Youth 11.5 25.6 12.0 13.2
Qualified Youth 12.1 42.0 14.0 14.4
Total
All Youth 13.0 20.3 9.3 13.9
Qualified Youth 15.0 49.9 17.6 18.2
Source: Derived from data that appear in Department of Defense, Profile o f Am erican Youth: 
1980 N ationw ide Adm inistrations o f the A rm ed  Services Vocational A ptitude Battery  (Wash 
ington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and 
Logistics], March 1982; and special tabulations provided by the office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (Manpower, Installations, and Logistics).
*This figure reflects the fact that during the FY 1976-80 period the Armed Services 
unknowingly accepted volunteers who did not meet eligibility standards because of errors in 
test calibration. Since these errors affected principally non-high school graduates with low 
aptitude scores the Services enlisted many more black male dropouts than would have been 




STUDY IMPLICATIONS: LOOKING AHEAD
The implications of the research reported here are, needless to say, far- 
reaching for both the military and society. The causes and consequences of 
screening for military service are intertwined with the lives and futures of 
individuals and their families, with social categories and communities, and with 
every person or group of persons touched by the nation’s military. Screening for 
military service may likewise affect our institutions, our domestic policies, 
international relations, and the tranquility and security of the nation. And the list 
goes on.
In this section, several separate, yet interrelated, implications of the study 
results are briefly explored. First, the discussion looks at factors or supplementary 
criteria (in addition to formal aptitude and education requirements) that may play 
an important role in determining who is or is not eligible for enlistment. Emphasis 
here is placed on the added selection standards used variously by the Armed 
Services, as well as the job placement actions that occur during the enlistment 
process. The discussion then turns to the special problems and issues—underscored 
by discrepancies in test score performance—regarding the selection and classifi 
cation of women and minorities. A short note concerning the future need for 
military personnel with high levels of ability is presented, followed by an 
examination of multiple standards and current definitions (as applied by the Armed 
Services) of “high school graduate.” The section closes with a concise review of 
current research efforts in the areas of initial screening and placement, along with a 
“look ahead.”
O TH ER FACTO RS IN ELIGIBILITY FO R  ENLISTM ENT
The present study examines the qualitative character of military pre-inductees, 
inductees, voluntary applicants, and enlistees over time. The study also describes 
the relative ability of different segments of American youth to qualify for
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enlistment in each of the Military Services and develops estimates of participation. 
Throughout the analysis, aptitude test scores and other individual attributes are 
treated in the context of minimum requirements for enlistment or induction. In the 
case of induction, where young men are selected, classified, and then assigned (by 
directive) to military jobs where they are needed most, minimum requirements 
draw a clear-cut line between the qualified and the unqualified. For volunteers, 
however, minimum aptitude/education, medical, and moral standards may be only 
the first among many “gates” that the individual will have to pass through before 
gaining admission. Eventual enlistment often depends on several other factors, 
including additional requirements for persons with marginal qualifications and the 
offer of guaranteed placement in a specific military occupation for those whose 
qualifications are well above the minimum.
In the Army, for example, all applicants are evaluated at the recruiter level on 
their background characteristics and behavior while in school. In addition, 
applicants who have arrest records, numerous traffic violations, or a history of 
alcohol abuse or drug use are ordinarily required to gain a special “moral waiver” 
before they are allowed to enlist. The Military Services each have their own 
guidelines and regulations for processing waivers and judging the merits of a case. 
There is an increasing tendency for individuals who fall into this category to have 
little chance of being accepted—particularly in a good recruiting market—unless 
they are clearly desirable candidates on other grounds (such as education or 
training). The final decision on a waiver is left largely to the discretion of the 
designated authority.1
The Navy also uses a method for assessing the qualifications of applicants that 
produces a general score or indicator of the individual’s potential for successful 
service. This evaluation technique, called SCREEN (an acronym for Success 
Chances for Recruits Entering the Navy), uses the individual’s educational 
attainment, age, and AFQT score to estimate the relative probability that the 
applicant will effectively complete the first year of service. Minimum SCREEN 
scores are established to prohibit enlistment of those applicants who, on the basis of 
previous experience, have the personal characteristics, background, and ability that 
increase their statistical likelihood for failure. Waivers can be granted to those with 
SCREEN scores below the minimum level, and for certain categories of applicants 
(such as those with prior drug involvement), the minimum scores are raised.
'Barbara Means, Moral Standards fo r Military Enlistment: Screening Procedures and Impact, FR-PRD-83-26 
(Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Organization, November 1983).
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Another consideration when viewing the enlistment process is the pre 
screening of applicants that occurs through the use of shortened versions of the 
AFQT. The policies of the Armed Services vary concerning the use of these 
prescreening tools, but they may be applied on a large-scale basis (depending on 
the supply and demand for new enlistees). The abridged versions of the enlistment 
test are seen to offer a preview of the individual’s performance on the full-length 
test. If a prospective recruit fails to achieve an acceptable score on the short test, he 
or she may be advised by the recruiter (who administers and scores the test) to 
postpone efforts to enlist or to seek entry into one of the other Armed Services. 
The entire enlistment process for some applicants may thus end here, even before it 
is allowed to formally begin.
In addition to their use in the enlistment screening process, aptitude test scores 
are used to classify the recruit or potential recruit and to determine eligibility for 
training and occupational assignment. An applicant may thus be able to pass the 
minimum criteria for enlistment—but, if he or she cannot meet the requirements 
for an available occupation (that is, one in which the yearly quota of openings or 
training “school seats” has not been filled), or is unable to qualify for any career 
field he or she is willing to enter, enlistment may be postponed indefinitely or ruled 
out entirely. For all intents and purposes, then, an applicant who is able to pass the 
minimum entry criteria but unable to qualify for the “right” job is an enlistment 
reject. (However, some Services do have a system for granting waivers for 
occupational assignment to candidates who are otherwise qualified.)
Indeed, as the authors of one study point out, recruiting is a function of 
training requirements: “The services attempt, primarily on the basis of written tests, 
to decide the capabilities a person must possess to be trained in a given occupation. 
Then, the services try to recruit personnel that meet these test-established 
qualifications.”2 “Hence,” the authors find, “mental testing, the keystone of the 
service’s recruiting programs, is used as a determinant of who is recruitable and 
who is trainable and as a limiting criterion in meeting recruiting mix objectives.”3 
In a syndicated article, a news service journalist similarly observed that 
“plainly, the ASVAB has power”:
Whether a recruit becomes something fancy like a 
microwave transmitter repairman or something dreary like 
what the Army calls a “laundry and bath specialist” depends 
on a power higher than the recruit or the sergeant.
’Herbert R. Northrup et al., B la c k  a n d  O th er  M in o r ity  P artic ipa tion  in  th e  A ll-V o lu n te e r  N a vy  a n d  M a rin e  
C orps  (Philadelphia, PA: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1979), p. 48.
’Ibid., p. 53.
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It depends on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
Battery, one of the most powerful instruments in the U.S. 
military this side of nuclear weapons. Score a 30 and you’re 
out for deferred enlistment next June. “Grab a lucky pencil,” 
as one recruit put it, score a 31 and you’re in.
Drop out of high school and you’ll need an ASVAB 
score of 62 [sic] to enlist immediately and get the next green 
bus to Fort Dix, N.J. Be a graduate and a 49 [sic] will do.4
“In the course of one afternoon,” the journalist adds, “overseeing one 
sergeant’s transactions, four points on an ASVAB subtest kept a bright adverturer 
out of the Special Forces, one point denied a young man enlistment entirely and 
another young man—an electronics wizard by his test scores—nearly picked that 
field instead of his dream: to become a truck driver.”5 Because the ASVAB scores 
are so important, and because minorities tend to score lower than whites on the 
test, it is noted, minorities tend to be consigned to the “soft skills” or low-level 
military jobs: “It’s a statistical tendency that played a part in the futures of 930,000 
young adults who took the ASVAB test last year.”6
The influence of aptitude test scores on job assignments and the general 
opportunities for technical training is illustrated in Table 46. The percent of male 
youth (18 through 23 years), according to racial/ethnic group and educational 
level, who would probably qualify for two occupational specialities in the Army 
was estimated using “Profile of American Youth” results and 1983 occupational 
classification standards. The two specialties represent (a) a basic, common 
occupation in the Army (Infantryman) at one extreme; and (b) a highly selective 
and technically specialized occupation (Calibration Repair Specialist) at the other 
extreme. (Males were singled out in this analysis because of the current prohibition 
on women serving in combat-related occupational specialties.)
The results of the analysis shown in Table 46 demonstrate, once again, the 
differences in eligibility rates (and accompanying opportunities) between the 
racial/ethnic groups and educational categories. About 81 percent of all white 
young men, for instance, would probably qualify for the Army Infantry, compared 
with 47 percent of Hispanics and 26 percent of all black young men. The 
racial/ethnic differences are accentuated in the highly technical field of Calibration 
Repair Specialist: just under one out of three whites could expect to pass the 
minimum standard, compared with one out of ten Hispanics and virtually no (three 
percent) blacks.
4Frank Greve, “Vocational Military Tests: Powerful, Controversial,” Baton Rouge State Times (Knight-Ridder 
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At the same time, one is struck by the degree to which requirements for 
highly technical specialties reduce so drastically the pool of potentially eligible 
recruits: although 76 percent of all young men nationwide would probably qualify 
for enlistment in the Army (see Table 21), fewer than one out of four would be 
available for training in calibration repair. And, since test scores vary considerably 
by geographic region, the respective pools of potentially qualified recruits are also 
quite different from one region to the next. Further analysis shows, for example, 
that 49 percent of all young men in New England would probably pass the 
minimum standard for the calibration repair specialty, compared with a regional 
low of only 16 percent in the East South Central area of the country.
M ILITARY SELECTION A N D  CLASSIFICATIO N ST A N D A R D S  
FO R M INO RITIES A N D  W OM EN: 
SO M E PR O BLEM S A N D  ISSU ES
As observed, in FY 1981 women who did not have high school diplomas or 
equivalency certificates were not eligible to enlist in either the Navy or the Marine 
Corps; women with equivalency certificates were also barred from entering the 
Marine Corps. Females who qualified on the basis of their education in these 
Services were required to meet different, higher aptitude standards than those 
established for men with similar education. By FY 1983, the differential standards 
for female applicants in the Navy had been abolished.
It should also be pointed out that, until recently, the Army used a different 
test composite for male and female applicants in determining AFQT scores. The 
net effect of this practice was a relative reduction in the supply of qualified female 
applicants—even though it appeared, ostensibly, that males and females were being 
evaluated equally in terms of mental aptitude standards. All Services still preserve 
quotas (or “ceilings”) on the enlistment of females, and informal barriers are 
periodically placed on the eligibility of female nongraduates. The Services point out 
that female applicants are treated differently than their male counterparts because 
they have a separate “selection ratio.” Legal and policy restrictions that bar females 
from serving in certain occupations along with other recruiting limitations, have 
permitted the Services to establish more stringent enlistment criteria for selecting 
among the pool of female applicants.
The movement of female recruits into certain nontraditional (i.e., male- 
dominated) and mechanically technical occupations is also hindered by the
108
disparate performance of females on the aptitude subtests and composites that 
figure so prominently in the minimum requirements for assignment to these 
specialties. On the Mechanical composite (comprised of the Mechanical Compre 
hension, Automotive-Shop Information, and General Science subtests), for 
instance, a large gap is found between the scores of males and females: the mean 
standard score (on a standardized scale having a mean of 500 and a standard 
deviation of 100) for males was 545, compared with a mean standard score of 454 
for females. Males also outperformed females on the Electronics composite (a 
mean score of 521 compared with a score of 479 for females) and, to a lesser 
degree, on the General composite (506 compared with 494 for females). Females, 
on the other hand, achieved a higher mean standard score than did males on the 
Administrative composite (513 compared with 487 for males).7 The Administrative 
composite (comprised of the Coding Speed, Numerical Operations, and Verbal 
subtests), in contrast to the Mechanical and Electronics composites, is commonly 
used to determine eligibility for the clerical-administrative military occupations in 
which women have traditionally served.
Differences in the measured mental aptitude between blacks and whites were 
used during the 1950s to justify segregation, racial restrictions, and quotas within 
the military. Historically, the military’s aptitude tests also once served as a 
convenient device to regulate the enlistment of blacks.8 The predictability of 
average race differences on certain test items and subtests permitted the creation of 
test composites that, with a fair degree of confidence, could be used to “favor” one 
race over another. In 1950, the Army agreed to an abolition of racial quotas based 
on the belief that blacks could be “counted on” to score well below whites on 
mental qualifying examinations. The minimum mental aptitude standards could 
thus be manipulated, it was believed, to keep the proportion of blacks below 10 
percent.9 Indeed, in 1975 and, ‘again, in 1979 the Navy was accused by a 
Congressman of using a disguised racial quota in the form of restrictions on the
’Janice H. Laurence, Mark J. Eitelberg, and Brian K. Waters, “Subpopulation Analyses of 1980 Youth 
Population Aptitudes,” Paper presented at the 90th Annual Convention of the American Psychological 
Association, Washington, D.C., August 1982.
8It should be noted that tests of aptitude, achievement, literacy, or the like have been a traditional tool for 
discrimination in this country and in many others. The examples are numerous— from instances in granting voting 
privileges, admission to jobs and educational institutions, immigration policies, and so on. The military has merely 
mirrored the tenor of the times in this respect. (See Chapter 2 of Martin Binkin and Mark J. Eitelberg, with Alvin 




percentage of recruits scoring in AFQT Category IV (the lowest acceptable 
category). Ironically, in 1980 Congress itself imposed a ceiling on the percentage of 
AFQT Category IV recruits who were permitted to enter military service between 
FY 1981 and FY 1983.10’11
One lingering effect of racial differences in performance on tests of mental 
aptitude is the existence of a definite pattern of black participation in the military’s 
occupational areas. Historically, blacks were relegated to service and supply 
units—a trend that can be traced back as far as the American Revolution. Recent 
experience exposes the enduring social class and color lines of the military’s 
occupational placement system: in 1964, the last peacetime year before the 
Vietnam conflict, blacks were greatly overrepresented in the Service and Supply 
Handler occupational area in all four Armed Services; in every succeeding year, 
blacks have remained overrepresented in this occupational area.12
It does not appear that this trend in the occupational placement of minorities 
will change very much in the near future. The margin of difference in the average 
educational level of whites and blacks nationwide and the test score differences 
revealed in the “Profile of American Youth” imply that, unless the Services change 
their classification criteria, blacks (as well as Hispanics) may be disproportionately 
relegated to the military’s “soft skills” for some time to come.13
There is also some question as to the relative effectiveness of the military’s 
minimum entry requirements for minorities. As noted above, the first-term attrition 
rates for high school graduates are typically half as large as the attrition rates for 
nongraduates. This historical trend serves as the principal reason for the present use 
of differential aptitude standards based on high school graduation status. Higher 
aptitude test scores are required for non-high school graduates. The intent is to 
accept only the “best” (i.e., those with higher aptitude scores) from among non-high 
school graduates, a generally less-preferred group of candidates. Thus, while 
aptitude does not control attrition, it does provide a means by which to reduce the 
number of enlistment-eligible nongraduates. The first-term experience of white male 
enlistees who entered military service between 1973 and 1978 tends to support this 
policy: the attrition rate (Defense-wide) for non-high school graduates in AFQT 
Categories I and II (combined) was 44 percent, compared with a rate above 50 
percent for those in Category IIIB and those in Category IV. Among black male
‘“Military Selective Service Act. 50 U.S.C. App. s 451-7la.
“Department of Defense Authorization Act. FY81 P.L. 96-342; FY82 P.L. 97-86; FY83 P.L. 97-252; FY84 
P.L. 98-94.
“Binkin and Eitelberg, Blacks and the Military, p. 172-173.
13It should be noted that the Navy, through its classification and assignment system known as CLASP, has 
been consciously working toward balancing the distribution of ethnic minorities within all ratings.
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enlistees during the same period, however, the attrition rates for nongraduates did 
not vary much at different aptitude levels. In fact, the historical attrition rate for 
black male enlistees who were nongraduates was generally slightly higher among 
those with test scores in Categories I and II than those with scores in Category IV.14
The creators and users of aptitude tests in higher education and civilian 
industry periodically have contended with critics who assert that most standardized 
testing is unfair and culturally biased. As one scientist and controversial author 
points out, “certainly no theory or practice in modern psychology has been more 
attacked than mental testing.” It is “the only topic in psychology that in recent 
years has consistently been showered by brickbats from the popular media.”15 The 
Military Services are likewise subjected to the skepticism expressed in certain circles 
concerning their methods of selection and classification.
The Military Services are, by far, the largest single employer of initially 
unskilled labor in the nation. Several hundred thousand young men and women are 
“hired” each year and then trained in jobs as dissimilar as cannon crewman, clinical 
nuclear medicine technician, calibration specialist, cryptologic technician, computer 
programmer, or cook. The military is a massive training institution that annually 
teaches technical skills to young adults in numbers equivalent to the entire 
population of some states. At the same time, the military’s enlistment standards and 
screening policies have a direct effect on the employment and training opportunities 
of millions of young men and women who are just starting out in the world of 
work. For many, acceptance or rejection by the military can affect not only their 
immediate opportunities for employment, but the total sum of their early “life 
chances” and the eventual course of their job histories. And, for some, service in the 
nation’s military could even be a sort of crossroad or junction between a path to 
either failure or success. At a point when testing in general is under fire and 
widespread public scrutiny, it is not surprising to find the nation’s Defense 
policymakers and testing psychologists fending off the same charges and complaints 
that have been leveled at aptitude screening for education or civilian employment.
TEST BIAS A N D  DIFFERENTIAL VALIDITY: 
EVALUATING THE ASVAB
The subject of bias in standardized testing is complicated and beyond the 
scope of the present study. Nevertheless, one may gain a feeling for the major issues 
involved by reviewing the definition of test bias contained in Title VII of the Civil
uEli S. Flyer and Richard S. Elster, First-Term Attrition Among Son-Prior Service Enlisted Personnel: Loss 
Probabilities Based on Selected Entry Factors (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, July 1983).
■’Arthur R. Jensen, Bias in Mental Testing (New York: The Free Press, 1980), p. 1.
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Rights Act of 1964 (as interpreted by the Supreme Court in 1971):16 tests are 
considered fair and unbiased when either (a) the use of tests in selection have a 
numerically equal impact on minority and nonminority groups or (b) any 
numerical advantage of one group over another empirically reflects a corresponding 
job-related advantage. (The latter criterion more nearly reflects the psycho 
metrician’s standard.)17
The ASVAB has been evaluated by civilian test experts. Extensive research 
studies have been performed to investigate the empirical validity of the military’s 
test for predicting training and job performance. As part of these efforts, the utility 
of the ASVAB in predicting the performance of the sexes and minority groups has 
been assessed.18 The battery has been shown to be equitable in predicting success in 
technical training for diverse military occupations among males and females, and 
majority and minority group members alike. In fact, most studies show that 
ASVAB scores have a slight overpredictive tendency with respect to minority group 
performance and a modest underpredictive tendency with respect to the per 
formance of whites. That is, the test generally predicts that minority examinees will 
do better and majority examinees will do less well in training than has been the 
case.
'‘Title X of the United States Code provides the governing statutes applicable to military personnel. 
Accordingly, the Department of Defense General Counsel has ruled that Title VII does not pertain to military 
personnel testing. Nevertheless, Defense Department psychologists recognize the need to have an equitable 
selection and classification instrument, and they follow the principles of test development and validation set forth in 
the testing standards of the American Psychological Association, the American Educational Research Association 
and the National Council on Measurement in Education.
17R.A. Weitzman, Racial Bias and Predictive Validity in Testing for Selection, NPS 54-83-008 (Monterey, 
CA: Naval Postgraduate School, July 1983) pp. 9-10.
>8The following represent a sample of available sources:
R. Darrell Bock and Robert Mislevy, The Profile o f  American Youth: Data Quality Analysis o f the Armed 
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, August 1981).
R. Darrell Bock and Elsie G. J. Moore, The Profile o f American Youth Demographic Influences on ASVAB  
Test Performance (Washington, DC: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Installations and 
Logistics], February 1984).
R. F. Boldt, M. K. Levin, D. E. Powers, M. Griffin, R. C. Troike, W. Wolfram, and Forrest R. Ratliff. 
Sociolinguistic and Measurement Considerations fo r Construction o f Armed Service Selection Batteries, AFHRL- 
TR-77-76 (Brooks AFB, TX: Air Force Human Resources Laboratory, December 1977).
Lonnie D. Valentine, Prediction o f A ir Force Technical Training Success from ASVAB and Educational 
Background, AFHRL-TR-77-18 (Brooks AFB, TX: Air Force Human Resources Laboratory, May 1977).
Nancy Guinn, Ernest C. Tupes, and William E. Alley. Demographic Differences in Aptitude Test 
Performance, AFHRL-TR-70-15 (Brooks AFB, TX: Air Force Human Resources Laboratory, May 1970).
Nancy Guinn, Ernest C. Tupes, and William E. Alley. Cultural Subgroup Differences in the Relationships 
Between Air Force Aptitude Composites and Training Criteria, AFHRL-TR-70-35 (Brooks AFB, TX: Air Force 
Human Resources Laboratory, September 1970).
C. Wayne Shore and Rodger Marion, Suitability o f  Using Common Selection Test Standards fo r Negro and 
White Airmen, AFHRL-TR-72-53 (Brooks AFB, TX: Air Force Human Resources Laboratory, May 1972).
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There is some evidence to suggest that the mechanical, electronic, and science 
areas of the ASVAB are statistically biased against females in predicting 
performance. Experts point out, however, that this outcome on experientially-based 
subtests is consistent with the social and cultural factors that currently affect the 
intellectual development and education of young men and women. Thus, the lower 
predictive validity for females as compared with males in certain test areas is not 
necessarily a weakness of the ASVAB, but a reflection of the previous experiences 
of the two sexes up to the time of testing.19
The purpose of the military’s aptitude test is to predict accurately the in-service 
performance of applicants for enlistment and to consequently provide a means for 
selection or rejection. The true gauge of bias in the AFQT is not the test’s 
worthiness in estimating the intellectual ability of test takers, but its capacity to 
predict accurately the relative military performance of individuals so that no 
particular group or sex is given an unfair advantage over another when the scores 
are actually used. As Weitzman notes:
Whereas the public at large might condemn as biased a 
test on which white and black people have different means, a 
test expert is likely to consider this judgment to be 
premature. In the expert’s view, more may be involved than 
simply a difference in test means. Particularly if the use of the 
test is to select applicants for work or school, the final verdict 
on test bias must also take into account subsequent perform 
ance on the job or in the classroom. If the racial group 
having the higher test mean tends to perform correspondingly 
better at work or school, then the difference in means may be 
a more accurate reflection of test validity than of test bias.20
In 1981, the Defense Department formed the Defense Advisory Committee 
on Military Personnel Testing, an independent panel of nationally recognized 
psychometricians. One of the first tasks of the Advisory Committee was to evaluate 
the possible existence of test bias in the ASVAB. In its 1983 report to the Secretary 
of Defense, the Committee concluded:
The evidence clearly shows that the ASVAB has 
substantial operational value for purposes of predicting 
training criteria in a wide range of military specialties. There 
is also substantial evidence that the tests provide reasonable
19Bock and Moore, The Profile o f American Youth Demographic Influences on ASVAB Test Performance.
“Weitzman, Racial Bias and Predictive Validity in Testing fo r Selection, pp. 2-3.
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predictions for minority as well as majority group applicants, 
and do not systematically underestimate the performance of 
minority group members.21
This conclusion was consistent with the findings of other independent test 
experts who had previously given the ASVAB a favorable rating:
Data from responses to the ASVAB are free from major 
defects such as high levels of guessing or carelessness, 
inappropriate levels of difficulty, cultural test-question bias, 
and inconsistencies in test administration procedures. They 
provide a sound basis for the estimation of population 
attributes such as means, medians, and percentile points in 
the youth population as a whole and in subpopulations 
defined by age, sex, and race/ethnicity.22
Thus, the overall consensus is that the ASVAB is a valid predictor of in-service 
performance for all groups, regardless of minority status or sex.
SELECTION TESTING IN O U R  SOCIETY
The National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on Ability Testing observed 
that “every society develops some sort of formalized criteria for making selection 
decisions.” Social characteristics and intuitive opinions have typically offered a 
convenient basis for making these selection decisions. However, “given the great 
tide of immigrants seeking to find a place in America and the expansiveness of the 
economy,” writes the Committee, “ability testing offered an ordering device that 
traditional institutions could no longer provide and that accommodated the 
aspirations of the ambitious. The convergence of these intellectual, economic, and 
social forces produced a climate conducive to the acceptance of tests and testing in 
industrial, educational, and governmental settings during the first half of this 
century.”23
Many institutions had adopted the practice of using paper-and-pencil aptitude 
tests for screening without adequate evidence that the tests actually identified the 
best performers on the job. Now, amid the lively controversy over the use and
21 Biennial Report o f the Defense Advisory Committee on Military Personnel Testing (Washington, DC: Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], June 1983). p. 2.
22R. Darrell Bock and Robert Mislevy, Data Quality Analysis o f the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
Battery (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1981), p. 51.
“Alexandra K. Wigdor and Wendell R. Gamer, eds., Ability Testing: Uses, Consequences, and Controversies, 
Part I: Report o f the Committee (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1982), p. 9.
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misuse of standardized tests, there is a somewhat declining reliance on traditional 
paper-and-pencil tests of ability. Many employers and educators, in an effort to 
reduce their vulnerability to charges of discrimination and unfairness—from the 
public and federal government alike—have curtailed use of certain tests in favor of 
alternative selection criteria.24 Yet, tests still determine to a large extent who goes to 
college, who gets hired, promoted, retained, licensed, and certified—or who gets 
life’s “chances” and who does not. And the costs and benefits of these tests are 
enormous to the user, the individual test takers, and the society itself.
For the test takers, the Committee on Ability Testing points out, “the 
consequences of testing are the opportunities gained or lost. Unsatisfactory 
performance will cost the test taker access to one sort of future.” On the other 
hand, “the benefits of testing accrue to the taker who gains access to a limited 
opportunity, is assigned to a potentially more rewarding position, is barred from an 
opportunity that would have led to failure, or can gain self-knowledge that will 
help in choosing among educational or vocational options.”25 The impact that the 
elimination of screening based upon test scores will have upon any particular group 
of applicants will depend upon the nature of the criteria used in place of tests. A 
major argument for the use of standardized tests in educational and employment 
settings has been that, in spite of their shortcomings, they are less biased and more 
valid than other selection methods, such as personal interviews.
The search for answers to these questions is difficult and tied to many other 
social, political, and philosophical concerns. But the general topics and issues that 
are presently being thrashed out in public, academic, and government forums serve 
to emphasize the substantial consequences of testing on the individual and the entire 
nation.
ABILITY LEVELS A N D  THE CHANGING M ILITARY
Some observers take note of the fact that technological advancements are 
rapidly changing the face of the American military as well as our traditional 
concepts of war and strategy. They also express concern that—along with trends in 
declining test scores and an apparently waning national interest in mathematics and
24Toby Friedman and E. Belvin Williams, “Current Use of Tests for Employment,” Ability Testing: Uses, 
Consequences, and Controversies, Part II: Documentation Section, Eds. A. K. Wigdor and W. R. Garner 
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1982), pp. 99-169.
J5Wigdor and Gamer, eds., Ability Testing, Volume I, p. 23.
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science—new weapons, communication systems, vehicles, and military equipment 
in general are becoming too complicated and demanding for military personnel to 
operate effectively. They point out, too, that today’s selection and classification 
standards are but the outdated, imprecise, and simplistic artifacts of a simpler time; 
and, new, more discriminating job-related selection criteria are needed to keep the 
modern military in step with the latest technological revolution.
As the authors of a Brookings Institution study observe:
Advances in technology since World War II have had a 
dramatic influence on the U.S. defense establishment. Unlike 
the armed forces of an earlier period, which were dominated 
by relatively unskilled infantrymen and able-bodied seamen, 
the majority of military personnel today are involved in pro 
viding support for the combat forces.26
For example, in 1945, about 13 percent of trained enlisted personnel were assigned 
to technical skills. Today, better than one out of four (28 percent) enlistees are 
serving as technical workers (computer specialists, electronics technicians, medical 
technicians, and similar occupations). And a total of approximately 46 percent of 
current enlistees are performing work that would be classified as “white collar” in 
the civilian sector.27
“Despite the popularized image of the automated Buck Rogers-style battlefield 
of the future, characterized by small numbers of highly trained operators remotely 
commanding electronic tanks and laser death rays,” the Brookings analysts write,
the composition of the U.S. ground combat forces will 
probably change little over the next twenty-five years, if 
experience is any guide. Although major advances are 
expected in precision-guided munitions and perhaps in 
improved battlefield mobility, the demise of traditional 
ground formations and their heavy dependence on the 
combat infantryman seems unlikely.28
Yet, the Air Force projects that its requirements for specialized technicians will 
rise by 34 percent through the 1980s. The Army, whose need for trained specialists 
has grown by over 30 percent in just the past two years, has only recently 
embarked on its weapons modernization program. And, as observers point out,
26Binkin and Eitelberg. Blacks and the Military, p. 132. See also Martin Binkin and Irene Kyriakopoulos, 
Youth or Experience? Manning the Modem Military (Washington, DC.: The Brookings Institution, 1979).
27Binkin and Eitelberg, Blacks and the Military, p. 133. In comparison, about 52 percent of the civilian 
workforce are currently classified as “white collar.”
28Ibid., p. 134.
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today’s modern weapons may actually be simpler in some respects to operate, “but 
their heavy use of microchip technology makes them logistics and maintenance 
nightmares, demanding better-educated technicians and more intense and expensive 
training.”29
Whatever may be the pace of changes in the future, it is clear that the 
aptitudinal basis for picking and placing new recruits has remained intact for the 
past thirty years. The only major modifications, other than the periodic raising and 
lowering of minimum scores, were the institution of an education standard with 
different minimum aptitude requirements in the 1960s, the use of certain aptitude 
composites, and the establishment of supplementary screening techniques (by the 
Navy). The following two subsections place the use of multiple standards 
(including several aptitude composites) and educational criteria in proper 
perspective.
Multiple Aptitude Standards for Selection
All of the Military Services, except the Navy, currently use multiple aptitude 
standards in determining basic eligibility for enlistment. High school graduates who 
apply for enlistment in the Army, for instance, are required to score at least 16 on 
the AFQT and no lower than 85 on any one of the aptitude composites. High 
school graduates seeking to enlist in the Marine Corps are required to achieve a 
score of at least 21 on the AFQT and 80 on the General-Technical Composite. 
Candidates for enlistment into the Air Force must meet minimum AFQT 
requirements as well as minimum scores on the General Composite and a 
minimum score on a combination of the Mechanical, Administrative, General, and 
Electronics Composites.
The “Profile of American Youth” offers the opportunity to investigate the 
effects of the separate components of Service aptitude standards on the enlistment 
eligibility of the general population. Table 47 shows the estimated percent of 
American male youth (18-23 years), by educational category, who would qualify 
for enlistment under the AFQT requirement alone, under other composite criteria 
without the AFQT, and under the currently required combination of aptitude 
standards.30
2,David Wood and Alan Citron, “Enlistment Surge Fails to Solve Military Woes,” Los Angeles Times, 
November 1, 1982, p. 11.
“Janice H. Laurence and Mark J. Eitelberg. Eligibility fo r Military Service: Operational and Alternative 




Estimated Percent of American Male Youth (18-23 Years)3 
Who Would Qualify for Enlistment Under AFQT, 
Composite, and Combined Minimum Aptitude Requirements 
by Service and Educational Levelb
S e rv ic e
E d u c a tio n a l L e v e lc a nd  
A p t itu d e  S c re e n d A rm y Navy
M a rin e
C o rp s
A ir
F o rc e
Non-High School Graduate
AFQT Alone 32.2 26.4 32.2 8.3
Other Composites Alone 58.0 e 15.6 39.4
AFQT and Other Composites 32.2 26.4 15.6 8.3
GED High School Equivalency
AFQT Alone 66.6 66.6 66.6 47.8
Other Composites Alone 89.5 e 42.0 78.4
AFQT and Other Composites 66.6 66.6 42.0 47.8
High School Diploma Graduate 
and Above
AFQT Alone 92.5 91.6 87.5 87.5
Other Composites Alone 93.4 e 90.4 84.4
AFQT and Other Composites 91.4 91.6 87.2 81.4
TOTAL
AFQT Alone 77.1 75.0 73.5 67.0
Other Composites Alone 84.7 e 70.7 73.4
AFQT and Other Composites 76.3 75.0 68.3 63.5
S o u rc e : D e rive d  fro m  s p e c ia l ta b u la t io n s  p ro v id e d  by the  O ffic e  o f the  A s s is ta n t 
S e c re ta ry  o f D e fen se  (M a n p o w e r, Ins ta lla tio n s , a nd  L o g is tics ).
a A m e ric a n  m a le  y o u th  p o p u la t io n  in c lu d e s  a ll m a le s  b o rn  b e tw e e n  J a n u a ry  1, 1957  and  
D e c e m b e r 31. 1962
^ E s tim a te s  o f th e  p e rc e n t o f y o u th  w h o  w o u ld  q u a lify  fo r m ilita ry  s e rv ic e  w e re  c a lc u la te d  
o n  th e  b a s is  o f re s u lts  fro m  th e  "P ro f ile  o f A m e ric a n  Y o u th "  (A d m in is tra tio n  o f th e  A rm e d  
S e rv ic e s  V o c a tio n a l A p titu d e  B a tte ry  [A S V A B ] to  a n a tio n a l p ro b a b ility  sa m p le  in  1980) and  
th e  1983 e d u c a t io n /a p ti tu d e  s ta n d a rd s  u sed  by th e  A rm e d  S e rv ic e s . (It s h o u ld  be  n o te d  tha t 
e lig ib i l ity  fo r  e n lis tm e n t w o u ld  a ls o  d e p e n d  on  o th e r fa c to rs — in c lu d in g  m e d ic a l and  m o ra l 
re q u irem en ts .)
c E d u c a tio n a l le ve l as o f S e p te m b e r 1980  (s ta rt o f 1980-81  s c h o o l year)
^ E a c h  S e rv ic e  (w ith  th e  e x c e p tio n  o f th e  N avy) re q u ire s  th a t e n lis tm e n t a p p lic a n ts  
a c h ie v e  m in im u m  s c o re s  on  th e  A rm e d  F o rc e s  Q u a lif ic a t io n  T e s t (A F Q T ) a nd  c e rta in  o th e r 
A rm e d  S e rv ic e s  V o c a tio n a l A p titu d e  B a tte ry  (ASVAB) a p titu d e  c o m p o s ite s  T h ese  m in im u m  
s c o re s  d iffe r by S e rv ic e  a nd  w ith in  S e rv ic e  by e d u c a tio n a l level.
e T h e  N a vy 's  e n lis tm e n t a p titu d e  s ta n d a rd s  a re  b ase d  on A F Q T  on ly .
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It can be seen in Table 47 that the multiple aptitude standards used to screen 
applicants during FY 1983 have various effects on the qualification rates of male 
youth. In the Army, the minimum AFQT standard, not the composite requirement, 
is the effective determiner of eligibility (regardless of educational level) for 
enlistment: about 85 percent of all male youth would probably qualify based on the 
minimum scores on other aptitude composites, compared with 77 percent using the 
AFQT alone. In contrast, aptitude composites other than the AFQT act as the 
determinant of enlistment eligibility for non-high school graduates and GED 
recipients in the Marine Corps, and the combined effects of the AFQT and the 
other aptitude composites determine the qualification rates for high school 
graduates in this Service. Nongraduates and GED recipients who apply to the Air 
Force are affected principally by the AFQT: the qualification rate for nongraduates 
based on the minimum AFQT score is eight percent, compared with a rate five 
times greater using only the other minimum composite scores; about 48 percent of 
GED recipients would probably qualify on the basis of the AFQT alone, compared 
with 78 percent using only the other composites without the AFQT. At the same 
time, the multiple aptitude standards used by the Air Force to screen high school 
graduates appear to have an interactive effect on the eligibility of persons within 
this educational category.
Although Table 47 does not show the interaction of multiple standards on the 
eligibility rates of male youth (and subgroups), the implication here is that certain 
combinations of aptitude standards for persons in certain education categories are 
superfluous. The use by the Army of composites other than the AFQT during FY 
1983 appears to have no bearing in determining basic eligibility for enlistment. For 
nongraduates and GED recipients seeking to enter the Marine Corps, it is the 
minimum required score on the General composite, not the AFQT requirement, 
that operates as an enlistment screen. And, in the Air Force, there appears to be no 
reason for having an additional aptitude composite requirement other than the 
AFQT for persons who do not have high school diplomas.
The High School Diploma in Fact and Fiction
In the classic American film, the Wizard of Oz (1939), four slightly unusual 
characters (and a small dog) set off on a strange journey down a yellow brick road 
to find a mysterious and omnipotent ruler of an emerald city. Dorothy sought the 
Wizard’s help in getting back to Kansas and her Auntie Em. The Tin Woodman 
wanted a heart. The Cowardly Lion wanted courage to make him king of the 
forest. The Scarecrow joined the pilgrimage in search of some brains.
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To make a long story short, Dorothy (and her dog Toto) got back to Kansas 
(through no help of the Wizard) by clicking her heels and saying magic words. The 
Tin Woodman settled for a ticking clock. Instead of courage, the Cowardly Lion 
got a medal for bravery. In lieu of brains, the Wonderful Wizard gave the 
Scarecrow a document certifying and symbolizing the powers of intellectual 
prowess. The Wizard instructed the Scarecrow:
Why, anybody can have a brain. That’s a very mediocre 
commodity. Back where I come from we have great 
universities, seats of great learning where men go to become 
great thinkers. And when they come out they think deep 
thoughts, and with no more brains than you have. But, they 
have one thing you haven’t got: a diploma.
In the world of work, symbols of accomplishment, such as diplomas, are often 
treated as tickets to employment or promotion. Recognition of previous accomplish 
ments, or abilities, or special achievements in the form of certificates or awards, it is 
believed, provide a fair indicator of the personal attributes of those who hold these 
symbols. Young men and women who have no previous record of employment 
have few indicators of their relative worth as potential employees other than the 
diplomas or academic degrees they have earned. Indeed, the main mark of 
distinction for those seeking entry-level jobs has traditionally been the educational 
equivalent of a red badge of courage: pieces of fancy paper or parchment with 
foreign words, lots of loops and curls, gold seals, and impressive-looking signatures. 
To get a good job, teenagers are told, get a diploma.
In some ways, the military shares a perspective with the Great and Powerful 
Oz. For, in the world of the military’s policymakers and data analysts, in the realm 
of placement officers and recruiters alike, diplomas and degrees hold an almost 
mystical property. These documents are regarded highly—not so much for what 
they say about a person’s intellect or knowledge or “brains” (according to the 
Wizard)—but for what they say about the statistical probability of a person’s 
chances for performing well in military service. To those who review applications 
for enlistment, diplomas suggest that the recipient possesses a fair amount of 
intellectual ability and a store of learning that was adequate enough to achieve the 
necessary passing grade. But, even more important, the diploma certifies a person’s 
value to the military by placing him or her in a desirable section of the military’s 
actuarial table: individuals with diplomas stand a much better than average chance 
of fulfilling their initial term of enlistment in satisfactory fashion.
This understanding, of course, is based on the assumption that there is some 
sort of common definition of “high school graduate” and an established method for
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determining who gets the treasured credential. The fact of the matter is that there 
are numerous types of high school diplomas, equivalency certificates, and 
alternative credentials. Furthermore, there is a wide and almost limitless variety of 
“graduation” standards now being used in the states, school districts, and even in 
individual secondary schools. The problem is compounded when one examines the 
way in which the separate Military Services treat these credentials under their 
enlistment screening process.
As shown in Table 48, there have been distinct variations in the Services’ 
definitions of the nine most common categories of education credentials.31 For 
example, in FY 1983, the Air Force treated recipients of non-state accredited 
diplomas as non-high school graduates. The Navy evaluated these individuals on a 
case-by-case basis under their waiver procedures, while the Army and Marine 
Corps called them high school diploma graduates. The Air Force, but not the other 
Services, recognized the California High School Proficiency Examination (CHSPE) 
as a valid diploma. All Services except the Air Force recognized high school 
completion certificates as diplomas. All Services except the Navy recognized (under 
specified conditions) correspondence school programs as an alternative source of 
high school diplomas. All Services except the Marine Corps recognized (under 
specified conditions) the authority of adult schools to grant high school diplomas. 
And there were, and continue to be, several other variations between the enlistment 
policies of the individual Services.
These differences in the treatment of educational credentials bear upon the 
qualification rates presented above. (The analysis presented in this study used the 
general definitions provided in the NLS along with supporting material collected 
from the high schools that were attended by the survey respondents.) As far as can 
be determined, there is no compelling reason why one Service should recognize a 
particular credential as a high school diploma and another Service should not. 
Without a strong argument in support of one policy over another, the present 
education standards appear arbitrary. More precise standards can be developed to 
coincide with the substantial changes that have occurred in the secondary school 
systems of this country over the past two decades. Clearly, some applicants who 
should not be allowed to enlist are being accepted; on the other hand, it is quite 
likely that some individuals who would perform well in the military are being 
eliminated from consideration due to educational standards that are outdated, 
unnecessarily rigid, imprecise, and overly generalized.
31See Janice H. Laurence, Education Standards for Military Enlistment and the Search fo r Successful 
Recruits, FR-PRD-84-4 (Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Organization, February 1984).
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Table 48
Treatment of Secondary School Educational Credentials 
For Enlistment Purposes During FY 1983, by Service
Treatment for Enlistment Purposes*





High School Diploma 
(State Accredited) Grad Grad Grad Grad
High School Diploma 
(Non-State Accredited) Grad Grad3 Grad Non
High School Attendance Certificate Grad Grad Grad Non
High School Completion Certificate Grad Grad Grad Non
GED Certificate GEDb GEDb Non GEDb
High School Diploma Based on GED GEDb GEDb Non GEDb
Adult High School Diploma Gradc Gradd Grade Grad*
California High School Proficiency 
Examination (CHSPE) Certificate Non Non Non Grad
Correspondence School Grads GED Grads Gradh
Sources: D e p a rtm e n t o f th e  A rm y  (D A P E -M P A -C S ), M e m o ra n d u m  fo r D ire c to r, A c c e s s io n  
P o lic y , O A S D (M R A & L), 29  J u n e  1982. D e p a rtm e n t o f th e  N a vy  (O P -1 3 5 L /0 5 2 7 :rk ),  M e m o ra n d u m  fo r 
D ire c to r, A c c e s s io n  P o lic y . D A S D (M P & F M ) (AP), 7 J u ly  1982. D e p a rtm e n t o f th e  N a vy  H e a d q u a rte rs  
U n ite d  S ta te s  M a rin e  C o rp s  (M P P -3 9 -m s h , 5 0 0 0 /1 ) , M e m o ra n d u m  fo r  th e  A s s is ta n t S e c re ta ry  o f 
D e fen se  (M P & F M ), 29  J u n e  1982. D e p a rtm e n t o f th e  A ir  F o rc e  (M P X O A ), M e m o ra n d u m  fo r D ire c to r, 
A c c e s s io n  P o lic y , O S D (M R A & L) (M P & F M ), 30 J u n e  1982.
* G ra d  is h ig h  s c h o o l d ip lo m a  g ra d u a te . G E D  is  h ig h  s c h o o l e q u iv a le n c y . N o n  is  n o n -h ig h  
s c h o o l g ra d u a te .
NOTE: A  1982  v e rs io n  o f th is  ta b le  a p p e a rs  in  J a n ic e  H. L a u re n c e , E d u c a tio n a l C re d e n tia ls  
a n d  M ilita ry  E n lis tm e n t. P a p e r p re s e n te d  a t th e  A n n u a l C o n v e n tio n  o f th e  A m e ric a n  E d u c a tio n a l 
R e s e a rc h  A s s o c ia t io n . M o n tre a l, A p r il 1983. T h is  u p d a te d  v e rs io n  w a s  o b ta in e d  th ro u g h  s u b s e  
q u e n t c o m m u n ic a tio n  w ith  th e  o ff ic e s  lis te d  above .
a E n lis te d  as h ig h  s c h o o l d ip lo m a  g ra d u a te s  on  a c a s e -b y -c a s e  w a iv e r bas is .
^ E n lis te d  u n d e r s ta n d a rd s  se p a ra te  fro m  b o th  h ig h  s c h o o l d ip lo m a  g ra d u a te s  a nd  n o n g ra d  
u a te s  b u t re p o rte d  as n o n -h ig h  s c h o o l g ra du a te s .
c E n lis te d  as h ig h  s c h o o l d ip lo m a  g ra d u a te s  p ro v id e d  th a t th e  d ip lo m a  w a s  a w a rd e d  o r 
a u th o r iz e d  by the  state.
^ E n lis te d  as h ig h  s c h o o l d ip lo m a  g ra d u a te s  p ro v id e d  th a t th e  p ro g ra m  is re c o g n iz e d  by the  
state .
e O n ly  in d iv id u a ls  a c c e s s e d  as p a rt o f te s t p ro g ra m s  (to  d e te rm in e  s u c c e s s  ra tes  o f a d u lt  h igh  
s c h o o l p ro g ra m s ) a re  e n lis te d  as h ig h  s c h o o l d ip lo m a  g ra d u a te s , a ll o th e rs  a re  e n lis te d  as n o n - 
h ig h  s c h o o l g ra du a te s .
^E nlis ted  as h ig h  s c h o o l d ip lo m a  g ra d u a te s  p ro v id e d  th a t th e  d ip lo m a  w a s  n o t issu ed  as a 
re s u lt o f th e  G E D  tes t on ly .
^ E n lis te d  a s  h ig h  s c h o o l d ip lo m a  g ra d u a te s  p ro v id e d  th a t th e  c o u rs e /p ro g ra m  is a c c re d ite d  by 
th e  N a tio n a l H om e S tu d y  C o u n c il.
h E n lis te d  as h ig h  s c h o o l d ip lo m a  g ra d u a te s  p ro v id e d  th a t th e  s c h o o l is  a c c re d ite d  b y  th e  s ta te  
o r ju r is d ic t io n .
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SCREENING FO R SERVICE IN TH E YEARS A H EA D
Recognition of the consequences of personnel screening decisions in the 
Armed Forces—on the individual “life chances” of today’s youth as well as the 
nation’s own defense capabilities—has operated to place the military’s enlistment 
criteria under greater scrutiny than ever before. As the authors of one recent study 
observe:
Whether the standards used for enlistment, job  classifi 
cation, and assignment are as valid as adherence to them 
implies is an open question. While in many cases present 
standards are based on years of experience and are the 
products of extensive and rigorous research, in others they 
appear to be nothing more than legacies of the conscription 
era when there was virtually no pressure on the armed forces 
to justify their manning criteria.32
Congress has strongly urged the Department of Defense and the Military 
Services to develop a solid empirical and analytical foundation for enlistment 
standards presently in use.33 Indeed, major efforts are currently underway to 
validate existing standards and to expand the selection and classification measures 
applied by the military (particularly aptitude test scores). Research is also in 
progress now to include several additional predictors—such as various high school 
credentials, supplementary test scores, high school academic records, and attend 
ance and behavioral records—in an effort to refine further the recruit screening 
process.
The most extensive, and potentially most rewarding, research project in this 
area is a joint effort by the Department of Defense and the Military Services to link 
enlistment standards directly to job performance on a large scale. As the 
Department of Defense notes in a report to Congress, “the methodology and 
technology used by the Services to measure the suitability of applicants for military 
services have changed little over several decades”:
The primary source of aptitude information has been 
paper-and-pencil tests which in turn have been validated 
against training success. While job performance has always
3!Binkin and Eitelberg, Blacks and (he Military, p. 155.
33Department of Defense, Department o f Defense Efforts to Develop Quality Standards fo r Enlistment, Report 
to the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], December 1981), p. 1.
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been considered the “ultimate” basis upon which to validate 
tests used to screen military applicants, the state-of-the-art in 
job performance measurement has not been adequate to 
permit evaluation of on-the-job performance and use of this 
information to conduct validation studies.34
Pilot studies conducted by the Services suggest that the further development of 
job performance measures is now feasible. The major research undertaking is 
scheduled to continue for up to five years. And, although some technical problems 
are yet to be worked out, the overall outlook is promising: “The preliminary data 
suggest that, if job performance measures can be developed, future attempts to link 
enlistment standards to the resultant job performance information may yield 
significant improvements in DoD’s ability to enlist and classify individuals in jobs 
for which they are optimally suited.”35
The military’s changing needs and progressive views of what constitutes an 
effective force have variously affected the history of aptitude and education 
standards over the past several decades. Basic tests of literacy have given way to 
combinations of interrelated aptitude and education requirements covering a range 
of individual attributes and abilities. At the same time, screening for military service 
has remained a flexible and adaptable process that fits the unique demands of 
recruitment within each of the Armed Services during any particular period. In the 
past, the exigencies of war have often forced the military’s qualitative barriers to be 
lowered. Now, over ten years after the nation’s last major armed conflict, the 
Services find themselves placing a rapidly expanding emphasis and importance on 
the intellectual capabilities of new recruits.
Throughout the evolution of screening for military service, the process has 
been able to cope sufficiently with the distinct circumstances and demands of the 
military. Yet, the flow of prospective recruits and the quality of new enlistees has 
characteristically fluctuated both in terms of quantity and quality. And, as the data 
on recruiting outcomes suggest, the qualitative profile of each new batch of enlistees 
from one year to the next is not entirely a function of efficient military 
management. Recruiting outcomes (except at the lower levels of “quality”) bear 
little relationship to the modifications in selection criteria.
D̂epartment of Defense, First Annual Report to the Congress on Joint-Service Efforts to Link Standards for  
Enlistment to On-the-Job Performance. A Report to the House Committee on Appropriations (Washington, D.C.: 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], December 1982), p. 2.
35Ibid., p. 111. See also Department of Defense Conference on Joint-Service Efforts to Link Enlistment 
Standards and Job Performance (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, 
Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], 28-29 September 1983).
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Screening for service can help to produce a solid and proficient military force 
by taking the best cut of the available crop of applicants each year and then 
matching them with the most suitable job. Current and planned research for 
improving or refining the screening process should help the scientific and 
policymaking community mitigate many of the problems mentioned here. After 
more than 10 years with the All-Volunteer Force, the Armed Services have 
accumulated enough experiential information—often obtained through trial and 
error—to approach more effectively the manpower troubles and recruiting 
difficulties that undoubtedly lie ahead. Now, the military stands at the edge of a 
new age, when the strength of its forces and effectiveness of its weapons are 
increasingly influenced by the education and aptitudes of its personnel. If all 
volunteer recruitment is to survive the next decade, it must learn how to pull, even 
harder, and pick, even better, the capable and the qualified from the young 
population. The latest efforts by the military to remedy a time-worn system for 
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CHRONOLOGY OF APTITUDE STANDARDS FOR 
INDUCTION AND ENLISTMENT OF MALES 
(ARMY, NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AIR FORCE)

Table A -l
MINIMUM APTITUDE STANDARDS FOR INDUCTION
INTO THE MILITARY FROM 1940 to 1973
Effective Period Minimum Aptitude Standards
Oct. 1940 - May 1941 Ability to comprehend simple orders given in the
English language.
May 1941 - July 1942 Ability to read and write the English language as
commonly prescribed for the fourth grade in gram 
mar school.
Aug. 1942 - Oct. 1942 Ten percent quota of illiterates (i.e., those who did
not meet the fourth grade requirement), later 
reduced to 5 percent.
Oct. 1942 - May 1943 Standard score of 90 on R-1 test (equivalent to a
percentile score of 31 on the Armed Forces Qualifi 
cation Test [AFQT] for induction of limited service 
(physically restricted) personnel.
June 1943 - Oct. 1945 Mental capacity above the lower 3 /5  Grade V on
Army General Classification test (AGCT).
Nov. 1945 - Oct. 1948 No inductions.
Nov. 1948 - Jan. 1949 Standard score >  70 on R-5, R-6.
Feb. 1949 - Aug. 1950 No inductions.
Aug. 1950 - Nov. 1950 Standard score >  70 on R-5, R-6.
Nov. 1950 - June 1951 Percentile (“converted”) score of 13 on AFQT-1,-2
(equivalent to a standard score of 70 on R-5, R-6).
June 1951 - Aug. 1958 Percentile score of 10 on AFQT-1, -2 until 1956,
then AFQT-3, -4 (equivalent to a standard score of 




Aug. 1958 - April 1963
May 1963 • Oct. 1965
Nov. 1965 • March 1966
April 1966 • Sept. 1966 
Oct. 1966 • Nov. 1966 
Dec. 1966 - June 1972
Percentile score of 31 on AFQT-5, -6; or AFQT 10- 
30 and standard scores of >  90 in two or more 
aptitude areas of the Army Classification Battery 
(ACB).
Percentile Score of 31 on AFQT-7, -8 or AFQT 10-30 
and General Technical (GT) score >  80 and stand 
ard scores of >  90 in two or more additional 
aptitude areas of the Army Qualification Battery 
(AQB).
Education Differential Introduced
(a) High School Graduate (HSG) with AFQT be 
tween 16-20 fully qualified; or HSG with AFQT 10-15 
and GT >  80 and standard scores of >  90 in two 
additional AQB aptitude areas, (b) Non-high school 
graduate (NHSG) with AFQT 31; or NHSG with 
AFQT 10-30 and GT >  80 and standard scores of >  
90 in two additional AQB aptitude areas.
Eliminated GT requirement for NHSG within the 
AFQT 21-30 range (see [b] above— Nov. 1965- 
March 1966).
Eliminated GT requirement for HSG within the AFQT 
10-15 range (See [a] above— Nov. 1965-March 
1966).
(a) HSG with AFQT 10 (i.e., no AQB requirements for 
HSG). Ail HSG in mental category IV were con 
sidered mentally qualified, (b) NHSG with AFQT 31; 
or NHSG with AFQT 16-30 and a standard score of 
>  90 in one AQB aptitude area; or NHSG with AFQT 




July 1972 - Dec. 1972* (a) HSG with AFQT 31; or HSG with AFQT 21-30
and a standard score of >  90 in one AQB aptitude 
area; or HSG with AFQT 16-20 and standard scores 
of >  90 in two AQB aptitude areas; or HSG with 
AFQT 10-15 and GT >  80 and standard scores of >  
90 in two additional AQB aptitude areas, (b) NHSG 
with AFQT 21-30 and standard score of >  90 in one 
AQB aptitude area; or NHSG with AFQT 16-20 and 
GT >  80 and standard scores of >  90 in two 
additional AQB aptitude areas.
*The last Selective Service draft call was issued in December 1972. The last induction (under 
previous draft calls) occurred in June 1973.
NOTE: This table was reviewed by the Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Personnel (DAPE-MPA-CS), 23 May 1983.
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Table A-2
MINIMUM APTITUDE STANDARDS FOR ENLISTMENT OF
MALES (WITHOUT PRIOR SERVICE) INTO THE ARMY FROM
1946 to 1983
Effective Period Minimum Aptitude Standards
April 1946 - April 1947 Standard score of 70 on R-1, R-2 or R-3/R-4.
April 1947 - July 1948 Standard score of 80 on R-1, R-2 or R-3/R-4.
July 1948 - Nov. 1948 Standard score of 80 on R-5, R-6.
Nov. 1948 - Dec. 1948 Standard score of 70 on R-5, R-6.
Jan. 1950 - July 1950 Percentile score of 31 on Armed Forces Qualifi 
cation Test (AFQT) 1,2 (equivalent to a standard 
score of 90).
July 1950 - June 1951 Percentile score of 13 on AFQT (equivalent to a
standard score of 70).
June 1951 - Dec. 1955 Percentile score of 10 on AFQT (equivalent to a
standard score of 65).
Jan. 1956 - June 1957 Percentile score of 10 for 2-year enlistments; AFQT
21 for over 2-year enlistments.
July 1957 - July 1958 Percentile score of 31 on AFQT.
Aug. 1958 - Dec. 1958 Percentile score of 31 on AFQT or AFQT 21 and
standard scores of >  90 in two or more aptitude
areas of Army Classification Battery (ACB).
Jan. 1959 - May 1962 Percentile score of 31 on AFQT.
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Table A-2 (Continued)
June 1962 - Oct. 1965
Nov. 1965 - March 1966
A priM 966-Jan. 1967 
Sept. 1967 - Feb. 1968
March 1968 - June 1971
June 1971 - Oct. 1971
Education Differential Introduced
(a) High School Graduate (HSG) with AFQT 31 fully 
qualified; or HSG with AFQT 21-30 and standard 
scores of >  90 in three Army Qualification Battery 
(AQB) aptitude areas; (b) Non-High School Grad 
uate (NHSG) with AFQT 31.
(a) HSG with AFQT 16 fully qualified, (b) NHSG with 
AFQT 31; or NHSG with AFQT 16-30 and General 
Technical (GT) score >  80 and standard scores of 
90 in two additional AQB aptitude areas.
(a) HSG with AFQT 16 fully qualified; (b) NHSG with 
AFQT 31; or NHSG with AFQT 16-30 and standard 
scores of >  90 in two AQB aptitude areas.
(a) HSG with AFQT 10; (b) NHSG with AFQT 31; or 
NHSG with AFQT 16-30 and a standard score of >  
90 in one AQB aptitude area; or NHSG with AFQT 
10-15 and standard scores of >  90 in two AQB 
aptitude areas.
(a) HSG with AFQT 16 fully qualified; (b) NHSG with 
AFQT 31; or NHSG with AFQT 16-30 and standard 
scores of >  90 in two AQB areas.
Above two-year enlistments:
(a) HSG with AFQT 16 fully qualified; (b) NHSG with 
AFQT 31; or NHSG with AFQT 21-30 and standard 
score of >  90 in one AQB aptitude area; or NHSG 
with AFQT 16-20 and standard scores of >  90 in two 
AQB aptitude areas.
Two-year enlistments:
(a) HSG with AFQT 10; (b) NHSG with AFQT 16 and 
a standard score of >  90 in one AQB aptitude area; 
or NHSG with AFQT 10-15 and standard scores of >  
90 in two AQB aptitude areas.
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Table A-2 (Continued)
Nov. 1971 - March 1972
March 1972 - July 1974
Aug. 1974 - July 1976
July 1976
Change with respect to NHSG requiring, in addition 
to standard scores of >  90 in two AQB aptitude 
areas, a standard score >  80 on GT for NHSG with 
AFQT 16-20 enlisting for longer than two years.
Above two-year enlistments:
(a) HSG with AFQT 31 fully qualified; or HSG with 
AFQT 21-30 and a standard score of >  90 in one 
AQB/ACB-73 aptitude area; or HSG with AFQT 16- 
20 and standard scores of >  90 in two AQB/ACB-73 
aptitude areas; (b) NHSG with AFQT 31; or NHSG 
with AFQT 21-30 and a standard score of >  90 in 
one AQB/ACB-73 aptitude area.
Two-year enlistments:
(a) HSG with AFQT 10 and GT >  80 and standard 
scores of >  90 in two additional AQB/ACB-73 
aptitude areas; (b) NHSG with AFQT 10 and GT >  
80 and standard scores of >  90 in two additional 
AQB/ACB-73 aptitude areas.
(a) HSG or General Educational Development (GED) 
high school equivalency with AFQT 16-30 and a 
standard score >  90 in one ACB-73 aptitude area;
(b) NHSG with AFQT 31 and standard scores >  90 
in two ACQ/ACB-73 aptitude areas.
Age Differential Introduced 
Age 17:
(a) HSG with AFQT 16; (b) GED and NHSG with 
AFQT 31. Aptitude requirements remain the same.
Age 18 and above:
(a) HSG and GED with AFQT 16; (b) NHSG with 
AFQT 31. Aptitude requirements remain the same.
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Table A-2 (Continued)
Nov. 1977 - March 1979
April 1979 - Feb. 1980
Feb. 1980 -Sept. 1980
Oct. 1980 - Nov. 1980
Dec. 1980 - Present
Requirements raised with respect to GED and 
NHSG, requiring an AFQT of 50 for 17 year old 
GEDs and NHSGs. For 18 year olds and above, the 
requirement for GEDs was also raised to AFQT 21.
(a) High School Diploma Graduate (HSDG) with 
AFQT 31 and a standard score of >  90 in one Armed 
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) apti 
tude area or HSDG with AFQT 16-30 and standard 
scores of >  90 in two ASVAB aptitude areas; (b) 
GED with AFQT 31 and a standard score of >  90 in 
one ASVAB aptitude area; (c) NHSG with AFQT 31 
and standard scores of >  90 in two ASVAB aptitude 
areas. (GT scores not used to qualify for enlistment.) 
NHSGs below 18 years old must score >  62 on the 
Military Applicant Profile [MAP].
Change with respect to 17 year old NHSGs, requir 
ing a score of >  50 on MAP.
MAP qualifying score for 17 year old and NHSG 
changed back to >  62. ASVAB aptitude minimum 
qualifying scores >  85 if tested with ASVAB 8, 9, 10 
and >  90 if tested before Oct. 1980 with ASVAB 6 
and 7. All other standards remained the same.
(a) HSDG with AFQT 16 and a standard score of >  
85 in one ASVAB aptitude area; (b) GED with AFQT 
31 and a standard score of >  85 in one ASVAB 
aptitude area; (c) NHSG with AFQT 31 and standard 
scores of >  85 in two ASVAB aptitude areas.
NOTE: This table was reviewed by the Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Personnel (DAPE-MPA-CS), 23 May 1983.
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Table A-3
MINIMUM APTITUDE STANDARDS FOR ENLISTMENT OF
MALES (WITHOUT PRIOR SERVICE) INTO THE NAVY
FROM 1951 to 1983
Effective Period 
July 1951 - Nov. 1951
Dec. 1951 - April 1957 
May 1957 - Aug. 1957 
Sept. 1957 - Oct. 1957 
Nov. 1957 -June 1961 
July 1961 - March 1962 
April 1962 - Oct. 1965
Minimum Aptitude Standards
Percentile score of 16 on Armed Forces Qualifi 
cation Test (AFQT).
Percentile score of 10 on AFQT.
Percentile score of 21 on AFQT.
Percentile score Of 31 on AFQT.
Percentile score of 21 on AFQT.
Percentile score of 15 on AFQT.
Percentile score of 21 on AFQT.
Nov. 1965 - Dec. 1966 Education Differential Introduced
Jan .1967 - Feb. 1972
(a) High School Graduate (HSG) with AFQT 16; (b) 
Non-High School Graduate (NHSG) with AFQT 31, 
or NHSG with AFQT 16-30 and General Technical 
(GT) >80 and standard scores of >  90 in two 
additional Army Qualification Battery (AQB) aptitude 
areas.
(a) HSG with AFQT 10; (b) NHSG with AFQT 31, or 
NHSG with AFQT 16-30 and a standard score of >  
90 in one AQB aptitude area; or NHSG with AFQT 
10-15 and standard scores of >  90 in two AQB 
aptitude areas.
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Feb. 1972 - April 1972 Age Differential Introduced
Table A-3 (Continued)
April 1972 - Oct. 1972
Oct. 1972 - Dec. 1972 
Jan. 1973 - Dec. 1975
Jan. 1976
Percentile score of 21 on AFQT. 17-year-olds must 
be high school diploma graduates (HSDG). Persons 
18 and over must be HSG or have an Odds for 
Effectiveness (OFE) score of 69. OFE was designed 
to provide success probabilities of an applicant for 
enlistment based on aptitude score, number of years 
of school completed, number of expulsions/suspen 
sions from school and number of non-traffic arrests.
Percentile score of 21 on AFQT, or AFQT 10-20 and 
a standard score of >  37 on General Classification 
Test (GCT) of Short Basic Test Battery (SBTB). 17- 
year-old NHSGs were acceptable. OFE minimums 
were cancelled.
(a) HSDG with AFQT 21; (b) General Educational 
Development (GED) high school equivalency with 
AFQT 31; (c) NHSG with AFQT 31.
New OFE tables established from SBTB. While 
waiver policy fluctuated, generally the OFE mini 
mum score was >  69. During this period SBTB 
served as the Navy’s entrance test and minimum 
standards were expressed in terms of standard 
score requirements as follows: (a) HSDG with a 
combined standard score on GCT + ARI + MECH >  
125. (b) GED with GCT + ARI + MECH >  134. (c) 
NHSG with GCT + ARI + MECH >  134.
Standards remained the same but ASVAB became 
the sole entrance test.
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Table A-3 (Continued)
Oct. 1976 SCREEN (Success Chances for Recruits Entering
the Navy) was developed, replacing OFE. SCREEN 
considers factors such as: educational attainment, 
age, AFQT scores, and dependency status in esti 
mating the chances that an applicant will effectively 
complete the first year of service. The minimum 
SCREEN score was set at >  70.*
Sept. 1979 - Aug. 1980 (a) HSDG with AFQT 21; (b) GED with AFQT 31; (c)
NHSG with AFQT 49. SCREEN >  70.
Sept. 1980 - Present (a) HSDG with AFQT 17; (b) GED with AFQT 31; (c)
NHSG with AFQT 38. SCREEN score >  70. SCREEN 
was revised to delete “dependency status” as a 
factor for estimating the chances that an applicant 
will effectively complete the first year of service.
NOTE: This table was reviewed by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations (Memo OP-135L/13L/0420:pak), 13 May 1983.
‘ According to SCREEN, for example, a 17-year-old applicant having an AFQT score of 35-49 
with no dependents and more than 12 years of schooling would be assigned a SCREEN score of 86 
(i.e., an 86 percent chance of successfully completing the first year of Service). With other factors 
held constant, if the applicant has 12 years of schooling, the SCREEN score would be 81; with 11 
years of schooling, the SCREEN score would be 66. Waiver policy has varied with SCREEN as with 




M INIMUM APTITUDE STANDARDS FOR ENLISTMENT OF
MALES (WITHOUT PRIOR SERVICE) INTO THE
MARINE CORPS FROM 1951 to 1983
Effective Period Minimum Aptitude Standards
July 1951 - March 1956 Percentile score of 10 on Armed Forces Qualifi 
cation Test (AFQT).
ApriM 956 • June 1957 Percentile score of 21 on AFQT.
July 1957 - Nov. 1958 Percentile score of 25 on AFQT.
Dec. 1958 - Dec. 1959 Percentile score of 28 on AFQT.
Jan. 1960 - May 1962 Percentile score of 25 on AFQT.
June 1962 - July 1965 AFQT 31; or AFQT 21 and standard scores of >  90
in three Army Qualification Battery (AQB) apti 
tude areas.
Aug. 1965 - Oct. 1965 AFQT 31; or AFQT 21 and General Technical (GT) >
80 and standard scores of >  90 in two additional 
AQB aptitude areas.
Nov. 1965 - Dec. 1966 Education Differential Introduced.
(a) High School Graduate (HSG) with AFQT 10; (b) 
Non-High School Graduate (NHSG) with AFQT 31; 
or NHSG with AFQT 16-30 and GT >  80 and 
standard scores of >  90 in two additional AQB 
aptitude areas.
Jan. 1967 - June 1971 (a) HSG with AFQT 10; (b) NHSG with AFQT 31; or
NHSG with AFQT 16-30 and a standard score of >  
90 in one AQB aptitude area; or NHSG with AFQT 
10-15 and standard scores of >  90 in two AQB 
aptitude areas.
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Table A-4 (Continued) 
July 1971 - Jan. 1972
Feb. 1972 -Jan. 1973
Feb. 1973 - March 1973 
April 1973 - Aug. 1973
Aug. 1973 - Sept. 1973 
Sept. 1973 - Oct. 1973
Oct. 1973 - Dec. 1973 
Dec. 1973 - Aug. 1974
(a) HSG with AFQT 10; (b) NHSG with AFQT 16 and 
a standard score of >  90 in one AQB aptitude area; 
or NHSG with AFQT 10 and standard scores of >  90 
in two AQB aptitude areas. All applicants with AFQT 
10-15 must have an Odds for Effectiveness (OFE) 
standard score of >  50. In addition, 17 year olds 
must be HSG or have AFQT >  50.
(a) HSG with AFQT 21 and a standard score of >  90 
in one AQB aptitude area; or HSG with AFQT 10-20 
and GT >  80 and standard scores of >  90 in two 
AQB aptitude areas; (b) NHSG with AFQT 21 and a 
standard score of >  90 in one AQB aptitude area. 
The OFE requirements and the requirements for 17 
year-olds remained the same.
AFQT Category IV acceptable only for 2-year enlist 
ments.
Percentile score of 21 on AFQT. All accessions 
within the AFQT ranges of 21-30 and 31-49 were 
required to have a GT >  80 and standard scores of 
>  90 in two additional ASVAB-3 aptitude areas.
GT and aptitude area requirements were dropped 
for HSG within the AFQT range of 31-49.
17-year-old NHSGs were acceptable within the 
AFQT range of 40-49 provided they had a GT >  80 
and standard scores of >  90 in two additional 
ASVAB-3 aptitude areas. NHSG with AFQT >  50 
had no additional requirements.
A standard score of 80 on Skilled Technical (ST) 
subtest of ACB-73 was acceptable in lieu of GT.
The requirement of a standard score >  80 on ST or 
GT was dropped for NHSG within the AFQT 31-49 
range; for all HSG accessions within the AFQT 21- 




A ug.1974 - Feb. 1975
Feb. 1975- March 1975 
March 1975 -Aug. 1975
Aug. 1975 - Jan. 1976
Jan. 1976 - Oct. 1981
Oct. 1981 - May 1982 
May 1982-O ct. 1982 
Nov. 1982 - Present
The requirement for 2 aptitude areas >  90 for 18 
year old and older NHSGs scoring AFQT 31-49 was 
removed.
AFQT 21 and GT >  95 for all applicants.
(a) HSG with AFQT 31 and GT >  90; (b) NHSG with 
AFQT 31 and GT >  95.
(a) HSG with AFQT 21 and GT >  90; (b) NHSG with 
AFQT 31 and GT >  95.
(a) High school diploma graduates (HSDG) with 
AFQT 21 and GT >  80; (b) NHSG with AFQT 21 and 
GT >  95.
(a) HSDG with AFQT 21 and GT >  80; (b) NHSG 
with AFQT 31 and GT >  95.
(a) HSDG with AFQT 21 and GT >  80; (b) NHSG 
with AFQT 31 and GT >  100.
(a) HSDG with AFQT 21 and GT >  80; (b) NHSG 
with AFQT 31 and GT >  105.
NOTE: This table was reviewed by the Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States 
Marine Corps (MPI-20:clk 1200), May 1983.
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Table A-5
MINIMUM APTITUDE STANDARDS FOR ENLISTMENT OF
MALES (WITHOUT PRIOR SERVICE) INTO THE
AIR FORCE FROM 1946 to 1983
Effective Period Minimum Aptitude Standards
April 1946 • March 1947 Standard score >  70 on R-1 (Raw score of 15).
March 1947 - Sept. 1949 Standard score >  90 on R-3/R-4, R-5/R-6.
Oct. 1949 - Dec. 1949 Standard score >  100 on R-5/R-6.
Jan. 1950 - May 1950 Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) >  49.
May 1950 - June 1950 Percentile score of 31 on AFQT.
June 1950 - July 1950 (a) High school graduates (HSG) with AFQT 31; (b)
Non-High School Graduate (NHSG) with AFQT 49.*
July 1950 - Nov. 1950 (a) HSG with AFQT 21; (b) NHSG with AFQT 31.*
Nov. 1950 - April 1951 Percentile score of 21 on AFQT.
May 1951 - Aug. 1951 Percentile score of 13 on AFQT.
Aug. 1951 - March 1958 Percentile score of 10 on AFQT.
April 1958 - Feb. 1961 Percentile score of 10 on AFQT and a standard
score of >  40 on any one of the following Airman’s 
Qualifying Examination (AQE) aptitude areas: 
Mechanical (M), Administrative (A), General (G), or 
Electronics (E). It should be noted that each apti 
tude area had certain career fields that required 
higher (i.e., 60 or 80) scores if applying to those 
specialties.
•Although other sources report that education differentials were introduced into the Air Force 
in 1961, a “temporary change” directive—TWX, AFPTP-2, 43066, 20 June 1950 (AFR 39-9, 15 April 
1949)— indicates that these standards existed during most of 1950.
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Table A-5 (Continued)
Feb. 1961 - July 1961 “Dual 25” minimum entry requirement established.
While the AFQT requirements remained the same as 
above, AQE requirements could be satisfied by a 
standard score of 25 in each of two of the four 
aptitude areas (i.e., M, A, G, E) or a score of 40 in 
any one area.
Education Differential Introduced*
Aug. 1961 - Dec. 1961 (a) HSG with AFQT 26; (b) NHSG with AFQT 31. The
AQE requirements remained the same as speci 
fied above.
Jan. 1962 - Sept. 1966 The minimum AFQT score was lowered for HSG
from AFQT 26 to AFQT 21. All other standards 
remained the same.
Oct. 1966 - March 1967** Under Project 100,000 guidelines the standards
were as follows: all applicants with AFQT 21.
April 1967 - Sept. 1967** Percentile score of 10 on AFQT.
Oct. 1967 - May 1972** (a) HSG with AFQT 21 or HSG with AFQT 10-20 and
a standard score of 25 in two aptitude areas or a 
score of 40 in any one area (i.e., M, A, G, E). (b) 
NHSG with AFQT 31 or NHSG with AFQT 10-30 and 
a standard score of 25 in two aptitude areas or a 
score of 40 in any one area (i.e., M, A, G, E).
May 1972 - June 1973 (a) HSG with AFQT 21 and a standard score of >  40
on either M, A, G, or E; (b) NHSG with AFQT 31 and 
a standard score of >  40 on G and a standard score 
of >  40 on either M, A, or E.
June 1973 - Jan. 1975 The minimum AFQT requirement was raised for
NHSG from AFQT 31 to AFQT 65. No other changes 
in minimum aptitude requirements.
**These standards were in effect under the DoD Project 100,000 program, implemented on 1 
October 1966. Under this program the intake of AFQT Category IV personnel was increased by 
lowering minimum aptitude requirements.
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Jan. 1975 - March 1975 (a) HSG with AFQT 21; (b) NHSG with AFQT 65. All
applicants must have a combined standard score of 
> 1 7 0  across M, A, G, E with a minimum standard 
score of >  45 on G.
March 1975 - Sept. 1980 DoD modified the definition of HSDG to exclude
non-state certified GED applicants. Such applicants 
must meet the same qualifications as NHSG. No 
other changes in minimum aptitude standards.
Oct. 1980-Nov. 1980
Dec. 1980 - Present
(a) High School Diploma Graduate (HSDG) with 
AFQT 21, and G >  30, and combined M, A, G, E >  
170; (b) GED with AFQT 50, G >  30 and combined 
M, A, G, E >  170; (c) NHSG with AFQT 65, G >  30 
and combined M, A, G, E >  170.
Combined M, A, G, E score minimum was lowered 
to 120 for all applicants. All other standards re 
mained the same.
NOTE: This table was reviewed by the Department of the Air Force, Headquarters United States 
Air Force (MPXOA), 10 May 1983.
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Comparison of the Percentage Distributions of Male 




Category I Category II Category III Category IV
Enlistee Draftee Enlistee Draftee Enlistee Draftaa Enllttaa Dratteeb
1955 7.1 10.9 24.9 27.7 44.7 31.2 23.3 30.2
56 7.1 9.4 26.1 26.8 46.7 32.0 20.1 31.8
57 8.5 8.2 25.7 23.5 49.2 32.9 16.6 35.4
58 9.6 7.8 28.4 20.2 57.6 32.5 4.4 39.5
59 8.5 9.1 25.7 22.8 55.4 37.3 10.4 30.8
1960 8.4 7.9 27.4 20.7 64.2 36.6 0.0 34.8
61 5.7 6.8 31.0 21.0 63.3 35.7 0.0 36.5
62 6.6 5.1 33.8 22.5 58.6 33.9 1.0 38.5
63 5.5 4.5 30.9 20.7 56.9 31.9 6.7 42.9
64 6.4 5.2 31.6 25.5 54.8 40.4 7.2 28.9
1965 5.1 4.5 29.1 24.3 58.3 40.9 7.5 30.3
66 8.1 4.3 33.5 25.9 41.7 42.9 16.7 26.9
67 7.3 5.0 31.3 26.8 37.6 40.3 23.8 27.9
68 6.9 4.6 30.1 25.7 38.8 39.5 24.2 30.2
69 6.3 5.9 28.9 27.9 37.5 38.6 27.3 27.6
1970 5.1 5.2 28.0 28.0 43.1 39.4 23.8 27.4
71 4.5 5.6 26.8 28.4 45.9 38.5 22.8 27.5
72 3.9 4.7 28.5 27.5 50.2 40.6 17.4 27.2
--------------- — ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE TRANSITION— ---------
73 3.2 4.6 26.8 30.6 53.3 45.1 16.7 19.7
74 1.9 22.8 55.8 19.5 . .
1975 3.5 25.4 57.9 - - 9.9 —
76 3.4 25.6 54.8 . . 16.0 —
77 2.4 18.0 38.3 — 39.8 - -
78 2.3 18.8 39.4 — 38.8 —
79 1.8 14.9 36.9 — 46.3 —
1980 1.6 13.8 34.8 — 49.7 —
81 2.2 21.5 45.1 — 31.2 —
82 3.0 29.0 48.6 — 19.4 —
83 3.4 32.1 50.8 - - 13.7 -
Source: S ta tistics for FY 1955-74 were derived  from  data appearing  in Departm ent of Defense. 
Q ualita tive  D is tr ibu tion  o f M ilita ry  M anpower. DD-M P&R (M )344 (W ashington. D C Departm ent of the 
Arm y O ffice  o f Personnel Operations). 19 55- 74  S ta tistics for FY 1975-83 were prov ided  by the 
Defense M anpow er Data Center
aAFQT ca tegory d is tribu tion  fo r FY 1976 does not in c lu de  the transition  quarte r (July through  
September)
^D raftees who failed the aptitude test but w ho were declared adm inistrative ly accep tab le  (on the 
basis of personal in terview s and som e additiona l aptitude testing) are inc luded  in AFQT Category IV.
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U.S. Bureau of Census Classification of States 
by Region and Division
Region Division and States
NORTHEAST NEW ENGLAND MIDDLE ATLANTIC
Maine New York













SOUTH SOUTH ATLANTIC EAST SOUTH CENTRAL
Delaware Kentucky
Maryland Tennessee
District ol Columbia Alabama
Virginia Mississippi
West Virginia














OTHER Outlying Areas; Bordering Nations; and Countries,
Dependencies, and Areas ol Special Sovereignty
Mexico Mariana Islands
American Samoa Marshall Islands
Canal Zone Puerto Rico
Caroline Islands Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands
Cook Islands U.S. Miscellaneous Pacific Islands





QUALIFICATION FOR ENLISTMENT IN THE NAVY 
































c  .U  
c
O  QJ£  I. co
>  V
if O  OC






























Q -O — c
■c 12Ol J
I  o
?  T> 








CO CO TT 10(0 0 
CM CM in
O  CM O
f i  oi id
oi n  cm 
co t -  in
s  m  n
CO CM CO 
in m in
co o> CM
lO 9  o
CO CO s
T- O) TT
' o   § E -s  £  •  o
£  2  IL  h
CO IO V  
CM N O V S  CM
(O S  IO
in v  oi 0 0)0) co cm in
o> o  o  co 
co in
a>
w —.2} c rem r  t r
0 o01 <£2 ™ 
2 P
CL 3
£  (0 5>
0)  ̂ 0)
«/> OJ _
c  c . ra .0) — r  ,
73 z0) o ra c3 ®o n 
m P
 ̂ N  c « ™E - ® S - a<  n  ® co c i
S  a> £ I  6  S i
„  .c d ® §  £  ;
J ; : ' ! - '
•5 O -  E -  *  1(t T3 ? O J  J I3 oi c n £ u 'rr </> ® _ <fl I
?  3 E c O O. !
o £ -  =  S
a I^  'T 3Q .ro
C ro _
£ %












•c  0) 
E
o  2 
o














>» c£  TO
c  a .0) 3
I  2
(A O
C  .2  
UJ c  
-  £  






























■C 'S .?  2 
Z u
|! . ?  T3
I  2 
i  v
| o
1 3 *• o
nI O
So
c ?  • =O '■=
co s  in 9) (O (O s  n  t -
(N N Ol N (O CO r  M Ifl
O O S 
in oo ^
9  r  n
■O W £






" 5 o2 u. »-
r  N CO N N V
o  n - r*.
; S su
i O -n E




c <« cE £ a>< % »
oi E 5
i= </> <d o  3 u ; ui
2 £ =
1 Ol >- o»- 0> u
I a> £  £
I £  °  *
, _ i / )  a. 
o Q- <2
o ^  
i i ;  o i o
L — (j </>













at c  > at
*  c
« S





















co k  •  o 3 ^n «
S 5
in m









*  _00 .
N'Sin 10
3f*5 I s
s's S ” S ’
CX Ol (Xs *
8T ►*
CO so« 5





















C'S • S'S S'S 8 5 40 ^in 8  8
• Ol 









ft's O £ 8 8 2 “ 3  « 0*2 S'S o
40 in cx 40 in
c - 2 * ? S ': s » 5cx . © T 2  « n _ o . CO•
«  * 8 * 8 « 5CX S'S
of £(O M  *2cx S'S
• o 














i  (? 
«J c■O 4) 







O * - C O <
- = -o I 5 ®* ® c
2 3 *
® — mU ® <D$ <-> O)</) » -
•  o <"' - o c *
L m f, Ol at
11 sS a 3
O r- i-
I I ?
s ot 2 2 «E oo  CD3 Ol
i ® r .  
1 £  ® ? <
o  o  
: 2  -  o  r .o _  c. o
f a * ;
5 I f  * 2  a  EI <J 4) « m 
! 2  o . o
:  S O I  o
® = ot ,
Z °  3











* 1  
2 3
CO «





















































5 - <0 TJ
I I
$ 5
*  -. ?  21 o
* s
f i







S  00 2 «










i*> at n  oc
»  • 2®S "  8 K
• • ^ *
at r- K lbN k i  «
^  co <o to
2 »» X •X • 2 •
§-» »• S ‘




'■i i: i g i i s• e u: I 5 ! z ••
H i  5 2 5E «
3  •z  a.
1C U ME «
3  •z  a.
SS
E S3 •Z 0.
15 1 ,51
: E «  «  E S; 3 • = 3 •





*if S 2 <
*i  ̂* 
S ® >• 2 c n
1 e S2 S 5 
—. £ •§ 
£ 2 « 
IS®
c O S  <0 « 0) "5 *> T> =- « 3® H
s 5 S® = «;
I S i




I s i ;*  j  « '
* * I- £• - 
o S E  | 
e -  e
I ! 1 10 » I
I I I  
1 s
1 S 
M l2 o « a  >• c
* o *
|® s S
c O <3 «
il
U * 3c o  O *
5  jo 2  ?  o
I I *
®58o -o
I * I * f II F £ I
5 | F 8“ a wO « (0 V.5 M o» =
r  |  °  |  Ej £ 2 *• •*: o * ® oj C ® 9) O
? ® • ? s
i • i 5 I1 ® 5 I S!*"SE> * S I 3
170
Appendix E
QUALIFICATION FOR ENLISTMENT UNDER 
VARIOUS ALTERNATIVE OR “SIMULATED” 
STANDARDS

Detailed statistics on the number and percent of American youth who would 
be expected to qualify for enlistment under existing aptitude/education standards 
are presented in Section 3 of the report. This appendix presents qualification rates 
for population subgroups based on alternative or “simulated” standards. First, the 
effects of using alternative standards for persons with General Educational 
Development (GED) High School Equivalency Credentials are examined in Tables 
E-l through E-4. Second, the effects of eliminating the educational differential—by 
requiring all. youth to meet the aptitude standards currently established for either 
high school diploma graduates or for non-high school graduates—are explored in 
Tables E-5 through E -l2. The effects of instituting an across-the-board minimum 
AFQT of 50 are then examined in Table E-13. Finally, the impact of using 
equivalent aptitude requirements for males and females in the Marine Corps is 
investigated in Table E -l4. Some of the alternative aptitude standards analyzed 
here would be more stringent (e.g., applying universally the aptitude requirements 
for non-high school graduates), while others would be considered more lenient 
(e.g., using the minimum aptitude requirement for high school graduates as a 
standard for everyone).
This analysis demonstrates the consequences of selected changes in enlistment 
requirements on the quantity of the “eligible” manpower pool and upon subgroups 
within the pool. Examples of conditions that might encourage the use of more 
stringent standards include extended recruiting and retention success, a sizable 
decrease in strength requirements, increases in occupational requirements or 
technology, and Congressional influence. Reduced aptitude criteria might be 
instituted in an effort to increase the “eligible” manpower pool or to maintain 
strength in a decreasing market.
Persons with General Educational Development (GED) high school equiv 
alency credentials constitute approximately three percent of the overall youth 
population (ages 18-23) and six percent of military nonprior service accessions. 
Despite the relatively small size of this group (compared with high school diploma 
graduates and nongraduates), they constitute an important component of the 
military manpower pool. High school equivalency (or GED) is one of three 
education categories used by the Services when applying different aptitude 
standards for enlistment. Because of higher attrition rates, persons with GEDs (and 
non-high graduates) are required to achieve higher AFQT and ASVAB composite 
scores than diploma graduates. There seems to be a general lack of understanding 
outside the military as to why such education policies exist. While a GED 
credential may be the legal equivalent of a high school diploma, persons holding 
the former certainly do not, on the average, have equivalent performance records. 
In light of Congressional and national educational associations’ (i.e., American
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Council on Education) questioning of the current practice of applying such 
differential standards as well as Service recognition that GEDs are an important 
manpower resource, the impacts of eliminating higher requirements for GEDs are 
presented below.
Tables E-l through E-4 compare the proportion of GEDs and the total youth 
population eligible for enlistment in each Service under existing standards (1983 
for the Navy and the Marine Corps, and 1980-83 for the Army and the Air Force) 
with the corresponding proportion of GEDs j f  they were treated as either 
nongraduates or high school diploma graduates for enlistment purposes. It can be 
seen here that using these simulated standards for GEDs would not substantially 
alter the size of the total manpower pool. For example, if the nongraduate (i.e., 
more stringent) standards were used, the overall population eligible for the Navy 
and the Air Force would be reduced by only 0.3 percent and 0.6 percent, 
respectively.
Existing Marine Corps standards treat GEDs as non-high school graduates for 
enlistment purposes. As shown in Table E-l, Army standards functionally 
accomplish the same result. The Army, consequently, would not decrease its total 
eligible pool or GED pool by raising its standards in this fashion.
If the more lenient aptitude standards used for high school diploma graduates 
were also used for GEDs, the total eligible pool would increase by less than one 
percent (i.e., approximately 200,000 persons) in all Services except the Marine 
Corps, which would experience an increase of approximately 1.6 percent (see 
Table E-3). Thus, the size of the eligible manpower pool (total) would not be 
substantially altered by allowing persons with GEDs to enlist under the minimum 
aptitude standards for high school diploma graduates.
The effects of eliminating the differential aptitude standards applied to broad 
educational groups (e.g., high school diploma graduates, GEDs, and non-high 
school graduates) are analyzed for each Service in Tables E-5 through E -l2. When 
education differentials were eliminated and replaced by the lower minimum 
aptitude standards required for high school diploma graduates (Tables E-5, E-7, 
E-9, E-l 1), the total eligible pool increased variably in each of the Services: 5 
percent in the Army; 7 percent in the Navy; 7 percent in the Marine Corps; and 2 
percent in the Air Force.
While the percentage increase in the overall pool would be relatively small, 
the increase in the percentage of eligible non-high school graduates would be quite 
substantial. Over 50 percent of nongraduates would qualify for both the Army and 
the Navy under these simulated standards, as compared with between 25 and 30 
percent under the existing standards. Eliminating education differentials in the
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Marine Corps and the Air Force would also result in a sizable increase in the 
proportion of non-high school graduates eligible for enlistment in these Services— 
from just under 10 percent to approximately 30 percent.
If the more stringent non-high school graduate standards were used for all 
youth (Tables E-6, E-8, E-10, E-12), the Army would experience the smallest 
absolute decrease in its total eligible pool (approximately 8 percent or from 77 to 
69 percent eligible), while the Marine Corps would have the largest absolute 
decrease (31 percent). The rather large decrease in the Marine Corps could be 
accounted for primarily by the different (more stringent) standards for women. 
That is, since female nongraduates and GEDs are presently ineligible for enlistment 
in the Marine Corps, absolutely no women would be eligible if nongraduate 
standards were used for high school diploma graduates as well. Since the 
qualification rates for high school graduates are still much higher than those for 
nongraduates under these non-differentiated standards, a substantial percentage of 
graduates would be lost from the pool. The Air Force, for example, would lose 
approximately 32 percent of its pool of high school diploma graduates.
Table E-13 shows the population eligibility rates under a minimum standard 
of AFQT 50 for all persons. A percentile score of 50 on the AFQT represents the 
median of the World War II reference population. This particular standard was 
selected for analysis because the Services use this score as a dividing line of recruit 
“quality”. As can be deduced from Table E-13 (in conjunction with the 
information from previous tables), if persons with aptitude scores at or above 
AFQT 50 were eligible for enlistment, the Army and Navy would each lose 
approximately one quarter of the overall manpower pool eligible under existing 
standards. The Air Force would lose only 9 percent of its currently eligible pool, 
and the Marine Corps would lose about 5 percent. If propensity estimations and 
“quality mix” (to name just two of the important variables) were not considered in 
setting standards, it appears possible that the Air Force and Marine Corps could 
meet existing numerical requirements under such a standard. However, it should be 
pointed out, that, although the percentage of the overall pool would not decrease 
dramatically, the high school graduate group would be primarily affected—a group 
that also defines “quality” among recruits.
The simulations presented and discussed above involve the elimination of 
education differentials. In addition to using different sets of aptitude scores for 
various education groups, the Marine Corps presently requires higher minimum 
aptitude scores for females than for males. The effects of eliminating these sex 
differentials are shown in Table E-14. The Marine Corps standards (which also 
vary according to high school graduation status) for males in 1983 were applied in
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similar fashion for females. This “reduction” in standards would increase the 
female pool by approximately 25 percent and the overall pool by roughly 12 
percent. Most of the increase in the female pool would be within the GED and 
high school diploma graduate groups (10 and 14 percent, respectively) rather than 
among female nongraduates (5 percent).
While there are obviously many different scenarios under which enlistment 
standards might be adjusted, the simulations presented here would not, for the most 
part, alter the size of the manpower pool substantially. While some gains would 
occur in the pool under more lenient criteria, most of the added members would 
not be among the preferred high school diploma graduate group. That is, most of 
the gains would occur among GEDs and nongraduates—groups that have not 
performed as well (on average) as diploma graduates in the military. The answer to 
screening in subsets of the nongraduate group that perform well is not reduced 
aptitude requirements but rather alternative predictors such as a biographical 
and/or more detailed educational background information.
While more stringent criteria would increase the quality of personnel entering 
the Services, it would also restrict flexibility and perhaps result in strength 
shortfalls. Under current standards, the Services are afforded the opportunity of 
using higher cutting scores during favorable market conditions. The bottom line is 
that current minimum standards seem to be set at levels which still allow for much 
flexibility to meet changing market conditions and Congressional requirements, but 
without major sacrifices in personnel quality.
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